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New technologies are emerging as a key part of the struggles for social change. In Africa, social 
change activists are increasingly relying on mobile phones to organise and mobilise protests for 
social change and to protect citizens from violence. Zimbabwe has experienced a long history of 
human rights violations stretching from the times of Rhodesia to post-coalition years. The 
violations have been in various forms, including the use of physical force and the constriction of 
political, media and electoral spaces. Human Rights NGOs, as part of civil society, have 
challenged the state over the violations in various ways, including through traditional and new 
media channels. Using case studies, namely the Zimbabwe Peace Project, (ZPP), Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA, Zimbabwe) 
and the Election Resource Centre (ERC), the research investigates the potential of the mobile 
phone as a tool for contesting the constriction of media freedom, information access, freedom of 
expression and citizens’ right to human dignity, to life, political choice and free movement and 
association. 
 
The research is based on findings from interviews conducted between 2014 and 2016 with 
Zimbabwean human rights activists as well as from document analysis. The study established 
that the phone is a key tool through which NGOs and community activists (or volunteers) are 
offering protection to citizens by documenting, reporting and disseminating evidence of 
violence. It is also playing a significant role in legal interventions for victims of violence. 
Further, the device is empowering citizens to educate themselves about voting and mobilising for 
elections. Mobile technology is also facilitating the production of community media which is 
giving marginalised communities voices and opportunities to contribute towards, or participate in 
local and national dialogue and development. Equally important, it is opening pathways through 
which NGOs and human rights defenders are able to challenge state institutions that undermine 
the rule of law and justice. Finally, the study also established that in the face of legal, 
surveillance, interception and censorship strategies by the state, NGOs are mobilising networks, 
collaborative campaigns and circumvention and mobile-phone-mediated education and 
information tools to counter these strategies and tactics. The research is thus significant in terms 
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1. Background and rationale for the study 
There is an ever-increasing body of literature on the usefulness of new Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) in promoting democracy and human rights. Even though 
it’s heavily contested (Fuchs, 2012), scholars have put forward the idea of “liberation 
technologies” because of their capacity to “expand political, social and economic freedom,” 
(Diamond, 2010:70). Research also shows that civil society organisations, including Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), are increasingly adopting these media to challenge 
authoritarianism, especially where governments are undemocratic, weak on governance and have 
a poor human rights record (Howard, 2010; Mudhai et al,2009; Mercer, 2002; Selian, 2002).  
 
There has also been a steady stream of literature on the interaction between digital media, civil 
society, democracy and human rights by academics from the continent, or writing about the 
continent. Writers like Mercer (2002), Mudhai (2004; 2005; 2009) and Wasserman (2005, 2007, 
2011) have explored the capacity of digital media and civil society in enhancing social change in 
Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. Other equally dynamic research explored the role of digital 
media in mobilising humanitarian efforts, in improving agriculture, education, health and 
business, in promoting inclusive political participation as well as in democratising media. For 
example Tufte et al, (2012) were researching how youth groups and other civil society 
organisations (CSOs) were adopting digital media for social transformations in East Africa; 
Goldstein and Rotich (2008) looked at the power of the Ushahidi platform in monitoring 
elections and violence in Kenya; Banda (2010) researched how digital media were spurring 
citizen journalism while Bratton (2013) and Obadare (2006), respectively, explored how mobile 
phones had become critical tools in promoting democratic citizenship as well as challenging state 
collusion with powerful telecommunications corporates who were cheating users.  
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, digital media, including mobile phones, have played roles in enhancing 
media freedom and development (MISA, 2009; Mutsvairo and Columbus, 2012) in social protest 
(Willems, 2010), in identity setting (Mano and Willems, 2011) in election monitoring (Dumisani 
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Moyo, 2009), in supporting citizen journalism (Last Moyo, 2011, 2009) and in content 
production processes in broadcasting and print (Mabweazara, 2014,2011, 2010; Mare, 2013; 
Mhiripiri, 2011; Last Moyo, 2014). Some of this literature is reviewed further in Chapter 3. 
Though much of the research has added considerably to our knowledge of digital media and its 
potential, what is relatively absent in the case of studies on Zimbabwe, is a focus on the capacity 
of NGOs to use digital media to promote or protect human rights. Focus on civil society’s 
engagement with digital media in this context, has been in the form of some contributions by 
Mare (2013), Mhiripiri (2011), Atwood and Clark (2010) and Mutsvairo and Mhiripiri (2013). A 
more recent but brief study on the use of e-media to monitor violations by one of my case 
studies, Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) had just been published by Mashingaidze in June 2016, 
the time that I was also analysing my results. There was no study that I was aware of on the other 
three local non-governmental organisations that made up my four case studies: Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Media Institute of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe Chapter, 
(MISA) and the Election Resource Centre (ERC).  
  
Research on Zimbabwe has been conducted against a challenging background. The country’s 
political environment has been one of the most polarised and most contentious on the African 
continent, with the government’s human rights record abysmal from the mid-1980s onwards 
(Freedom House Reports, 2010-2015; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2007, 2013; Zimbabwe NGO 
Forum Reports, 2001-2016; CCJP, 1999). International Human rights organisations like the UN 
Commission on Human rights and Amnesty International added their voices to the continuing 
criticism against the government on the issue. The country was suspended and subsequently 
withdrew itself from the Commonwealth in 2003; it also attracted EU and US economic 
sanctions in 2002 following heavy criticism by countries from these blocs for the same reason. 
The abuses have been bolstered by a plethora of repressive laws. The rights and freedoms 
negatively affected by these laws, introduced by the government between 2002 and 2008, form a 
long list but freedoms of the media, of expression, access to information, assembly and 
association, the right to political participation, to life, human dignity, security and privacy as well 
as access to water, food, sanitation and health stand out as the most critical. Despite these 
shortcomings, the country boasts a solid telecommunications infrastructure with a 103% mobile 
phone penetration by the end of 2016 (POTRAZ, 2016) and competitive tariff structures. There 
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is sufficient connectivity for human rights NGOs to strengthen their capacity to mobilise digital 
media to enhance human rights. 
1.1 Research Topic and Objectives 
 
Given this background the study sought to contribute further to the body of knowledge from 
existing research by investigating the potential of the mobile phone in the context of it being a 
liberation technology (Diamond, 2010) following four examples from the Human rights NGO 
sector. The cases have specific human rights mandates, and, to that extent, are unique. The 
spectrum of human rights under stress in the sector is wide and the study could only limit its 
investigation to a few. These cover freedom of expression and media and access to information, 
represented by the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), political rights or freedom to 
participate in electoral processes, represented by the Election Resource Centre (ERC), and the 
rights to human dignity, to life, to liberty, free assembly and association, represented by 
Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). These rights 
are also defined in various sections of the country’s Constitution but of note are Sections 
48,49.51,58,61,62 and 67 which can be read in Appendix 3. These NGOs appeared to be 
deploying the mobile phone in unique ways, in specific projects or initiatives, that research had 
either not explored before, or had not done so to a sufficient depth. There was therefore scope to 
believe that given the particularity of the cases, the inquiry would provide new insights into the 
links between human rights NGOs, mobile phones and human rights protection. The study also 
hoped that its findings would contribute to dialogue between human rights NGOs, the state, and 
the rest of civil society, in ways that would enhance human rights and democracy.  
 
The study therefore used case studies as examples to answer the following research questions:  
a) Why, how and with what implications are NGOs using mobile phones to protect human rights 
in a challenging environment like Zimbabwe’s? Specifically, how are they appropriating the 
technology to contest human rights challenges in the following areas: 
i) people’s rights to privacy, security, life and human dignity  
ii) media freedoms and people’s right to access information  
iii) freedoms of speech, assembly and movement  
iv) people’s right to participate freely in electoral processes 
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b) What political, legal and other challenges are the NGOs facing in deploying the mobile 
phone in such a restrictive environment? 
c) How are the NGOs using mobile phones to facilitate interaction between themselves and 
their networks or partners to enhance human rights protection in the country? 
 
The different foci in the NGOs’ mandates necessitated some different interview questions for 
each of the case studies, targeted to elicit responses to particular, as opposed to general human 
rights problems. There were also other questions for participants coming from outside the case 
studies, questions designed to gauge more generalised perspectives on the NGOs’ capacity to 
effectively use the digital media. I believed it was necessary to canvass perspectives external to 
the subject NGOs to obtain some balance. The questions form an integral part of analysis in each 
of the case study chapters and in the Discussion Chapter. The thesis is divided into 11 chapters. 
 
Chapter 2    reviews literature around human rights, looking at their history and some of the 
contentions in the field, including the NGO and state roles in protecting them and the (potential) 
conflicts that may emerge in the process. The chapter also explores links between democracy, 
empowerment and human rights, to help establish the background against which the potential of 
mobile phones in human rights contention may be assessed. 
 
Chapter 3 explores literature around the mobile phone including its roles in promoting and 
protecting human rights and democracy as well as in contesting repression and authoritarianism. 
 
Chapter 4  gives a background to Zimbabwe: the challenges in the country’s political, 
economic, social, legal, telecommunications and media environments, to put into perspective 
some of the factors that fuelled political violence, media repression and electoral violations and 
have necessitated human rights NGO responses for the protection of human rights. The chapter 
looks at the penetration and prevalence of mobile phones, mobile internet and social media, 
linking these developments to the adoption of these technologies by human rights NGOs. Further 
the chapter discusses some of the critical pieces of legislation that have negatively impacted 
NGO efforts to champion social change in general and human rights specifically, with focus on 
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seven of these laws, discussed in some detail in the chapter1. The chapter’s presentation attempts 
to crystallise the direction of the study, to underscore why its focus is on the rights represented 
by the four case studies. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the Methodology used in the research. The study design involved using 
primarily qualitative methodology: a descriptive but analytical assessment of information from 
interviews, websites and case documents. The qualitative method was also designed in large part 
to elicit insights into how digital media has influenced or facilitated new relationships amongst 
NGOs, their targets and the Zimbabwean government. The method had three aspects to it. The 
first consisted of interview (face-to-face, WhatsApp text, WhatsApp calling and Skype) with 
personnel from the four case studies. The second involved further interviews with other actors -
mobile network operators, other NGOs, human rights defenders, Internet cafe users, media 
practitioners and lawyers-to understand the factors driving mobile and general ICT growth, 
motivations for appropriating the mobile phone and public views about NGOs. The third aspect 
involved analysing documentary and archival material from various sources to complement the 
interview results. Lastly, the chapter also discusses some of the challenges of researching NGOs 
in the human rights sector, given the country’s conflicted environment. There were sensitivities 
around the security of informants and the difficulty of an outsider seeking co-operation from 
professionals working under threatening or risk-prone conditions. 
 
Chapters 6-9  present the findings from the four case studies: the Zimbabwe Peace Project 
(ZPP) the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), the Media Institute of Southern Africa 
(MISA, Zimbabwe) and the Election Resource Centre (ERC). The cases, identified by acronyms 
through-out most this study, present differences and similarities in how they deploy the mobile 
phone, and the findings are presented in such a manner as to distinguish them. Because a 
fundamental aspect of this study also explores the state’s capabilities in using legal, surveillance, 
interception and censorship impediments to suppress alternative views the chapters also explore 
activists’ experiences and perspectives on these issues. 
 
1  These are the Criminal Law and Codification and Reform Act (CODE), the Public Order and 
Security Act (POSA), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the 
Electoral Act (EA), the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), the Private Voluntary Organisation 
Act (PVOA) and the Interception of Communication Act (ICA). 
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Chapter 10.  discusses and analyses the findings in response to the research questions, placing 
the analyses within the context of relevant concepts and theories and drawing comparative 
threads, where possible, from relevant research elsewhere on the continent or from any other part 
of the world.  
 
Chapter 11  concludes the study by making recommendations and, where information or 






























This chapter reviews the literature around human rights as a lead into literature around digital 
media and human rights challenges. The chapter explores some contentions around the concept 
of human rights, their links with democracy and empowerment- critical concepts in interpreting 
and understanding human rights- as well as potential protection strategies and tactics. Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), another critical element of this study, are also reviewed 
briefly, including their role in promoting human rights and democracy, as well as the sources of 
conflict with the state. The discussion is introduced as one way of exploring the background to 
how and why these institutions use digital media to protect human rights.  
2.1  The human rights concept: the contentions 
 
Understanding the concept of Human rights has generally been problematic partly, as Morgan 
and Turner (2009:3) and Ishay (2004:6-7) argue, because of the belief amongst some, that the 
origins of human rights lie in the metaphysical disciplines of theology and philosophy which do 
not lend themselves well to empirical inquiry and partly because of contextual and cultural 
differences (Shivji,1989). There has also been little consensus on the foundations of human 
rights (how do we judge their rightness or correctness) because one of the arguments generally 
offered for their basis-that they are founded on natural law- is not considered as illuminating as 
arguments that appeal to the application of international law to interpret and understand the 
rights. Morgan and Turner (2009:3) however point to an increasing understanding of the field 
over the decades as it has opened itself up to empirical inquiry, moving away from arguments 
based on philosophical thinking (Ibid, 3).  
 
The ‘natural law’ view, in its simplest form, suggests that human rights are rights enjoyed by 
individuals by virtue of their being human, thus they are Man’s natural rights (Petrina et 
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al.,2004)2 as decreed by God. In other words, they are owned by him and he therefore has a right 
to them (Morgan and Turner, 2009:187 and 6; MacDonald, in Waldron, 2009:21-24). They are, 
broadly, the rights to human dignity, life, liberty and property. Morgan and Turner’s conception 
of the ‘natural law’ perspective thus suggests that state laws or legal jurisprudence protect human 
rights better. But I see this category of rights as also defining the right to human dignity. 
 
The ‘contextual and cultural differences’ perspective, subscribed to by many developing 
countries, is illuminating, suggesting as it does, that people’s cultures, religion, experiences and 
histories-their contexts or their peculiarities- influence their conception of human rights (Hinz, 
2009 in Bösl and Diescho, 2009:7). The world is populated by people with different religions, 
different histories, cultures, values, and practices which influence their views about what may be 
considered right or acceptable and what is not. This perspective, also described as ‘soft or weak 
universalism’ or ‘soft or weak relativism’ (a less rigidly legal view of the universalism of human 
rights) appeals for a legal anthropological approach to the issue of human rights: one that 
“…reflects on all sorts of rules and norms, irrespective of their sources,” and is not bound by 
given sets of rules or what ought to be but by what is (ibid,7). In other words, what might be 
acceptable and practised in some society might appear, from a legal point of view, untenable in 
others. Human rights practices in those regions or societies should be judged in their specific 
contexts. The appeal from “soft or weak universalism” is therefore for an adoption of an 
anthropological approach, one that calls for an understanding of what religious, cultural, or other 
practices have influenced societies to accept what, from a formal legal point of view, could be 
deemed threats against individual rights. Donnelly (2007:281) holds the same view arguing that 
the world had to allow for national, regional, and cultural particularities and deviations from 
international norms in human rights interpretations. However, progress and development often 
lead to a review of old values and practices and thus an acceptance of new notions of rights.  
 
 
2 Stephen Petrina, Kenneth Volk and Soowook Kim suggest that ‘natural’ rights are accepted by many to 
be rights that are “decreed by God, inherent in human nature or defined by reason.”  Natural rights 
include claims to life, liberty and property. Historically natural rights were enshrined in the English Bill 
of Rights in 1689, the US Constitution in 1787 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 
and continue to reflect the foundation from which many other Conventions have been developed. 
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The arguments presented by these approaches may partly explain the reasons underlying the 
criticism of human rights and the founding declaration itself, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, including by some developing countries whose reluctance to accept the 
‘universalism’ of human rights is influenced by their colonial experiences. This may be why 
African governments, particularly those who have gone through liberation struggle experiences, 
appear slow or reluctant to adopt the West’s definition of universalism or the spirit of 
international human rights. The following is Turner’s (1993:499) summary of the challenge 
against the human rights concept, especially from the perspective of developing countries:  
 It is seen by many to be biased and western; it provides western powers with an 
opportunity to intervene in the Third World under the auspices of the United Nations. 
The human rights movement has been criticised in particular for adopting western 
individualism as the underpinning for the modern exercise of rights…. human rights are 
still too closely connected to the justifications of the market and possessive 
individualism. For many critics of the concept of rights, the contemporary status of 
human rights, especially when it is institutionally and globally attached to the United 
Nations Universal Declaration on Human rights and the European Convention on Human 
rights, is in no significant way different from its seventeenth-century intellectual 
forebears.  
 
Sen (1999:148-9) makes the same observation, but adds that some developing countries were 
further opposed to democracies and civil and political rights as touted by developed countries, 
because they felt poor people preferred fulfilment of their economic needs compared to having 
political freedoms. Some governments also argued that political freedoms tended to hamper 
economic growth and development. Sen’s own argument though is that public debates made 
possible by political and civil freedoms allow for the formation of positive values, integral 
elements in democracy (Sen, 1999:158) and human rights. 
 
Despite the appeal of the perspective that pushes context, religious and cultural traditions (or the 
national, regional, and cultural particularities and deviations perspective) as the basis for defining 
and protecting human rights, this thesis subscribes to the approach that acknowledges that human 
rights require formal legal protection. I take this approach because despite some of the 
developing countries subscribing to UN and domestic human rights conventions, the level of 
human rights violations is not showing any significant decrease. The thesis thus argues that a 
formal legal approach would force some of the nations, to exercise their obligations towards 
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human rights protection and promotion instead of taking refuge in arguments invoking 
contextual, religious, moral and cultural interpretations. The approach would also provide routes 
for violated citizens with little recourse to domestic legal support to seek regional or international 
interventions and relief at institutions like the Sothern African Development Commission 
(SADC) Court, the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) or the International 
Criminal Court. 
2.2  The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), Conventions and their spirit 
 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) was the response of UN members to the 
atrocities committed during the Second World War (Johnson and Symonides, 1998:27). It was a 
declaration, non-binding, but still designed to ensure that similar violations that had been 
experienced by millions of people to their rights and lives would never recur. Although some 
participating nations had histories of violations against their own citizens, the UN presented the 
first platform where there was global acknowledgement that human rights violations could not 
remain the internal issue of individual states. The UN thus provided the UDHR declaration as the 
document which would identify and highlight standards for all UN member states.  
 
The UDHR articles were drawn from contributions by, among others, NGOs, European, North, 
and Latin American countries when they negotiated the provisions of the UN Charter. The 30-
article document became the spring board from which several key Human Rights Covenants and, 
subsequent, more elaborate, more specific, and focused human rights documents designed to 
protect specific rights, were drawn. At least seven Covenants and Conventions have been drawn 
since3. The treaties enhance the general spirit of the UN Charter, which is to promote peace and 
security, and that of the UDHR, whose major aim is to protect life and promote human dignity. 
Clapham (2006:317-346) draws special attention to some of the treaties’ foci on protecting 
specific target groups like women, children, racial or ethnic minorities, refugees or any other 
groups located in foreign countries whose rights may be infringed by local or domestic laws.  
 
3  The UN Human Rights treaties include The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination; Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Conventions on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights as well as civil and political rights; Convention on the elimination of Discrimination against 
Women; Convention/Law on Refugees and the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
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In the case of Africa, the ACHPR provides the base line from which member countries can draw 
domestic legal frameworks to ensure the protection of citizens’ rights4. The ACHPR itself draws 
its framework from the UN Charter. In fact, Keetharuth (2009 in Bosl and Diescho, 2009:166) 
contends that this Charter is viewed to be an even more compact document, synthesizing the 
contents of the UDHR and Covenants, as well as the special rights under one document. 
Regional African blocks like SADC have also agreed general principles that again guide each 
member state in formulating legal frameworks to protect the rights of its citizens. The rights, 
which cut across several institutional frameworks and form the foundation for democracy, 
include the freedoms that have formed a fair part of the foregoing discussion as well as to public 
services, health and education, to life, liberty, and dignity.5  
 
Debate around the critical nature of the UDHR and Conventions argues for example that they 
reflect the universality, indivisibility, inalienability, interdependence, and interrelatedness of 
human rights (Vogelgesang, 1979; Turner, 1993; Donnelly, 2013, 2007, 2003; Morgan and 
Turner, 2009). These are also what Donnelly (2013:31) describes as the key features of the 
Universal Declaration Model. The argument is that all human beings are equal and therefore 
have or are entitled to the same international human rights (Ibid, 67). Whether as single or 
collective freedoms or duties, the rights have the same relevance and importance. None should 
be more important than another. The improvement of one right facilitates the promotion of other 
rights. Conversely the weakening or deprivation of one right adversely affects the others (Hope, 
2011). The Millennium Development Goals, (MDGs) may serve as a useful example of the 
comprehensive approach to human rights issues. The goals are about fulfilling people’s social 
and economic rights, and even though each goal focuses on improving specific areas of 
development, the overall focus of their implementation was designed in such a way that positive 
 
4 Article 1 of the ACHPR says ‘The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present 
Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them. 
5  These and many other rights expressed in the UDHR and ACHPR are reflected in Zimbabwe’s Constitution, 
Chapter 4, Part 1, Sections 44-78. Chapter 4 of Zimbabwe’s Bill of Rights spells out a huge number of rights under 
34 sub-sections. The Bill also outlines 26 Objectives of the government, in essence its obligations to its citizens. The 
obligations include promoting good practices and policies in/for education, labour and work, social welfare, youth 
development, the marriage institution, war veterans, sports, health services, shelter, traditional knowledge, children, 
and persons with disabilities. 
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outcomes in one area would influence or relate, directly or indirectly, to improvements in other 
sectors. 
2.3  Types of human rights 
 
Although the number of rights recognised by the various UN treaties and protocols is finite, they 
have tended to evolve with changes in development and technology. Technological and other 
changes increase society’s knowledge as well as its expectations for increased human dignity and 
improved living conditions. It has already been intimated in the foregoing discussion that with 
improved knowledge and increased interaction amongst global actors what may have been 
viewed as morally acceptable in the past becomes questionable and even unacceptable. By 
increasing demands for protection against old unsustainable practices or policies, society in the 
process compels an increase in demands for more rights. Even the “…emergence of new 
techniques of repression, changing ideas of human dignity, the rise of political forces and even 
past human rights successes…” have helped shape human rights lists (Donnelly, 2003:58). 
 
International human rights are divided into three broad groups contained in three Covenants. 
(Donnelly, 2011). The first group, made up of civil and political rights is also distinguished as 
‘first generation’ rights. The second group, social, economic, and cultural rights, is also known 
as “second generation “rights. The third group, generally distinguished as minority, group or 
“third generation” rights comprises rights claimed by special groups arising from the notions of 
self-determination (Ishay, 2004:10-11), under privileging or dispossession. The sections which 
follow examine these covenants in a little more detail. 
  
2.3.1  Civil and political rights. 
 
Civil and political rights are enshrined in both the Universal Declaration and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966). While it is argued that all rights are 
equal there are some core elements, describing the essence of human dignity, equality, and 
freedom, which have given greater weight to civil and political rights. It could be argued that 
these are the most fundamental elements of the human rights model (Donnelly, 2003:34) 
allowing people to live in freedom and liberty, free from fears of persecution or any form of 
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injustice; freedom to enjoy political participation, to express opinions, to tell their own story, to 
assemble and associate. Embodied in both the UDHR’s Article 21 and national or domestic 
constitutions in varying forms6, the right of political participation reflects people’s freedom to 
decide how they should be governed. Constitutions that seek to foster democracy attempt to 
capture the people’s will which in its turn is expressed by facilitating citizens’ participation in 
political activities (such as forming political parties, standing for public office, associating freely 
with others with similar political interests) as well as participation in regular, free, and fair 
elections. The challenge however is that the interests of political elites do not always coincide 
with those of ordinary citizens. Because the political elite invariably control or dominate 
electoral processes, in many cases electoral deficiencies emerge which result in the violation of 
electoral rights and the failure of democracy. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that these 
deficiencies give the appearance of genuine democracy but are in fact deficiencies cloaked in 
what Gautier (2000, in Hick et al, 2000:92-93) describes as a veneer of democracy shielded by 
judicial instruments and constitutional provisions. 
 
The rights and freedoms to privacy, expression, assembly, and association, enshrined in such 
Articles as 3, 12, 13,18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration model (Donnelly,2013:26-28; 
UDHR) embody citizens’ desires for peace and personal security, to share and express opinions 
openly, to associate with people with similar (political and other) interests and to move around 
freely without fear. As noted elsewhere in this discussion, rights and freedoms are negotiated 
because their enjoyment impinges on other people’s rights to enjoy the same. Donnelly 
(2003:25) observes that some of the freedoms, for example those of assembly and association, 
assume collective action and therefore involvement not only of one group of actors, but another 
with different agendas. Other groups’ interests in such cases must be respected. But even in the 
case of collective action, everyone still has responsibility for their own action within the 
collective framework, but at the same time has a right to protection. Nickel (2007:11) describes 
these as basic liberties, that is rights which talk to the need for each person to be recognised as 
an individual, to be treated equally and with dignity. There should be no discrimination on any 
 
6 There is a whole range of Articles (19, 4, 37,38,39) from which such constitutions as South Africa’s, India’s, USA, 
Argentina and Canada have borrowed. The list can be found on the Human Rights website: http:// www.hrcr.org. 
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grounds, although everyone is charged with the duty to recognise that other citizens’ must be 
given the same treatment, that their rights must command similar respect. 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s a broader interpretation of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, as expressed in the Universal Declaration’s Article 19, emerged and was defined as 
‘the right to communicate.’ The UN’s argument in endorsing the ‘right to communicate’ as a 
human right, was that because of global inequalities in media development, access to information 
and the means of communication, nations had to go beyond the spirit of Article 19 and redress 
the inequalities across various groups, including in the same nation, and truly allow the citizens 
to have a voice. Mansell (cited in Klang and Murray, 2006) summarises the World Summit on 
Information Society (WSIS, 2003)’s view of the features of the right to communicate, features 
which underpin today’s strands of alternative, citizen and social movement journalism, 
(Rodriquez, 2001; Atton, 2003; Downing, 2007, 2008) or any other terminologies that writers in 
this group have coined.  
Key elements of the right include the right to a diverse, pluralistic media; equitable 
access to the means of communication, as well as to the media; the right to practise and 
express one’s culture, including the right to use the language of one’s choice; the right to 
participate in public decision-making processes; the right to access information, including 
from public bodies; the right to be free of undue restrictions on content; and privacy 
rights, including the right to communicate anonymously.7 
 
In a keynote speech at Community Media Festival, London, in November 2001, Andrew 
Puddephatt, Executive Director of the organization Article 19, which promotes Article 19 of the 
UDHR, framed his interpretation of this right in language that implied its capacity to empower 
citizens: ‘... every individual or community has a right to have its stories and views heard,’ 
(Puddephatt, 2001; Article 19, 2003:1). I view this interpretation of the right as reinforcing the 
notion of the power of alternative or citizen media and its capacity to empower citizens (Atton, 
2001; Rodriguez, 2001) by giving them a voice. Empowering people to tell their own stories is 
one of the elements that contribute to human dignity. People can articulate their contexts better 
when they read, talk, and write about themselves or their situation. When people create their own 
media, when media and content are embedded in their everyday lives, citizens are better able to 
 
7 The World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) was by 2003, still debating the ‘ideology’ of the 
right to communicate, and the impact it would have on nations, technologies and other communities. 
While the notion was acceptable, as endorsed by the UN, it would not be easy to implement. 
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represent themselves, fight disenfranchisement and abuse of their rights. The discourse on citizen 
media is reviewed further in Section 3.4.3 of the next chapter which explores some of the digital 
media that citizen journalists are using. 
 
However, just as with promoting electoral rights, telling ‘our’ story is not that simple. As 
Mansell (2012) cautions, despite the advent of digital media and prominently the internet, 
barriers continue to be imposed by global media owners or other elites who can influence how 
the story is told, for example by controlling content production processes. Critically, where the 
elites control the mass media and other forms of communication through legislation, ownership 
or other forms of co-ercion, the marginalised, “…the minorities, women, the poor and local 
communities lose an important cultural resource: the right to tell their own stories to their 
children and significant others,” (Melkote and Steeves, 2001: 355). Even if it were argued that 
because the stories tend to empower people more at individual than group level, it is inarguable 
that because they emerge from personal and community experiences, in the long term they will 
create confidence in, and give self-respect to their creators. Invariably these stories reflect the 
levels of democracy, development and human dignity that exist in the communities. 
  
2.3.2  Social, economic and cultural rights  
 
For long the world’s focus has been more on civil and political rights than on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Economic rights relate to the rights to private property, to work and  leisure, 
rest and holidays. Social rights relate to food, health care and other living conditions while 
cultural rights relate to education, starting and maintaining a family and participating in the 
cultural life of a community. Donnelly, (2013:45) suggests that there are affinities between these 
and civil and political rights, in that they aim to assure life, dignity and a sense of liberty to the 
person as much as the other group of rights also aim to do. Cultural rights, he argues have an 
affinity to civil liberties while economic rights such as the right to work are instrumental in 
creating opportunities that are in the end valuable in political participation.  
 
One of the reasons for the ‘devaluation’ of this group of rights was the fact that, according to 
Merali and Oosterveld, (2001:43), states did not think they were as important as civil and 
political rights, and therefore did not promote their content or significance. They ignored 
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instituting domestic laws to protect the rights in the manner civil and political rights have been 
protected and promoted. Merali and Oosterveld contend that the action exacerbated the situation 
by, sadly, creating a sense of entitlement to civil and political rights amongst citizens. That sense 
of entitlement also means citizens overlook or do not demand the other rights. At the beginning 
of 2000 one of the responses to correcting the deficiency created by the derogation was to adopt 
a development approach that focused on fulfilling as many rights as possible. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) offered the opportunity for UN members to adopt an integrated 
approach to social change and development as opposed to promoting specific rights. And as 
2015 approached with recognition that there are still numerous economic inequalities and social 
injustices globally, world leaders agreed to pursue Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) 
whose implementation also now encompasses the fulfilment of a few rights in the third group. 
 
2.3.3. Minority Rights 
 
Minority rights arise mainly from claims by minority groups for self-determination or the need to 
preserve their cultures, values, religion or ethnicities. This set of rights has tended to be 
controversial because they are often invoked by marginalised or minority groups claiming the 
right to exist in environments where other groups have contesting rights (Nickel, 2007:154-156). 
The groups may feel that if they are not granted the rights to exist in the constricting 
environment, their history and identities are threatened. Or, if the rights are granted, they must be 
accompanied by clear protective frameworks. With globalization, the challenge for self-
preservation amongst these groups has increased further, because, despite crossing borders, the 
groups still want to retain their identities in the new borders. In the book The United Nations 
and Human rights: a guide for a new era, Julie Mertus (2009) summarises the challenge that 
accommodating this group poses to the UN human rights system: “Marginalized groups seeking 
the imprimatur of legitimacy within the mainstream human rights community continue to push 
for new treaties reflecting their concerns,” (ibid, 2). My interpretation is that Mertus was 
highlighting the evolutionary nature of human rights more than the challenge of demands from 
special groups. 
 
It is not cultural rights claims alone though, that fall into this group. Special-interest groups have 
also claimed special recognition for protection because of specific, defined needs, or because 
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they have become the targets of specific threats. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of Children 
for example, was one of the fastest moving international instruments because of the universal 
appeal of children’s issues (Donnelly, 2013:187). Laws which deal with Women’s Rights, issues 
of torture, racial discrimination and disabilities have been incorporated into the legal regimes of 
most UN members, again because of the readiness by members to be seen to be compliant 
towards issues with ‘universal’ support. Zimbabwe has domesticated laws dealing with 
disabilities, children, and women’s issues. There are other examples of violations against specific 
gender, age, religious or other groups, many such examples quoted in numerous Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) reports. The diamond-driven wars in Liberia and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example violated the rights of young boys by forcing 
them to become boy soldiers; in Somalia and other drought and war-torn regions in Africa, 
young girls have been forced into early marriages and require protection from circumstances that 
the UDHR did not envisage in developing countries, but which now require not just domestic but 
regional and even international interventions.  
2.4  Democracy and human rights 
 
Just as much it has been argued that human rights are interdependent, indivisible and interrelated 
(Donelly,2003:27-29) scholarship has also argued that democracy and human rights share strong 
links. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted on June 25, 1993 by the World 
Conference on human rights - reaffirming the indivisibility of human rights- and specifically 
Article 8 of the Declaration, highlighted the relationship between democracy, development, and 
human rights. Article 8 states:  
 
Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will 
of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and 
their full participation in all aspects of their lives. In the context of the above, the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and 
international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached. The 
international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, 




The link has become conceptually clearer with time though. Julie Norman (2005) summarises the 
dynamics behind the reconceptualization and convergence of the two fields, for some time 
regarded as unrelated8. 
Specifically, definitions of democracy have expanded from the traditional procedural 
democracy to encompass the ideals of a substantive, liberal democracy. Likewise, the 
human rights framework has begun to further develop conceptions of social, economic, 
and cultural rights, in addition to civil and political rights, thus expanding the notion of 
human rights to include human security, and extending human rights to the collective as 
well as the individual level. These renewed definitions present opportunities for 
recognizing the convergence of the theories and fields related to human rights and 
democracy.  
 
Norman makes this exposition in relation to the situation in Palestine as an emerging democracy 
but the interdependence between the two fields is as applicable to that country as it is to other 
emerging democracies. Beetham, (2002, cited in Murray, 2004) similarly criticises the fallacy of 
looking at democracy and human rights as “… distinct phenomena occupying different areas of 
political sphere: the one a matter of the organisation of government, the other a question of 
individual rights and their definition,” (ibid, 73). Their spaces should be seen to be converging or 
at the very least overlapping. Democracy provides a fertile ground for human rights promotion 
and protection: ground which accommodates and promotes mechanisms which in their turn 
ensures that people have peace and freedoms. 
  
The modern concept of democracy is based on the participation of every individual to determine 
the social, economic, and political system that is meant to influence their lives (Donnelly, 
2013:220). Modern democracy elements include formal election processes, good governance, a 
constitution that provides a framework for accountability, separation of powers, rule of law, 
support for civil society (and even the opposition), implementation of sustainable development 
programmes and human rights protection (Murray, 2004:107-109). Democracy is particularly 
visible at national levels when there are clear indications of constitutional bills of rights 
protecting individual rights and freedoms. Beetham (2002, cited in Murray, 2004:73) correctly 
 
8 Julie Norman focuses on how democracy and human rights issues intertwine in Palestine. However, the 
‘convergence’ of the concepts of democracy and human rights apply universally and are not confined to 
developments in the Middle East country alone.  
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argues that democracy without freedom is a contradiction, going further to state that a country’s 
political system is related to the standards of rights and freedoms that its citizens enjoy:   
Without freedom there can be no democracy. If people are to have any influence or 
control over public decision making and decision makers, they have to be free to 
communicate and associate with each other, to receive accurate information and express 
divergent opinions, to enjoy freedom of movement and to be free from arbitrary arrest 
and imprisonment.  
 
The Vienna Declaration saw this link clearly and stated that democracy, development and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The 
Declaration then enjoined the international community to support their strengthening and 
promotion in the whole world. The fact that the appeal was in the form of a declaration and 
therefore non-binding, did not detract from its significance. 
 
Sachikonye, (cited in Bujra and Adejumobi, 2002:186) conceives democracy as “…a system or 
form of regime whose legitimacy derives from the principle of popular sovereignty.’ Although 
the definition does not add substantially to the depth or breadth of the debate it still makes a 
useful contribution. The principle of popular sovereignty suggests citizens’ ability and capacity 
to decide how they should be governed. In thus defining the concept of democracy, Sachikonye 
identifies several key attributes that themselves are the fundamental foundation of human rights: 
the right to vote, the right to belong to a political party of one’s choice (freedom of association), 
the right to freely express oneself (freedom of expression) and the general observance of human 
rights. These and other attributes only become truly expressible based on the existence of other 
democratic frameworks: for example, the existence of Electoral, Media, Gender, Human rights, 
and Judicial Commissions to enforce state and non-state actors’ transparency and accountability, 
citizen protection, media independence and various other protections. 
  
Donnelly (2003:191) suggests another link which he describes as a “… commitment to the ideal 
of equal political dignity for all.” I interpret this link to refer to the principles contained in the 
Articles articulating the rights to vote, to select political leaders and belonging to a political party 
of one’s choice. Various forms of democracy have been criticised for one weakness or another, 
but procedural democracy, common in both developed and developing countries, is considered 
even less representative of citizen participation and influence in electoral processes (Beetham, 
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2002, cited in Murray, 2004:73). Under liberal democracy, which is the most celebrated form, all 
citizens are ideally allowed full participation and influence in the choice of their leadership. 
Procedural democracy on the other hand is criticised for focusing on the presence of voting 
structures and institutions, allowing incumbent office holders to manipulate the voting process to 
remain in office. This in effect circumscribes citizens’ rights to objective and fair political 
choice, achievement of political dignity and, overall, undermining of democracy.  
 
While acknowledging that human rights have a chance of thriving better in a democracy, 
Donnelly (2013) however disagrees that the link between the concepts is that straightforward nor 
as mutually beneficial (ibid, 223).  
Democracies have a significantly better average human rights record than non- 
democratic regimes. Some non-democratic states, however, perform better on many 
rights than some democratic states. Furthermore, human rights practices among 
democracies vary dramatically. 
 
Donnelly argues that democracy only enhances human rights if people collectively make 
considerable effort to constrain and contain their interests and actions. The reality however is 
that this does not happen, with individual interests often overriding collective interests. 
 
Another point relates to good governance as a key indicator of democracy in a state. Good 
governance is reflected in state transparency and accountability in decision-making processes, 
responsibility in the exercise of power as well as the state’s responsiveness to people’s needs. All 
these elements underpin good human rights practices. Conversely an absence of these factors 
reflects paucity of democratic practices and a potential for violation of human rights. Institutions 
like the UN and African Commission, through the UDHR, Conventions and the ACHPR (1986) 
require states to bind themselves legally to respecting the rights of their citizens.9 If there is 
evidence that these legally binding obligations are being honored then they would become 
evidence that democracy is ensured. Ofcourse individuals must also fulfill complementary 
human rights obligations, but the larger portion of the burden lies with the state (An-Na’im, 
2003, cited in Sarat and Kearns, 2004). 
 
9An-Na’im stresses that legal obligations towards human rights issues minimizes the deficiency of states being 




An-Na’im’s observation about the role of the state in human rights protection is critical as much 
of the criticism leveled against Africa’s failure in governance and human rights protection stems 
from authoritarian leadership’s disregard for democratic conventions. What the preceding 
discussion has tried to do is to show that even if there was debate about direct causal 
relationships between democracy and human rights, it can-not be dismissed that, at the very 
least, there are affinities between the concepts (Donnelly, 2003:186-192). There is a mutual 
relationship between the two. Democracy not only offers the conditions for human rights 
protection but is itself enhanced when human rights are protected.  
2.5  Empowerment, democracy, and human rights. 
 
As much as it was important to discuss the links between democracy and human rights in the 
preceding discussion, it is also important to assess the links between empowerment, democracy 
and human rights. Empowerment is a concept that has not easily found common ground 
amongst practitioners and academics although traditionally the most common conception of 
empowerment relates to education and development. This is so because historically Latin 
American scholars, notably Freire (1993) led its debate when he was examining the role of 
education in delivering impoverished and disempowered Brazilians from a system fraught with 
economic, social, and political injustices. Freire’s, and other researchers after him, perceived 
empowerment as a process, identifying three key steps towards its fulfilment: ‘conscientising’ 
the marginalised about their situation, ‘inspiring’ them to act- such as getting education and 
skills- and finally, ‘liberating’ them by encouraging them to use their capabilities to gain 
confidence, self-reliance, and self-worth (McAnany, 2012:96; Melkote and Steeves, 2001). 
Freire’s exposition, that true democratic participation involves interactivity, problem 
identification and solution seeking could be argued to justify the push for such issues as the 
right to (access and disseminate) information and the right to free expression.  
 
The modern argument is that when citizens understand their rights they feel inspired and 
empowered: human rights empower citizens when institutional frameworks (for instance legal, 
judicial, media and other institutions) are invoked to demand adherence to minimum standards 
and norms for peace and development. Welch Jr (1995:54) frames his understanding of 
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empowerment to highlight the element of citizens’ right to be politically involved. Political 
participation is one of the key pillars of democracy and a critical human right. The 
empowerment approach, Welch contends, entails ‘…deliberate political mobilisation’ of 
historically, socially, and economically disempowered groups (ibid,54). Friedman (1992) also 
suggests empowerment is critical in mobilisation and transforming social to political power; 
Melkote and Steeves (2001:354-5) define empowerment as “the mechanism by which 
individuals, organisations and communities gain control and mastery over social and economic 
conditions and democratic participation in their community.” Shalit (2004) and Banducci et al, 
(2004, all cited in Hyung Hur, 2006:525) refer to additional aspects of empowerment. 
Banducci, Donovan and Karp single out the capacity of empowerment to strengthen 
representational links and encouraging political participation while Shalit links it to intellectual 
capacity growth, problem solving and, as well, political participation. The range of 
interpretations that the term offers is relatively wide but through them all is a general inference 
to empowerment leading to social, economic, and political transformation. In all notions of 
empowerment, the element of individual and community struggle to overturn social and 
political disadvantage is also evident, and is reminiscent of elements in Freire’s Brazilian 
model. Even development institutions debate the links between empowerment and democracy 
and human rights. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA, 2009) contends10 
that when democratic processes guarantee people what Tambin (1999, quoted by SIDA, 2009) 
describes as the four key transactions to democracy-access to information, the right to choose 
leaders of their choice, free deliberation, and free assembly- then a high degree of 
empowerment has been achieved. For the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID,2000) empowerment means “... individuals acquiring the power to think and act freely, 
exercise choice, and to fulfil their potential as full and equal members of Society.” Freedom to 
act and think, to make conscious choice and to participate and be accepted by society as a 
productive member, is the ultimate product of empowerment. Society accepts more a member 
who acts according to ‘group’ norms, such norms being the ones that are reflected in or by 
democratic practices. Loosely but relevantly aligned to the DFID definition is Kabeer’s (2001, 
 
10 The SIDA Department of Empowerment puts great stock in strategies to empower marginalised groups, 




cited in Bartlett, 2004), which contends that the process of empowerment results in previously 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups cultivating the ability to make strategic life choices. 
Kabeer goes further to suggest that the strategic nature of the choices becomes evident when 
the actions taken benefit the whole group rather than individuals. Marginalised group actions 
make a difference when the entire group acts in a manner that transforms the fortunes of the 
group rather than individual group members, an inference to the importance of group 
empowerment and group rights. This view of what constitutes real empowerment is a response 
to arguments that empowerment only benefits individuals and is therefore not as important to 
pursue as democracy and human rights.                                                                                          
 
The common denominator in all the interpretations appears to be that empowerment culminates 
in people understanding that their condition of disenfranchisement is a result of lack of ability 
and capacity to influence social and political power and that social and political participation is 
a primary goal for those seeking recognition and acceptance in society. It can therefore be 
argued that empowerment creates power within the less privileged and forces them to define 
themselves as their own agents for change.  Disempowered groups, according to Bartlett, 
(2004, in Hyung Hur, 2006) should have courage and capacity to mobilise resources, 
opportunities, and capabilities for ‘political’ participation so that, in the end, they are able to 
influence the direction of their lives. 
  
2.6  The state and human rights protection 
  
The interrelationships between democracy, empowerment and human rights debated in the  
foregoing sections are significant in understanding the role of various actors-the state, civil 
society organisations, the media, corporates and even citizens themselves-in relation to, for 
example, what responsibilities and accountability each actor must assume to promote and protect 
human rights. The role of the state is the most critical in this respect. The primary role of the 
state is to ensure that the country’s laws, policies as well as institutions not only serve the 
demands of its citizens but do so in the spirit of international laws, standards and norms which 
protect international human rights (Hope, 2011). The objective in having institutional 
frameworks to protect human rights is to remind offending states or institutional actors that 
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breach of the rights can breed legal, political, social, and other sanctions at national or 
international levels. Response to violations could involve other states acting to protect human 
rights in the offending state, either individually or jointly with other states (Nickel, 2007:19). 
However, this is an area where, according to Keetharuth (2009 in Bosl and Diescho, 2009) 
African nations have failed because of reluctance by leaders to interfere in each other’s internal 
affairs. Reluctance to protect human rights appears to be more prevalent amongst developing 
countries although, as Eric Posner argued in The Guardian of December 4, 2014, such countries 
as India, Brazil and South Africa-reputedly amongst the world’s largest democracies-also 
represent cases with the worst judicial killings. Massive citizen abuses, including genocide and 
forced migrations have gone unchecked in countries like the DRC, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Eastern 
and Horn of Africa and many more. But even more developed countries like the USA, the UK 
and other European nations have also been criticised for the massive losses to human lives when 
they have been involved in attacks in parts of the world, North Africa and the Middle East for 
example, where they have said they wanted to remove dictators. 
  
A combination of factors converges to create conditions for effective human rights protection. 
Sarat and Kearns (2004:91) suggest that amongst several factors, the level and quality of political 
commitment to citizen welfare by the state, availability of economic resources and civil society 
activism can influence to a very large extent the level of human rights protection offered by 
governments. Political stability, economic resources and non-legal institutional capacities also 
need to be complemented by a combination of the rule of law, independent judiciaries, executive 
compliance with judicial determinations, a strong and critical media, and willingness and ability 
by the public to enforce human rights through the courts (Sarat and Kearns,2004:1,6,91; 
O’Donnell,1998). These are crucial observations because a suppressed public, a weak civil 
society and a politically compromised judicial system are likely to act more as barriers to the 
observance of human rights and good governance than promote them.  
2.7  Non-Governmental Organisations: definition, history and roles 
 
Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) form part of civil society which itself is made up of a 
large number of civic or special interest groups (Edwards,2004:63-64), notably churches, media, 
student bodies, political groups, professional groups, trade unions and other informal and formal 
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but non-political groups.11 As members of civil society they are part of Habermas’ public sphere, 
the space in which new communication platforms, unencumbered by state bureaucracies  and 
barriers, for example, have shown capacity to open debate and interaction amongst the various 
individuals, groups and institutions that reside in the space. Scholars like Edwards (2004:70) 
however warn that much as the public sphere promotes democratic engagement, it can equally 
breed conflicts and contentions.  
 
Kirk de Heliker’s (2012) observation, that NGOs, as a subset of civil society, are “an instrument 
in the process of social and political democratization”12 is a strong indicator of the institutions’ 
role in supporting fundamental aspects of human rights. They represent general or universal 
interests, as opposed to the state which he argues pursues its own partial and particularistic 
interests. Although this view has been contested (Shivji,2007; Nelson and Dorsey, 2008:6-7; 
Last Moyo, 2013:213; Dickson, 2016) NGOs are defined by their independence and non-
partisanship, their ability to act freely, devoid of political or other influence. They are also 
defined by having narrowly focused but clear objectives and agendas which enable them to press 
human rights concerns more strategically. 
 
Mitlin et al., (2006) define NGOs as ‘corporate entities acting according to the logic of the 
market-place,’ a definition suggestive of economic or development imperatives. The general 
view of NGOs in developing countries though was, for a long time, one in which political 
leadership felt more comfortable associating the institutions with development issues than with 
human rights, although, ultimately, development encompasses human rights. This view of 
development in its turn has its origins in the post-World War 2 modernisation approach. At the 
end of the war, Europe, America, and multilateral institutions pushed a development agenda into 
developing nations (mainly the global south), an agenda into which Northern NGOs were 
incorporated (McAnnany, 2012; Melkote and Steeves, 2001). Western Europe and America 
 
11  Some people could see this as a dated conception of civil society, which has metamorphosed into new forms, 
dictated by new needs and global challenges. For example, Social Movements pursuing special interest or once-off 
issues are now common; they may have no offices, the mobilisation and organisation efforts dependent on and 
syncronised through new media platforms.  
12 Heliker’s arguments were in the context of the situation in Zimbabwe, where civil society was at logger heads 
with the state and Human Rights NGOs in particular were being challenged to lead the fight against the state for 
social and political democratization. Heliker also contends that in Zimbabwe civil society is equated with 




relied on the power of technology to diffuse knowledge and innovations, reflective of levels of 
development in their own countries. NGOs were thus incorporated into the development 
institutions’ broad programmes for technology, culture and information transfer, an incorporation 
which also included ensuring budget support for the NGOs.  
 
Serving in developing countries, NGOs were, as a result, viewed as proponents of more positive 
and effective development approaches, being less encumbered by bureaucracy, politics, and 
capital as developing governments were. Developing countries were then viewed as regressive 
while NGOs were viewed as agents of alternative development and more progressive. NGO 
programmes were aimed at improving people’s living conditions and empowering people with 
skills, resources, and education for self- sufficiency. Although most programmes were launched 
after WW2, under what came to be known as the ‘NGO decade’ (Bratton, 1989, cited by Mitlin 
et al, 2006:3; Pearce, 2000) it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, that their role came under 
scrutiny from various quarters, including from development experts, scholars, and politicians. 
The modernisation agenda failed to offer developing countries the relief that people sought from 
underdevelopment and poverty and the NGOs’ capacity too began to attract those mixed views. 
 
The views that began to filter through then relate to the need to professionalise NGOs, demand 
more accountability and sustainability and encourage stronger cross-NGO ties and international 
partnerships (Edwards and Hulme, 1992, 1995 & 1996; Lewis, 2001; Fowler 1997 & 2000a 
Wallace et al.1997, all cited in Hyung Hur, 2006). The development role began to be interpreted 
essentially as an interventionist, reformist role, in which NGOs were viewed as donors and 
service providers (Mitlin et al.,2006). They were seen as offering partial solutions to problems 
instead of being real alternatives to development. Mitlin and her colleagues (2006) argue that 
alternatives to development needed to offer alternative ways of organising the economy, politics 
and social relationships in society, the role that human rights NGOs began to espouse as 
reflecting their objectives.  
  
The role of NGOs and other civil society organisations in democracy promotion can be assessed 
against the background of their partnership with the state and private sector in improving 
citizens’ social, economic, and political conditions. The NGOs’ primary role is to be watchdogs 
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and monitors for society (Mercer, 2002; Edwards 2004:63-64). Lucan Way, (2014:38), 
underscores that role by describing NGOs as “traffic cops”, “mobilisers” or “dispatchers” and 
facilitators of stability. The role involves facilitating, motivating and initiating public voice or 
action in positive and non-violent ways. In non-permissive countries, this role is associated more 
with human rights NGOs than with those in development. In these environments, the voices of 
local NGOs might infact be the only voices of reason. From the standpoint of liberal democracy, 
the NGO/civil society role is viewed as being complementary- as opposed to being 
confrontational- to the state (Edwards, 2004:13) while the state is considered as provider of 
accountable government. Accountable government is achieved in various ways including 
through co-operation with civil society, often the conduit of the public’s concerns. Constant 
dialogue between the state, civil society and citizens, which creates a relationship of mutual trust 
between the partners, ensures that the state’s capacity for good governance is strengthened and 
its legitimacy assured.  
  
The advent and intervention of digital media technologies brought a considerable transformation 
of NGOs, turning them into a critical sphere of power that began to challenge the state, private 
sector and the media. In 2006 Cammaerts and Carpentier (cited in Servaes and Carpentier, 
2006:36-37) predicted an even more pronounced shift in the balance of power towards NGOs 
and other civil society organisations as new technologies, under WSIS, opened communication 
space. In fact, drawing on the strength of their communication platforms and networks, some 
NGOs have become so powerful that they can influence considerable political, social, and 
economic changes. Transnational NGOs like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the 
International Commission of Jurists, Oxfam and Doctors Without Borders have built such strong 
profiles that they can “…shape the agendas, policies and treaties of the UN through their 
participation and lobbying, and provide links between the international human rights system and 
politics at the domestic level,” (Korey, 1998, cited in Nickel, 2007:20). Thus, by supporting 
regional and national NGOs who may lack international lobby and advocacy capabilities they 
can still influence the sanctioning of human rights abusers.  
 
The issue however is that there are almost always conflicts between the state and NGOs because 
of the watchdog and monitor role (McPhail, 2009:73)-bringing attention to crises. Authoritarian 
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governments consider this role a challenge on their control and power (ibid, 69). When NGOs 
advocate for political and other rights for the people, non-permissive governments tend to view 
them as going outside ‘development’ and moving into the political sphere, something which 
these governments distrust and fear. The NGOs are then viewed as political actors, potential 
opposition, and thus targets of persecution. Their function as advocates for public policies and 
citizen participation ends up being challenged. Accusations that NGOs no longer serve the 
traditional development interests but are surrogates of Western interests, covers for rebellion, 
regime-change champions or perpetuators of colonial tendencies (McPhail, 2009:65,69; Gautier, 
in Hick et al 2000:69), are manipulated by repressive regimes to undermine the NGOs’ 
democratising and human rights protection functions.  
 
Accusations have also been made that the NGO/civil society space is no longer inherently 
democratic but one in which there exist various other interests (Mercer, 2002), particularly the 
interests of donors or funders. Sunit Bagree (2014) suggests that for example, for development 
NGOs, fear of losing funding inhibits them from criticising the policies of their sponsors, instead 
they advance their agendas. Additionally, because of the mutual recognition by governments and 
civil society that economic, social, and cultural rights are as important as civil and political 
rights, there is increasing pressure from traditionally quiescent development NGOs for 
governments to shift their policy priorities.  
2.8  Strategies for human rights protection 
 
This section discusses broad strategies adopted by NGOs for the protection of human rights. In 
discussing the strategies, the section also identifies some of the major actors, notably 
professionals, grassroots activists, and other types of human rights defenders (HRDs), and 
strategies and tactics, which include education, documentation and reporting, enforcements and 
litigations and international and domestic frameworks- such as networks and collaborations- 
supporting lobby and advocacy efforts. 
 
The process that produces information and reports on violations- that is monitoring, documenting 
and reporting- is a critical component in the human rights protection chain. For human rights 
NGOs investigating, evaluating, documenting, reporting and disseminating information on 
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violations (in other words the monitoring process) to a large extent defines the key processes that 
underpin human rights protection. The effectiveness of global response to human rights abuses is 
a direct result or reflection of the timeliness, accuracy, and credibility of information from these 
processes. The processes must therefore be robust if reports are to yield positive responses from 
partners or networks. Human rights reports are designed to seek accountability from both 
governments and non-state perpetrators - another reason why accuracy and credibility are 
important. Welch (1995:61) suggests that for states these reports are likely to be more 
problematic because of the implications of being named and shamed (he calls it ‘mobilisation of 
shame’). Media involvement in publicising the reports strengthens NGO monitoring activities at 
the same time increasing the potential for responsible actions from authoritarian regimes.  
 
Protecting human rights effectively also depends on citizens’ knowledge about relevant human 
rights issues as well as the processes of putting together information which informs those issues. 
Welch (1995) contends that one of the weaknesses of the protection process is the limited 
knowledge that citizens’ have of their own responsibilities in protecting human rights. Citizens 
are likely to identify violations and abuses directed at them more clearly if their understanding of 
the subject is stronger. This can be achieved through education and collaborations between civil 
society, treaty bodies and human rights institutions (Horn, in Bosl and Diescho, 2009:67-69). 
Information, education and knowledge about human rights issues can also be gained from special 
human rights publications, through targeted, specialised training programmes as well as using 
traditional and new media. Some of the more crucial information relates to institutions that offer 
legal support in cases of violations, including those which offer free support. 
  
Practically, at the forefront of the human rights protection system, are the ‘foot soldiers’, the 
grassroots activists, or human rights defenders (HRDs). Defined as ‘people who, individually or 
with others, act to promote or protect human rights’ (Nah et al, 2013:404; OHCHR,2004:2) 
HRDs are the bulwark of most successful human rights protection and promotion projects. In 
countries with repressive governments, HRDs often comprise volunteers from grassroots 
communities. These HRDs are thus the most at risk mainly from state actors, although non-state 
actors could also be culprits. Types and levels of risks help shape the activists’ protection or 
promotion strategies as well as the tactics and tools they may adopt to achieve their results (Nah 
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et al, 2013). Mobile phones and social media platforms have increasingly become the tools of 
choice for HRDs as much as person-to person interaction also remains critical. Common risks 
from the state include physical violence, coercion, threats and intimidation, arrests, detentions, 
censorship and surveillance.  
 
Effective human rights protection also requires enforcement which can be achieved through 
litigation, or the threat of such, using the power of international treaties against offenders. 
Litigation is often aimed at challenging a breakdown in domestic legal structures that are meant 
to protect citizens’ rights. It is thus a reflection of state failure to uphold or maintain a system 
that promotes democracy. The system should include a framework of constitutionally guaranteed 
laws (rule of law), a truly independent judicial system and a state supported system that should 
guarantee free legal assistance to the poor or marginalised (Welch Jr. 1995:56). Absence of clear 
complaints channels may mean victims will continue to suffer in silence without state 
intervention.  
 
In some countries the laws are there, but legal support structures for victims are not there. The 
political system must clearly define the boundaries of Executive and Parliamentary influence, 
and empower the Judiciary to uphold the rights enshrined in the constitution without fear of 
intervention from the other two (O’Donnell, 1998). In authoritarian regimes violations could go 
unreported or unprotected because there are no systems to support those without the means to 
fight injustice. Judicial systems are compromised, lacking the will to override executive power or 
afraid to direct or challenge law enforcement agencies. If protection frameworks are 
constitutionally guaranteed, but practically ignored, civil society has the responsibility to set up 
independent systems which provide free legal and other support for poor victims. Litigation is 
often an indication that normal, formal procedures or frameworks to seek justice quietly and 
peacefully by individuals or groups are compromised, and thus they resort to the courts. And 
where domestic judicial structures are compromised, are too weak of unwilling to dispense 
justice, litigation for human rights abuses could seek justice by appealing for intervention by 
regional or international justice bodies. Such bodies include the Southern African Development 
Commission court, the African Human Rights Council in the case of African countries and the 
International Criminal Court in the case of UN members.  
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Networks are an important element in human rights protection systems. Based on the theory of 
collaboration, openness and strategic alliances, networks bring value to the work of member 
organisations, improve their professional capacity, the quality of their interventions as well as 
mutual trust (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010:6) The connections and links they create between 
groups or individuals benefit both the members themselves and their targets. For human rights 
NGOs, the links facilitate information sharing for the protection of either citizens/targets or their 
own network members. Shared information can ignite domestic, regional, and global responses, 
an important requisite for organisations who may lack resources to implement sustained 
protection campaigns. Blazevic et al., (2013), who developed a policy and practice manual for 
HRDs from the East African region, observed that supporting national HRD coalitions helps 
bring down their need for protection. The effectiveness of networks relies on the strengths and 
ties amongst the actors. Organisations with strong actors tend to attract strong network partners 
such that, assured of their support, the organisation will also tend to solicit strong responses to 
their communication (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010:232). Strong networks also distinguish 
themselves through shared identities and shows of togetherness and solidarity. This approach 
applies in the case of NGOs as in other institutions.  As much as many NGOs want to ensure 
they build strong networks and coalitions I believe the need for these relationships may be more 
critical amongst those in the human rights sector because of the potential for conflicts with the 
state. And the urgency with which NGOs expect results from their networking efforts, probably 
has more significance amongst human rights NGOs than amongst NGOs in other sectors. This is 
because of the sensitivity of the human rights issues they deal with: mainly issues to do with 
respect for life and human dignity. Some of the network relationships emerge from social 
networks. The social network approach is pre-eminently associated with social movements 
(della-Porta and Diani, 2006:37; Kavada, 2005), notably during those times when interpersonal 
connections in the social networks help in driving collective action. From a social movement 
perspective then, social network members are ‘socially’ connected and have stronger ties within 
these structures than they would have within the broader network structure. It is the aspect of 
interpersonal relations amongst the small social networks and their potential to draw members 
from different NGOs towards areas of common interest that is relevant in this study. Some NGO 
staff may be members of the small networks which feed into bigger social networks as well as 
into their own NGOs’ network structures.  
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Networks can be important for interventions in times of distress, especially so in repressed 
environments where HRDs are more threatened. Interventions could be at local level, where 
local partner NGOs may deploy legal or media partners to intervene, or at international level, 
where international NGO partners could mobilise global activist segments to mobilise, their own 
networks to support the local NGO. Lawyer-to-lawyer networks (Korey, 2001:494-502) for 
example are known to be quite effective in mobilising financial, technical, and even political 
support to assist smaller and weaker human rights NGO networks or to support each other. 
Network links with powerful human rights NGOs therefore make a difference for the cause of 
repressed local NGOs who can ride on the credibility and influence of established partners, 
including the latter’s links with powerful governments pledged to fight human rights violations.  
 
Collaborations and solidarity involve working with other institutions, including traditional 
media, to identify violators; to lobby institutions and governments with more effective links to 
support your campaigns, including campaigns to source financial and other resources. Even 
though they wrote way back, Keck and Sikkink (1999:93), proponents of the concept of issue 
networks, suggested that a ‘boomerang’ effect was likely if, for instance, transnational advocacy 
networks seeking to support smaller domestic organisations against intransigent states, 
influenced their own governments and other stronger actors to pressurize these offending states 
using tactics that leveraged information, symbolism and accountability (ibid, 93-95). Human 
rights NGOs in restrictive environments may need to seek support from regional and 
international alliances to force offending governments not just to observe minimum human rights 
standards but to comply with their own legal statutes. Networking and collaborations may result 
in any number of outcomes not least of which is the institution of sanctions against offending 
governments. Sanctions vary but according to Meernik et al (2012:234) they may include 
“naming” and “shaming” (the primary weapon of international human rights NGOs), economic 
embargoes, military interventions, and international criminal tribunals. The hypothesis behind 
these forms of sanction is that putting repressive regimes under the public spotlight forces them 
to reduce excesses. Results have however been mixed about this hypothesis, amongst them, those 
from studies by Hafner-Burton (2008) and by Meernik and his colleagues. Hafner-Burton’s 
results showed that some countries reduced some violations- especially those relating to political 
rights- while others actually increased political terror. Yet others reduced the excesses, with the 
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intention that when they increased them again, as they invariably did, the impact would not be 
noticeable.13 Hafner-Burton (2008:712) suggests that strategic behavior or capacity problems 
drive the responses. Her overall observation though, was that authoritarian regimes increase 
violations after naming and shaming (Ibid, 4). Meernik et al (2012) found out that the higher the 
number of perpetrator institutions in a country, the more ‘name and shame’ reports were 
generated by organisations like Amnesty International. They conclude that the stronger local 
NGO campaigns are against perpetrator regimes, the greater the potential for collaborative and 
supportive response from more powerful and influential institutions like Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch.  
 
There are other strategies and tactics, depending on an NGO’s primary mandate and its resources 
(its internal capacity) that may be used to enhance advocacy and lobby efforts. The choice of 
strategies and tactics will also depend, if we go by Meernik and his colleagues’ findings, on the 
types and levels (degree) of human rights violations and the attitude of the offending regime 
towards criticism. Street demonstrations, sit-ins, picketing and disruptions of international 
conferences have become hallmarks of transnational activism. Transnational campaigns have 
been successful particularly when they were a result of transnational NGO structures using 
mutual relationships and the potential support of international norms and laws to push for 
universally acknowledged rights challenges (Gready, 2004:4-5). Even challenges that seemingly 
appear centred only in developing nations- such as landmine victims, boy-soldiers, and 
physically violated girl-children in war-torn and hunger-affected regions- assume transnational 
proportions because of the involvement of international institutions.  
 
Human rights and peace initiatives will each have their own tactical approaches to promoting and 
protecting human rights but the following, from the United States Institute of Peace represent 
some ‘standard’ tactics adopted by most human rights NGOs. Social media and art can be used 
to keep the memories of those who have disappeared or been killed in people’s memories; victim 
testimonies can be used to create public awareness, legitimizing the experiences, and 
 
13   Nigeria’s Abacha is reported to have committed terrible excesses against the Ogoni tribe for example, despite 
massive global criticism by NGOs, media and the UN. Instead of reducing the violations Hafner-Burton (2008:711) 
notes that Abacha actually mounted his own media counter-offensive in the form of a video and books, dismissing 
the accusations and extolling the virtues of his government’s policies. 
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encouraging positive action while collecting mass signatures to support a cause, challenges the 
community to ask themselves about responsibility, mobilising themselves as well as demanding 
accountability and action from perpetrators. When one engages the Zimbabwean context, where 
it is clear that the government for instance, was sanctioned by the international community from 
2000 onwards because of human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2012; CNN, 2012; 
Howard-Hassamann, 2010; Raftopoulos, 2014)14 what evidence exists to support the view that 
civil society’s deployment of new media technologies played some part in producing outcomes 
that resulted not just in this international response but in a broader public awareness of the threat 
of continuing human rights violations in the country? It is my contention that the role of mobile 
phones, in relation to this issue, has not been evidenced sufficiently through carefully presented 
academic analysis and in that regard this study hopes to make some contribution.  
2.9   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to explore a few contentions around the theory of human rights, 
looking at the features and types of human rights. The chapter also explored the links between 
human rights, democracy, and empowerment because they assist in increased understanding of 
the challenges for human rights. Further the chapter briefly discussed the role of human rights 
NGOs in protecting human rights at the same time identifying some sources of the conflict 
between themselves and the state which may better inform the choice of communication strategy 
that the NGOs may adopt in responding to the conflict. The next chapter discusses literature 
around digital media technologies-with an emphasis on the mobile phone- seeking to explore that 











14 Rhoda Howard-Hassaman’s Zimbabwe Human Rights (2010) report is enlightening in respect of the amount and 
types of violations, which the discussion under the ZPP case study corroborates. Reference can also be made to the 





Mobile phones and human rights 
3.  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses literature around the mobile phone and its potential in championing 
human rights in authoritarian environments. The mobile phone is one of those technologies 
regarded as tools with the potential for promoting democracy and empowerment, both of which 
create environments conducive for promoting and protecting human rights. The technological 
structure of the mobile phone allows the technology to incorporate features which have potential 
for promoting activism. The features, in the form of digital platforms and applications are also 
known to facilitate development in general. In discussing the potential of mobile technology this 
chapter thus looks at its links with the concepts or notions of democracy, empowerment, 
networking, and surveillance as they are sometimes connected in discussions on human rights 
issues, and, in the case of the NGOs in this study, particularly so. Many NGOs in repressed 
environments are appropriating mobile phones and other ICTs not only to protect human rights 
but to champion democracy in general.  
3.1  Global mobile communications growth 
 
Mobile communications have grown considerably throughout the world over the past two 
decades with the mobile phone recording the most significant growth. According to ITU (2015) 
global mobile subscriptions grew from 738 million in 2000 to 7 billion in 2015 and represented a 
97% penetration. The greatest growth was in Asia and the Pacific where subscriptions grew from 
833 million in 2005 through 2.614 billion in 2010 to 3.74 billion in 2015. Asia was followed by 
Africa where subscriptions rose from 87 million in 2005 to 366 million in 2010 and 685 million 
in 2015.  
 
Although mobile phone growth before the 1990’s was significant the device’s importance in 
everyday life increased when GSM or 2G communications network was introduced then, with 
text messages, picture messages and MMS (multimedia messages) welcome highlights for users. 
GSM thus marked the entry of the early smartphone with more features than earlier models with 
basic platforms. In terms of increasingly pervasive mobile communication technology, the 
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smartphone has subsequently become the most appropriated, with 2 billion users worldwide by 
mid-2015, according to the ITU (2015) figures. Of the 2 billion smartphone users, ITU says 83% 
access their internet on their instruments. In 2015, there were 3.2 billion internet users globally, 
up from 400 million in 2000 (ITU, 2015). Two billion of these users were from developing 
countries, according to the ITU statistics.  
3.2  Factors influencing the adoption of the mobile phone 
 
Various factors have favoured the adoption of the mobile phone over other digital technologies, 
but two broad groups of factors can be distinguished from studies. One group relates to factors 
that have to do with the technical structure and usability of the technology itself (Schrock, 2015) 
the second to do with social and environmental factors such as affordability, user technical skills 
and state capacity to provide adequate and appropriate infrastructure. The first group of factors 
relates to the perspective of mobile phone affordances, an understanding of which can help with 
escaping the trap of technological determinism. The affordance perspective emphasises what the 
user can practically achieve with the medium or perceives he can (Schrock, 2015:1230); the 
value or utility he can get out of its utility. Mobile phones may be functional tools, but they are 
only as good as the users actually derive some value from them. In this context, Schrock 
(2015:1229) thus suggests that from a communicative point of view the mobile phone offers 
users four affordances: ‘portability, availability, locatability (or locationality), and 
multimediality’. 
 
As more advanced models of mobile phones with newer features emerge, improved uses have 
also emerged for users. The convergence of multi-media on the smartphone, has increased the 
technology’s utility for users, thus the continued interest in what other, additional uses the 
devices can be put to. Multimedia convergence also gives old technology new life. New or 
additional features for example, strengthen the older technology on the platform, benefitting 
users by offering them new communicative experiences or additional opportunities (Mudhai et 
al, 2009:2-4). 3G technologies for example, have integrated high quality audio, video, and data 
while 4G technologies have, additionally, incorporated dynamic information access and wearable 
devices. In other words, integration of voice, text messaging, internet, GPS, photography and 
video cameras, keyboards, alarm clocks, radio, television, and social media platforms give the 
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user huge communication advantages. The capability of the mobile phone camera to take 
pictures and videos which can then be posted on the net or sent to news organisations, gives the 
mobile phone, as an ICT, what Howard (2011:41) would view as political relevance. The 
keyboard and editing functions on some new models of the new technology literally afford users 
the ability to produce their own content and where and how it can be distributed. This is of 
strategic advantage to citizen or freelance journalists, who can prepare their material in the field 
and transmit it to publishers of their choice. Mudhai et al (2009) also observe that the technology 
allows people to manage interactions and transactions expeditiously, relatively cheaply and with 
efficiency. Thus, in contrast to older modes of communication, mobile phones provide more cost 
effective, more interactive, and more convenient means of communication. As Karefelt and 
Hellstrom, (2012) observe, the capabilities enabled by the convergence allows the mobile phone 
to empower its users -grassroots communities and national groups - to influence economic, social 
and political policies and practices. Ultimately this also improves human rights and democracy. 
 
There are more conveniences introduced by the technical structure of the phone. Improvements 
that have been woven into the device’s structure facilitate an intimate personal relationship 
between it and its user (Goggin and Clark, 2009:586; Katz,2008), with consequences on how the 
user then shapes relations with his social environment. Over the years, the device has become 
smaller, lighter, more compact, conveniently portable, personal, and highly individualized, 
becoming an extension of the self (Schrock, 2015:1236; Campbell and Park, 2008:372; Goggin 
and Clark, 2009:586). It has so reduced in size that it is almost invisible and yet gives the user 
assurance, security, and comfort that it is there and easily reachable. Portability also enhances the 
potential for sharing the device in situations where others have no access to a phone. This is 
possible in situations involving family members and friends as long as issues of privacy are 
agreed and respected.  Even in those situations where it is shared, this does not happen in the 
manner that home or office landlines are shared, where privacy and personal control are lost. It is 
these characteristics and features that some users might regard the device as a powerful, 
functional communication tool. 
 
Mobile phone adoption has also increased because the devices themselves have become more 
accessible. In many countries entry barriers to phone acquisition have been lowered particularly 
50 
 
for individuals (Hellstrom, 2012), increasing the number of sets and therefore their accessibility 
to users. Accessibility has thus become a direct result of affordability of the technology: the more 
affordable the devices have become, the more accessible they have also become. The fact 
however remains, that while they have become an almost indispensable ‘everyman’s’ device for 
populations in the developed world, the situation is considerably different for people in 
developing countries. Despite leapfrogging (Alzouma, 2005) and what appears to be an 
impressive growth in subscriptions, there are still huge areas in developing countries where 
connectivity is still very poor. And lack of connectivity brings its own challenges, such as higher 
costs associated with contracting other means of keeping communication open. For example, 
costs could be incurred because of using transport to facilitate personal contact; or they could be 
in the form of consequences of delays in disseminating information or appropriate action not 
being taken.  
 
As they have become more accessible mobile phones are facilitating ready, constant and 
consistent contact between people. Like landlines, mobile phones can also provide person-to-
person connectivity, but have the advantage of accessibility. Without this capability, it becomes 
more challenging for individuals and institutions to keep each other updated often and 
expeditiously. This affordance, together with mobility, approximate Shrock’s (2015:1237) 
‘availability’ “…a combination of multiplexity, direct contact, and increased frequency.” The 
mobile phone is able to keep lines of communication open but where there is no availability there 
would have to be greater reliance on direct personal contact, or information being communicated 
from one person to another over time. Where great distances are involved and there is lack or 
absence of transport, as many developing countries experience, inability to access mobile phones 
can impact service delivery, social relations, community, and national development. Where the 
phones may be useful in maintaining regular contacts with family and friends, or extending, 
maintaining, or strengthening community ties (Goggin, 2009), it could be argued that their 
absence on the other hand, could lead to a breakdown in social relations and, in extreme cases, 
failure in facilitating interactions that could promote human rights.  
 
Related to the concept of accessibility is that of mobility, the notion that the mobile phone 
facilitates communication 'anywhere any time’ (Lee and Perry, 2002). This discourse around 
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mobility not just being about travelling but about the way mobile phones support people’s 
interactions with each other has become even more interesting beyond Perry and Levison’s early 
observation. As users have become more mobile they are relying on the mobile phone to make 
communication easier and convenient (Rainie and Wellman, 2012:84; Donner, 2008; Overa, in 
Katz, 2008). The cell phone has shown capacity to make the world a ‘smart’ place, a place where 
information is at our fingertips, where-ever we are and at whatever time. People thus move with 
their cell phones both physically and spatially. The smartphone particularly, makes “…the world 
and its components stay in place,” supplying us with intelligence and information and keeping us 
connected (Levison, 2004:118-119). Levison’s conception of the relationship between people’s 
mobility and the instrument’s function in keeping people connected and informed may appear 
antiquated now but it is critical especially in environments marked by repression, distress and 
crises. A study by Porter et al (2014:19)’s of youth mobile adoption in Ghana, Malawi and South 
Africa, for example, established that virtual mobility resulted in ‘leapfrogging’ of problems as 
communication, once established and maintained, allowed the device to intervene in problems 
that, because of distance, could have appeared insurmountable. It is in similar contexts that the 
mobile phone could be viewed as a tool through which professionals, for example, could keep 
connected with their offices and with friends or allow activists to use the device to keep their 
finger on the pulse of human rights issues.  
 
Related to the notion of mobility is that of ‘virtual communities.’ In today’s world where 
communities may be separated and dispersed, mobile communications facilitate contact amongst 
them. The internet offers features which allow diasporic groups who for example share similar 
goals and interests, to interact with each other over the technology’s space, giving prominence to 
the concept of dispersed citizens as virtual communities, (Kang, in Katz, 2008:419; Howard, 
2010:132). The conventional conception is that virtual communities exhibit strong emotional ties 
and shared social conventions; they are in constant communication and active participation, 
sharing information about home or the diaspora, or even sharing material support for each other 
(Kang, in Katz, 2008:419). In developing countries because of increasing mobile phone 




The fact about the device having become a useful internet source can be explored further. In 
addition to enhancing reach and access, interaction and interactivity, mobile phones on 3G and 
4G mobile networks have easier access to the internet. This capability enhances information 
availability and thus makes the technology more preferable, compared to other devices like 
laptops. Kreutz (cited in Ekine, 2010:23) refers to how the internet platform on the mobile phone 
can facilitate research, something ideal for activists. Finding out not just the latest news, but 
specific information is critical for mobile groups like human rights defenders or field monitors, 
who would rely on the internet to give them the most up to date information about their 
environment- be it geographic, political, or cultural- to facilitate their work. Goggin and Clark 
(2009:586) refer to the advantage of accessing radio and television on the mobile phone, noting 
that it is a cheaper and convenient broadcast medium that still manages to keep people connected 
with world events. And of the wide range of social networking sites that are internet-supported 
and accessed on the mobile phone, none are more popular than Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and 
WhatsApp (Ekine, 2010). The sites have increasingly become significant tools for enabling not 
only social interaction but political activism amongst groups.  
 
In some countries mobile phone technology has also become the most adopted because it is the 
only optional technology. This is primarily because of the prohibitive costs of investing in 
landline infrastructure (Hellstrom, 2009; Aker and Mbiti, 2010:208; Raine and Wellman, 
2012:88). The last two authors in particular, argue that even in developed countries, fibre optic 
cable required for landlines renders the technology considerably more expensive than cell 
towers. In developing countries, the situation is aggravated by the fact that infrastructure like 
railways, roads and electricity which could support landline infrastructure in rural areas, 
continues to be poorly developed. This means developers are left with little option but to invest 
in mobile phone infrastructure. Thus, for most people in these countries mobile phones have 
become the only devices for communication (Aker and Mbiti, 2010:208). 
 
 In a world described by Rainie and Wellman, (2012:84) as one of increasing “networked 
individuals” mobile devices with the capabilities explored above are expected to greatly enhance 
communication amongst a wide spectrum of users: urban human rights defenders, lawyers, 
grassroots volunteers, media activists and many others. Human rights activists, by the nature of 
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their work, benefit from being strongly networked using media which allows them to connect 
and interact quickly, easily, and relatively cheaply. Mobile internet and social media platforms 
provide spaces in which these groups can declare public engagement, a process that would 
manifest democracy and empowerment. Because these spaces and platforms are not easily 
manipulated or controlled by the political elite, the argument is then that they have the capacity 
to empower participants. It can be argued further that these spaces allow debate in an atmosphere 
that is free of coercion, offering autonomy and freedom of expression to individual or collective 
participants. Through the open debates- which Edwards (2004:59) calls “dialogic politics,”- civil 
society encourages protagonists to collaborate to resolve differences and citizens to demand 
accountability from their governments, including the protection of their rights. For Human rights 
NGOs, therefore the spaces are crucial for the dissemination of their messages and the promotion 
of democratic processes. They can as easily be turned into realms for potential seeding of 
activism as they can provide opportunities for dialogue with the state. It is however pertinent to 
acknowledge that the spaces opened up by digital media for the interaction of users are not 
without their challenges. Some of them, such as those opened up by the social network platforms 
Facebook or Twitter, have potential for attracting or starting conflicts, even amongst participants 
who share common interests or agendas. Even they may still have differences of opinion which 
can be disruptive. As a result of these shortfalls, it is important to heed the alarm bells sounded 
by Howard (2010), Bratton (2010) and Morozov (2011) that authoritarian states could 
manipulate their way onto online platforms and mobile communications spaces to spy on, 
undermine, distort or disrupt civil society messages and activities.  
3.3  Mobile phones, democracy and human rights 
 
In an address at a Harvard Forum in 2010 Amatya Sen (2010) said the following about mobile 
phones and related technologies’ potential in supporting efforts that challenge oppressive 
regimes as well as protect people’s freedoms: 
Not only can they help communication in the standard way, but they can also help in the 
political struggle against oppression. This is not just through the obvious routes of aiding 
communication among protesters—though that is important, too. There are big concerns 
about dealing with repression in, say, Burma, not to mention North Korea. The mobile 
phone can be an instrument of liberation even against heavy odds, and this is a subject on 
which the authorities are, understandably, scared. Communication is snapped in order to 
keep the population in a state of voice-less and communication-less submission. We 
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know this is an important issue, but we need more understanding of how the mobile 
phone can be used better against the repression of oppressors. We should see more 
clearly how mobile information technology can be used to enhance the battles for 
freedom and against the viability of repressive regimes 
 
What Sen describes here as one of the capabilities of the mobile phone, that of supporting 
political struggles against oppression, is what Larry Diamond (2010) also suggests ‘liberation 
technologies’ do. Diamond (2010:70) describes these ICTs as ones which allow “...citizens to 
report news, expose wrong doing, express opinions, mobilise protests, monitor elections, 
scrutinise government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom,” (Diamond, 
2010:70). This list of mobile phone-enabled capabilities highlights the fundamental issues of 
freedom, participation, accountability, and transparency which Diamond (2008:138) also submits 
affirm the presence of democracy. In other words, the mobile phone is one of those technologies 
which is being deployed to promote democracy and human rights. Sen’s warning about 
authoritarian clamp downs on mobile communications when the technologies are used to 
challenge governments with these tendencies, brings up one aspect of what this thesis is 
exploring in the context of Zimbabwe: “…how mobile information technology can be used to 
enhance battles for freedom…” to quote him.  
 
The potential in using the mobile phone to contest or promote various human rights issues is 
evidenced by various studies. Kaplan’s studies (2006) show evidence of the mobile phone’s 
capability to facilitate access to information and services aimed at transforming people’s health; 
Chiumbu and Chinyamanhindi, (2012), Etzo and Collender, (2010) and Aker & Mbiti, (2010) 
explore the technology’s usefulness in facilitating economic transformations which improve 
people’s lives while Mabweazara (2011) Last Moyo (2013) and Mare (2013) have researched the 
technology’s contributions in print media readership participation in news content production. 
Among other things Mabweazara, (2011:705), established that mobile phone deployment by 
Zimbabwe’s mainstream journalists resulted in the broadening of news sources from the 
traditional elite-dominated practice to wider participation by ordinary citizens in newsmaking. 
With increased direct mobile-mediated interactions between ordinary citizens and journalists, 
government sources or the elite no longer had monopoly as news sources. The newsroom also no 
longer had monopoly in defining what constituted news as perspectives from ordinary citizens 
increased discourses that could not be ignored. SMS alerts from human rights NGOs always 
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presented credible news that official sources did not report. Mabweazara further established that 
SMS text messaging, beeping and hidden IDs played important functions in interactions with 
news sources, especially in receiving news/tip-offs or protecting news sources. Last Moyo 
(2013) established that radio was creatively tapping into mobile phone technology when the 
latter facilitated audience participation in content-making through phone-ins.  
 
Wasserman, (2005, 2007, 2011); Dumisani Moyo, (2009) and Atwood and Clark (2010) also 
explored the technology’s capability to influence transformations in African politics. For 
Dumisani Moyo (2009), the use of SMS by citizens to monitor and expose irregularities in 
Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections had some influence in the decision by Southern African regional 
leaders to force Mugabe to accept a government of national unity with the opposition. These 
examples may relate to the African continent, but they are no doubt replicated in other parts of 
the developing world. The bottom-line is that in facilitating all these changes, which could be 
seen as social change, mobile phones can objectively be viewed as enablers of empowerment, 
(Heacock, 2009; Bennet, in Van de Donk, 2004:141) human rights and democracy. 
 
Another example could be drawn from Patrick Meier’s (2011) studies of the Ushahidi platform, 
although the platform is not closely distinguished in this study15. Seeking to establish if the ICT 
platform, as deployed in restive regions like Egypt, Kenya and other North African countries, 
could be viewed as a liberation technology, Meier (2011:216) established that it was the mobile 
phone’s role in that platform that indeed qualified Ushahidi as one. He saw Ushahidi’s 
dependence on the phone for voice and SMS in crowd-sourcing information which could be used 
by resistance movements in civil society to challenge repression and undemocratic tendencies, as 
proof of the device’s significance. Meier held that increased access by civil society actors to 
ICTs like the platform and other mobile communications, would lead to information sharing, 
which in turn would result in shared awareness of problems. The shared awareness would 
ultimately result in synchronised response against repression (ibid, 216). Goldstein and Rotich 
(2008), who had even earlier researched the platform’s use in Kenya’s 2007-8 Presidential post-
election crisis had also proved that mobile phones, SMS and other digital applications were 
 




central in facilitating crowd-sourcing of information- particularly on ethnic violence and the 
perpetrators- as well as catalisation of citizen journalism and human rights campaigns (Goldstein 
and Rotich, 2008:1).  
3.4 Mobile phones and some human rights challenges 
 
Literature thus abounds that suggests the use of mobile communications to support democratic 
practices in general (Diamond, 2010). This study is about specific human rights and the sections 
which follow explore, further, literature in the context of some of these specific areas: 
monitoring electoral processes, litigating and enforcing fairness, ensuring the security and 
personal safety of activists, projecting a community voice by supporting or promoting citizen 
journalism, and facilitating network relationships. The function of the mobile phone in all these 
strategies or tactics is to facilitate the protection and empowerment of activists, ordinary citizens 
or even institutions.  
 
3.4.1  Ensuring citizen participation in political choice  
 
One of the more keenly contested fields in developing countries is that of elections. This is 
because of the prevalence of violence and electoral fraud. Mobile phones have become a 
strategic tool for recording violations as well as monitoring the entire electoral process. Their 
facilitation of the electoral processes, including the conduct of the elections themselves, have led 
to the conclusion that the technology facilitates citizen participation in these processes. The 
integrated services/capabilities discussed above are critical elements in electoral activism.  
 
As the previous section suggests, the mobile phone’s text messaging and video services (SMS, 
Messenger, WhatsApp, photo, and video capture) enable civil society groups to record and 
present not just incidents of election fraud but of other violations. Rheingold (in Katz, 2008:227) 
cites the example of the use of SMS by Kenyan electoral authorities to distribute news about the 
country’s 2007 elections. Dumisani Moyo (2009)’s study of Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections 
highlights how SMS proved a powerful medium for citizen journalists and civil society observers 
to expose electoral discrepancies which led to the rejection of the election results by the 
opposition and international community, and, in the end, formation of a Government of National 
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Unity. Some of the discrepancies were supported by mobile images of contested results posted 
outside polling booths. The images presented by the opposition as proof of the correct results, 
became instrumental in the party threatening litigatory action and mass civil unrest, convincing 
Southern African leaders that the elections had not been fair. 
 
Ushahidi, as suggested above, is one of the better-known platforms for monitoring elections, 
although it has also become popular for monitoring and reporting crises (Meier, 2010, 2012). 
Apart from the studies by Goldstein and Rotich (2008), those by Rebecca Heacock (2009) and 
Meier (2013) are equally enlightening on the use of mobile communications by the platform in 
election monitoring. The studies almost replicated Goldstein and Rotich’s in terms of 
crowdsourcing information, but also showed that incidents of post-election violence texted or 
called into monitoring centres in Nairobi were logged onto the Ushahidi platform to produce 
crisis maps. The maps became sources of media reports as well as government and activist 
interventions. Heacock (2009:2) also researched use of digital media in Nigeria’s 2007 elections, 
establishing that the example of an NGO managing to collect 10 000 SMS text messages from 
voters about the elections, showed the platform could effectively facilitate citizen participation in 
electoral processes, both as evaluators and voters. Months leading up to the elections had been 
marked by violence, apart from fears of electoral fraud. When the losing party challenged the 
results of the election, it was mainly because of reference to the NGO’s results that the Nigerian 
court upheld them (ibid, 2). 
 
3.4.2  Assuring citizens and HRDs of security and personal safety  
 
Human rights violations tend to increase in situations of stress, crisis or conflict and adoption of 
digital media by both individuals and NGOs working under these circumstances also appears to 
increase. Because it can easily be carried on the person, and is therefore capable of supporting 
physical and virtual mobility by users, the mobile phone can be seen as a strategic enabler of 
safety and security. Best (2011, in Poblet, 2011) gives an example from Liberia, West Africa, 
one of the world’s worst sources of violence and human rights abuses, which reinforces the 
personal protection function of the device. “In Liberia people cling to their mobile phones as 
tools for security and safety. They use phones to combat crime, sexual violence and to help in 
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medical emergencies,” he says (Ibid,5). Does the device have this potential in the Zimbabwean 
environment? 
 
In addition to assuring users of their personal security, other empirical studies have added an 
empowerment dimension to the mobile phone’s function in distressed situations. In Uganda for 
example, the NGO known as Women of Uganda NET (WOUGNET), encourages women, many 
of whom have subsequently turned activist, to use the mobile phone not only for personal 
security but as a means of empowering themselves (Madanda et al, 2009). Women whose phones 
are monitored by jealous husbands or boyfriends circumvent intrusion into their privacy by using 
a second sim-card, to report cases of harassment by the partners to relevant authorities, or 
discussing incidences and possible solutions amongst themselves (Madanda et al, 2009; 
WOUGNET). Yet other studies show that deployment of mobile phones and applications can 
facilitate immediate interventions. Hotlines for example, give human rights defenders (HRDs) a 
sense of immediacy which translates to a greater sense of security. This is a common feature of 
HRD protection strategy (Nah et al, 2013:412) where the facility provides immediate 
interventions for individuals in distress, particularly so in conflict environments (Shaver, 
2016:4)16.  
 
Violations are not just against ordinary citizens. As a matter of fact most are against human 
rights defenders (HRDs) themselves, the activists who seek to protect others. One of the primary 
concerns of such activists in repressive environments, especially those involved in using the 
phone for interventions, mobilisation and other collective actions, is to be anonymous but, at the 
same time, be as effective as possible. Anonymity is almost guaranteed in situations where 
simcard registration is not effected. While in most developed countries users are not legally 
required to register their simcards-and thus use the phone anonymously- this is a mandatory 
requirement in several developing countries. The requirement poses privacy and security risks 
(Carly Nyst, 2013; NGO Forum, 2013, 2016:11). Simcard registration requirements include 
users providing their name, address, gender, and phone number, information which could be 
used to identify and track them. Where there is no risk or fear of being traced through this 
 
16  Shaver’s example of a conflict environment though, is more extreme, as the author refers to a war or insurgency 
environment rather than one filled with political tension. 
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process, activists can use the phone to plan and mobilise collective action, to document and 
report violations or to call for emergency interventions. 
 
Mobile anonymity makes it difficult for authorities to track human rights defenders or demo 
organisers for instance, an outcome which makes it difficult for the state to undermine the 
activists or break up demos because of the technology’s capability in viral messaging. One of the 
celebrated examples is ofcourse Rheingold’s (2002) ‘Smart Mobs’ in which the author describes 
how thousands of mobile phone users were drawn into Manilla’s streets by SMS texts in 2001 to 
demonstrate against the Philippine President, Joseph Estrada’s corrupt government.  
 
3.4.3  Citizen journalism, WhatsApp and giving communities a voice. 
 
Citizen media, the practice of citizen journalism, according to Rodriguez (2001), is one 
dimension of what authors have variously described as alternative media (Atton, 2002); 
community media (Carpentier et al, 2003,2008), radical media (Downing, 2001), and, lately, 
critical alternative media (Fuchs, 2010). Associated mostly with social movements alternative 
media often challenge mainstream or dominant discourses (Mattoni et al. 2010), one explanation 
for Downing (2001: v) viewing his version, radical media, as expressing “… an alternative vision 
to hegemonic policies, priorities and perspectives.” Whatever dimension of alternative media is 
adopted it is aimed at serving its community; it is free from state and market influences and 
offers discourses that are counter to current structures and practices of power (Carpentier et 
al.2008). It is however Fuchs’ (2010) notion of alternative media, which is grounded in Marxism 
and has gained currency with African scholars like Mano and Mukhongo (2016:27-28), which 
has close resonance with what citizen or community journalism in repressed environments is 
meant to achieve: “…challenge the dominant forms of media, production, media structures, 
content, distribution and reception (Fuchs, 2010:178) as well as support the eradication of 
exploitation and oppression (ibid, 182). Media in these environments aims to respond to the 
information needs of marginalised, fringe, disempowered groups-which Mano and Mukhongo 
(2016:27) also describe as the ‘have-nots’- groups of citizens also marginalised by state-
controlled or institutionalised journalism. Mano and Mukhongo thus argue that Fuchs’ definition 
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of alternative media “goes beyond alternative media activism, to encompass media literacy and 
other elements of media democratisation (2016:27).  
At the centre of Rodriguez’ notion of citizen media, is recognition that the practices and 
processes of producing information are driven by the communities themselves using available 
technologies, which often include digital technologies. Thus, in terms of practice, citizen 
journalism is characterised by the involvement of ordinary, independent citizens, who, 
unconstrained by traditional media practices and processes, take the initiative “… to report news 
or express views about happenings within their community,” (Banda, 2010:26). Because they are 
often volunteers from the communities, the journalists rely on their own resources to source, 
produce and distribute news, unfettered by professional, institutional journalism strictures 
(ibid.28). Institutional or conventional journalism is held together by regulations, professional 
standards, shared values and teamwork, and institution-supported technologies used in news 
production. 
 
The practice of citizen journalism also draws part of its attraction from the fact that even if the 
journalist lacks professional training, his personal involvement with events on the ground, the 
aspect of ‘personal witnessing’ (Allan et al, 2007:373) carries more value than perspectives 
presented by institutional ‘helicopter’ practitioners. For example, when the Egyptian government 
shut down the internet and mobile phone networks during the 2011 Arab Spring, Aouragh and 
Alexander (2011:1352) observe that it was citizen journalists, reporting from personal 
experiences, who became alternative sources of news/content for Al Jazeera. Allan et al 
(2007:382) suggest that through personal witnessing and online reporting citizen journalism has 
the capability to present “alternative perspectives, contexts and ideological diversity to news 
reports.” Distant voices, which could otherwise be marginalised or even silenced, or human 
rights violations which could go unreported, can be broadcast. Mutsvairo (2015:51) drives the 
point of community involvement home when he explains his findings following a research in a 
rural Zimbabwe setting. He sought to establish if digital technologies, as deployed by citizen 
journalists in this setting could be considered trusted news providers as well as enablers of 
contests against repression. He concluded that while the technologies could be said to achieve 
these objectives, it was the involvement of the citizen journalist, as a member of the community 
deeply involved in its issues, that was of greater significance. Citizen participation in community 
61 
 
issues alone, even without the help of mobile phones or other digital technologies, was sufficient 
to guarantee the trustworthiness of the news.  
Within the assemblage of digital media that citizen journalists rely on in news production, 
mobile phones now occupy the most central place, with social networking sites or applications 
Facebook, Twitter, You Tube and WhatsApp the most regularly accessed on devices with 
internet capabilities. Mano and Mukhongo, (2017:27) contend that on the African continent 
Facebook together with Twitter, as alternative forms of communication, are reshaping alternative 
media suggesting that proof of the significance of the platforms can be seen in the attempts by 
African authoritarian governments to control or censor the platforms because of fears that 
oppositional forces are increasingly using them to criticise the ruling elite. But experiences from 
crises zones have heightened the importance of WhatsApp. Despite its recency and scant 
research in its effectiveness, writers like Said-Moorhouse, (2016) Albaih, (2015) and Dempsey 
(2015) suggest that WhatsApp is emerging as one of the most essential communication tools for 
activists and citizen reporters operating in repressive environments. Said-Moorhouse (2016) 
observes for example that in war-ravaged Syria the application was being deployed by activists 
and ordinary citizens to document and share images and videos of violence, initially amongst 
themselves and then with the rest of the world so that people removed from the horrors of the 
Syrian war can understand the “crimes taking place” in the country. In this context WhatsApp 
could therefore be viewed as an instrument to document and expose atrocities, for local and 
global judgment. Albaih (2015) reports that in Sudan the application had fuelled a ‘sharing 
revolution’ in which activists, journalists, artists and many other groups shared views, news and 
critical artistic works without fear because of the application’s encryption. Additionally, because 
of its affordability and the speed with which it can be used to document, report and transmit 
events, as well as the capacity to retain anonymity and security for users through encryption the 
application was replacing the more common platforms through which news had been passed: 
websites, newspapers and even the social mediums, Facebook and Twitter.  
 
Significantly, with respect to citizen reporters and in parts of the world which are shunned by or 
inaccessible to mainstream journalists, the application has become the preferred tool to report 
election irregularities, conflicts, health crisis and other issues often misrepresented by 
mainstream state media (Dempsey, 2015). In Nigeria for example, where government troops 
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have been engaged in a protracted and violent conflict with Boko Haram, or remote 
constituencies where election processes have been contested, it is citizen journalists immersed in 
their communities and using WhatsApp, who have captured and reported aspects of the conflicts. 
Describing this type of reporting as ‘reporting from the frontline’, Dempsey (2015) posits that 
use of WhatsApp in these circumstances allows the world to read powerful, moving and 
authentic testimonies from the actual sources, at the same time empowering the journalists. This 
is because of the application’s capabilities. But the point about reaching out to the world is also 
exactly the point that Allan et al (2007:382) make about the impact of citizen journalism. In 
Nigeria’s case, supported by an NGO that promotes communication rights, On Our Radar, these 
remotely located citizen journalists are encouraged to utilise WhatsApp’s capabilities to 
document and instantaneously transmit images, video, audio and text to the organisation, who 
moderate the stories before sending them out to reputable local and international media 
(Dempsey, 2015). The moderation process ensures credibility of the stories. From Southern 
Africa, Mujere and Mwatwara researched the role played by citizen journalism through 
Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter in Zimbabwe’s 2008 and 2013 elections and suggested that 
these social media supported the emergence of a counter publics resistant to state power (cited in 
Mutsvairo, 2016:x).  
 
3.4.4  Networks and alliances: generating international support  
 
Digital media platforms highlight human rights violations more glaringly than old media 
platforms. Where networks of local and international institutions and NGOs are strong, they can 
use these new platforms to more effectively expose and force accountability for the violations 
than old mass media could. Mobile communications can also stimulate stronger amplification of 
the voice of smaller actors by bigger or stronger network partners. For example, studies in Africa 
by Wasserman (2005) and Chiumbu (2012) established that national, regional, and international 
partnerships, properly managed in the communication and networking processes, can consolidate 
their power and resources to assume the cause of grassroots or domestic NGOs, amplifying their 
communication and helping put pressure on governments. Wasserman’s 2005 study was about a 
South African activist group, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which sought to promote the 
right of South Africans to access and disseminate information about HIV/AIDS by using the 
power of consolidated local and international networks. The study also sought to demonstrate 
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‘…how a network can be established which simultaneously consolidates African organisations 
around an issue while opening this Pan-African network, via postings to other email lists, to 
global users forming communities of interest (2005:176)”. The HIV/AIDS challenge, has, for 
many developing countries, developed into an emotive human rights issue whose message can be 
amplified by strong and multiple networks. Although in this case e-mail lists were a primary 
platform through which links with other network partners were formed, Wasserman’s study also 
worked with a mix of platforms, including the mobile phone, to enhance the diffusion of the 
messages. Chiumbu’s study (2012), coming seven years later, looked at how the NGO, the Anti 
Eviction Campaign, used mobile phones and other digital media technologies to mobilise both 
local and international partners to respond to and intervene in the emotive issue of eviction of 
homeless groups in Cape Town. Chiumbu concluded that mobile phones work more effectively 
when combined with other media and that social movements’ mobilization, identity setting and 
network strengthening campaigns would benefit from adopting technology mixes. The findings 
may point to the efficacy of technology mixes, but they also emphasise the potential of networks 
in amplifying messages about human rights challenges. 
 
However, simply being a member of a network or coalition is not enough to ensure that the 
technology achieves its purpose. The networks must be relevant and generate public attention to 
the NGO’s cause. Civil society may have the technology to monitor violations but there is, 
unfortunately “…a scarcity of both news media and public attention…” (Thrall et al., 2014: 136). 
In other words, information about the violations must get the attention of international media and 
international public. The approach of focusing on the role of digital media technologies that 
protect human rights is understandable but is not sufficient to achieve comprehensive protection. 
Apart from focusing on the technologies, the writers propose that emphasis should also be placed 
on why there is a lack of global news media attention to violations. Their proposal is based on 
findings from an analysis of the efforts by 257 transnational Human rights NGOs –a few of them 
in Africa-to generate attention in international mainstream news and social media on human 
rights issues. The findings suggest that global NGOs-such as Amnesty International, Doctors 
Without Borders and Save the Children -with strong brands and adequate resources (big budgets 
and global presence) are more able to generate news and political interest than smaller and 
poorer funded ones. They have global presence and professionals with skills and expertise “…to 
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demonstrate credibility on the issues and to interact effectively with legal, governmental, 
academic and journalistic audiences,” (Thrall et al, 2014:144). In short, global response becomes 
a product of the quality of the reports from the smaller NGOs, as well as the profile (resource 
capability, size, networking, capability) of the initiating NGO. Smaller NGOs face disadvantages 
in reaching international media and networks because they are not well known and therefore 
spend more to build “brand” recognition or identity. They also lack resources to market 
themselves and attract people to their websites and Twitter feeds and, finally, the quality of their 
information cannot match that of the bigger NGOs (Thrall et al, 2014:144-5). In the context of 
this study the authors’ findings and recommendations are relevant: given the country’s poor 
human rights record, the results of human rights mobile phone protection efforts require 
international support. 
3.5  Challenges to human rights protection 
 
This section discusses state-initiated obstacles and risks that human rights NGOs face in 
deploying mobile phones to protect human rights. Most authoritarian regimes follow a broad 
strategy that involves censorship, deployment of surveillance technologies and structures-
including co-opting private telecommunications providers, blocking or taking down SMS and 
GPS and GPRS tracking- the use of physical force, legal enforcements, and political threats 
(Zicardi, 2016; Morozov, 2011; Howard, 2010, MacKinnon, 2010, 2012). Surveillance however 
is the more pervasive element of the strategy. 
 
3.5.1  Threat of censorship, surveillance and interception  
 
Writers who have hailed the potential of the digital media as “liberation technologies” capable of 
mediating in democracy and empowering processes, have at the same time warned that there are 
challenges (Diamond, 2010; Meier,2011; MacKinnon, 2012). Some of the ICTs, particularly the 
internet, have a dark side, as Morozov, (2011) would put it, which implies risk for human rights 
and democracy. Heeks and Seo-Zindy (2013) and Howard and Hussain (2013:73) warn against 
developing a sweeping perspective about digital-driven democracy as ICTs can be used even by 
democratic governments to interfere with or censor digital networks. Besides warnings about the 
potential of new digital technologies to create divides between rich and poor nations, rural and 
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urban populations and gender and age groups (Fuchs and Horak, 2008; van Dijk, 2006;) there 
have also been concerns over their potential to be turned into socially divisive and politically 
repressive technologies (Bratton, 2013).  
 
Authoritarian regimes’ investments in suppression strategies and technologies, including 
collaborations with governments of similar inclinations, to neutralize activists have increased. 
Criticism and dissent are severely curtailed and human rights and democracy are heavily 
undermined. But why do authoritarian regimes use surveillance? Interception? Or censorship? 
Surveillance is a strategy often associated with attempts to conceal, repress, or dominate. Fuchs 
et al (2012:43) suggest surveillance aims to control the behavior of individuals or groups by 
warning them that their “…appearance, movements, locations or ideas are or could be watched 
by surveillance systems.” Monahan (2006:12) makes a similar observation, arguing that State or 
corporate policing is meant to be a deterrent and to alter what the state considers to be deviant 
behavior. Surveillance and its technologies “…act as forms of social engineering that legislate 
norms for acceptable and unacceptable behaviors and actions, and they accomplish this by 
individualizing people,” (ibid,12). Individualization would be associated with bringing division 
amongst individuals or groups who might share the same views. Individualisation disturbs 
consensus, with the result that each individual must then be responsible for their views and 
behaviour. People acting alone are more vulnerable and easier to influence. The notion of 
individualization also creates the impression of people being singled out for tracking and 
monitoring.  
 
Fuchs and his colleagues (2012) also suggest that surveillance creates cultures of fear amongst 
those under observation. By creating these cultures surveillance overtly diminishes the potential 
for democracy, freedom, and human rights observance. They suggest that political electronic 
surveillance invariably threatens ordinary citizens and civil society groups with the prospect of 
violence and constant security harassment which could also involve the use of legal instruments- 
a suggestion, it could be argued, which serves to reinforce the point about technology creating 
cultures of fear and curtailing freedom and democracy. Monahan (2006:16) argues that 
surveillance appears to be more invasively applied to marginalized groups because their poverty 
appears to expose the failures of the elite, resulting in the latter being uneasy and fearful. Thus, 
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Monahan posits, the inherent politics of technologies or their capacity to generate power 
relations and possibilities gives the marginalized the appearance of a threatening force to 
corporate and political structures.  He adds that for the elite the threat lies in the fact that 
information empowers marginalized groups to make demands on political and corporate 
structures. This tends to create a vicious cycle of fear, counter threats and repression.  
 
In repressed environments, the state tends to turn its surveillance efforts against civil society 
because they are in the forefront of protecting the (rights) disempowered. In the case of 
authoritarian governments versus civil society, surveillance, interception, and censorship is a 
strategy used against the latter for challenging repression, dominance, and concealments by the 
former. Amongst authors who have written about this challenge to democracy and human rights, 
Howard (2011) offers sufficient theoretical grounding and empirical evidence in his analysis of 
examples from the Muslim world. To him the technologies are part of states’ toolkit to manage 
information flow and restrict political opinion (2011:175). Focusing on Zimbabwe Gwagwa 
(2013), Tendi (2016) and McGreggor (2013) suggest that the strategy, bolstered by legislative 
and administrative proscriptions, has the effect of curbing citizens’ freedoms and curtailing 
challenges against the hegemony of the regime.  
 
3.5.2 Other state tactics that compromise human rights protection 
 
Authoritarian states use a wide variety of other tactics against civil society activists. Hope 
(2011:9) identifies a comprehensive list of the tactics, the most invasive of which involves co-
optation of telecommunications services to assist law enforcement agencies with investigations 
of user accounts and GPS tracking of cell phones and mobile devices with location-based 
services. Operators may also be instructed to install network equipment which could either 
restrict certain content or allow data to be collected by network managers. Hope adds that other 
tactics include state invasion of websites to remove, block or filter undesirable content; 
deactivating user accounts; forcing companies that host data “in the cloud” to gate-keep the data, 
or provide it to recipients who are not entitled to it; installing equipment which could either 
restrict certain content or allow data to be collected by network managers when it should not be 
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and, finally pre-installing software in consumer electronics which can restrict access to certain 
content, unscramble encrypted information or allow for surveillance. 
MacKinnon (2010) and several other authors (Su et al,2013; Jones, 2014; Li, 2010) have 
identified China as one example of states using some of these tactics. MacKinnon (2010: xxii) 
gives the example of China co-opting private operators, a strategy that she says creates 
‘Networked authoritarianism.’ Li (2010:73) refers to self-censorship amongst website 
moderators. The co-optation gives the semblance of being voluntary on the part of 
telecommunications operators, but it is really because they fear losing licenses, being shut down 
or facing other forms of state harassment if they refuse to co-operate. MacKinnon also observes 
that this co-optation has become so entrenched that some operators may no longer see the 
practice as unethical and even repressive towards users of their networks. Activists find this form 
of harassment difficult to circumvent technically as the network of surveillance and interception 
is wide, invasive, and unpredictable. The tactics also present security and privacy risks. The risks 
invariably increase when legislation bolsters the surveillance and interception strategy, or, as 
argued by O’Donnell (1998) and in the Human rights chapter, when the judicial system is 
reluctant to prosecute offending state institutions or actors. 
 
Enforcement of simcard registration, which has been discussed in a preceding section, is another 
strategy which has the potential of exposing HRDs to state surveillance and potential repression 
(Crowe, 2013). The registration process exposes subscriber information to state security 
institutions, putting activists at risk of surveillance. In extreme cases, like in Zimbabwe, the 
requirement for involuntary sim registration is enforced by threats of imprisonment (NGO 
Forum, 2013). In some cases, the risk is sometimes disguised in governance projects such as 
mobile voter registration. Crowe (2013) in-fact warns that citizen voter registration and crime 
and corruption reporting via cellular phones might appear progressive, but can just as easily 
expose personal data to state surveillance and possible persecution. She observes that some 
technical features of the device make surveillance more sophisticated and threatening: for 
example, file size has grown, databases are dispersed and easily accessed by central institutions 
and the speed of data flow has increased. As Gary Marx (2002, quoted in Fuchs et al., 2012:2) 
warns, the ‘surveillant’ can now know more about the person being monitored than the person 
knows about themselves.  
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The foregoing discussion can be viewed against the backdrop of two schools of thought on the 
usefulness of ICTs in contesting repressive regimes. One maintains that networked 
communication, particularly where cellphones are used, vastly reduce costs enabling activists, 
for example, to more easily organize or co-ordinate against repression (Christensen and Garfias, 
2015:27; Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 2013). The other counters that repressive governments have, 
at the same time, become increasingly knowledgeable and competent in developing counter 
strategies which may involve acquiring and using surveillance technologies, censorship, or 
regulating ICT use by activist groups (Meier, 2011; Morozov, 2011: 82,145). The list of risks 
and threats outlined above by Crowe is instructive. Mobile phones can also be tracked by GPS or 
have their text messages traced through their registered numbers. Linnet Taylor (2014) makes 
this threat even more compelling when she argues that because the mobile phone can be tracked, 
and therefore its user, it must leave traces that can be used to control it, thus exposing the user to 
surveillance. For human rights activists, the development could make the device as dangerous as 
it is useful. NGOs respond differently to these aggressive authoritarian tactics but a notable 
response has been to mobilise circumvention resources. Sabry and Ftouni (2016) describe the 
successful use of the Tor circumvention software by activists during the Arab Spring uprisings, 
and parallel interest in the use of similar software by Tactical Technology Collective. Stepanova, 
(2011), Aday et al, (2012) and Monacardo and Tersei, (2016) highlight other examples on the 
usefulness of digital activist tools in challenging repressive regimes and impacting democratic 
processes in general, but still Howard’s (2011) warning about state capabilities in countering 
activist tools should be heeded.  
3.6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed several issues relevant to investigating the usefulness of mobile 
technology in contesting human rights violations. There has been a simple but comprehensive 
assessment of some of the affordances of mobile phone technology which gives insights into 
why civil society adopts the device. Notions of public communication spaces for NGOs, virtual 
communication, phone accessibility and mobility have been explored, given that the 
communication experiences of actors within the operational structures of the case studies may be 
influenced by these circumstances of phone deployment. The discussion has also touched on the 
concept of networks and alliances and how they function to facilitate interventions and group 
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support in situations of human rights violations. Some views on the efficacy of the device in 
offering personal protection and security to activists and ordinary citizens under conflicted 
environments have also been canvassed. Fuchs and his colleagues’ observation (2012) that 
authoritarian governments use repressive tactics to achieve particular goals, the primary one 
being to create fear, is important in this study, as I would argue that in Zimbabwe, civil society 
and citizens’ fear of government reprisals appears to have entrenched human rights abuses. It is 
necessary to have some understanding of the psychology behind authoritarian tendencies of 






















Zimbabwe: the context 
4.  Introduction 
This chapter looks at some of the issues that impact the observance of human rights in 
Zimbabwe, and is meant to allow for a better understanding of the environment in which digital 
media, especially the mobile phone, are being deployed to protect human rights. The chapter 
explores several broad areas: the political environment; the mobile communications 
environment, the legal environment- specifically some of the laws which have impacted human 
rights observance- NGOs and the human rights environment, including the role of human rights 
NGOs and their relations with the state, and a brief assessment of human rights violations since 
independence. The chapter also explores the state’s surveillance capabilities, highlighting their 
potential to impact civil society oganisations’ protection efforts.  
4.1  Political, social and economic environment 
 
Since the country’s independence in 1980, the political landscape has been dominated by the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF), a merger of the political parties ZANU and 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). The country enjoyed only five years of post-
independence peace before entering years of political, electoral and economic crises from 1985. 
Political challenges included the violent clashes between elements of the former Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) military fighters and government forces in Matebeleland which 
led to the loss of almost 20 000 civilian lives, and marked the country’s blackest episode of 
human rights violations (Sachikonye, 2011). Political challenges were compounded by droughts, 
government involvement in regional military ventures, economic mismanagement, corruption, 
and the entry of serious political opposition in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) in 1999.  It was however the ruling party’s response to MDC’s entry that sparked off 
other crises. For instance, the land reform programme that was launched then, much as it has 
been lauded for addressing racially-based land inequalities, was chaotic and resulted in massive 
displacement of families from farms and mines as well as a drop in agricultural productivity 
between 2000 and 2009 and then after 2013 (Figure 4.5). The biggest challenge though has been 
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the ruling party’s reluctance to review a legal environment with several laws that have severely 
curtailed citizens’ rights and democratic processes.  
 
Although these developments affect the entire population, they have particular significance to 
rural populations because they form the ruling party’s electoral stronghold and at the same time 
civil society’s major constituents for welfare services, development programmes and human 
rights protection. At the last census in 2012 Zimbabwe had a population of 12.97 million 17 of 
which 61.7% lived in rural areas and 51.9 % were women (Zim Stats, 2012)18. The map and 
table below show the population distribution by province and gender. The country also has one 
of Africa’s highest literacy rates (94% for women and 96% for men) (UNICEF Report for 2010-
2011). Almost 70% of Zimbabwe’s population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods which 
means it is the sector that also assures stability for the country. Male migration has resulted in 
60% of rural households being female-headed and thus the major contributors to family-farming. 
The statistics are thus significant for two reasons: first they may explain the prevalence of 
development and welfare NGOs in rural areas and the need to empower women. Second, as 
prime victims of inequalities and oppression (Mazingi and Kamidza in Jauch and Muchena, 
2011:334) women become a major concern for human rights organisations.  
Figure 4.1- Zimbabwe’s Provinces & Population Ratios (2014) 
 
 
17 The population is located in ten provinces: Midlands, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central, the Midlands, 
Harare, Bulawayo, Manicaland, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, Matebeleland North and Matebeleland South. 
18 Zim Stats still publishes the figure of 12 973 8008 but says as at 18th August 2012 population was 13 061 239  
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 Table 4.1 Population per province by gender (Figures courtesy of ZimStats 2012) 
  Figure 2:  Total Population by Sex and by Province, Zimbabwe 2002 -2012 
 








Total 2002 Growth Rate 
Province  Males   Female           l   Males   Females        2002-2012  
Bulawayo  304 446  351 229     655 675  323 550  353 100    676 650  -0,3%  
Manicaland   831 762  923 238  1 755 000  747 242  821 688  1 568 930  1,1%  
Mash Central   559 702  580 238  1 139 940  488 695  506 732     995 427  1,3%  
Mash East   648 207  688 852  1 337 059  545 898  581 515  1 127 413  1,7%  
Mash West   721 218  728 720  1 449 938  609 778  614 892  1 224 670  1,7%  
Mat. North   359 173  384 698     743 871  340 475  364 473     704 948  0,5%  
Mat. South   328 009  357 037     685 046  309 316  343 738     653 054  0,5%  
Midlands   779 233  843 243  1 622 476  703 831  760 162  1 463 993  1,0%  
Masvingo   691 350  795 254  1 486 604  702 429  618 009  1 320 438  1,2%  
Harare   1 011 831  1 086 368  2 098 199  947 386  948 748  1 896 134  1,0%  
Total   6 234 931  6 738 877  12 973 808  5 718 600  5 913 057  11 631 657  1,1%  
                 
4.2  The media environment 
 
For NGO targets, as indeed for the rest of the public, a well-developed, non-partisan media 
infrastructure is important for effective information access and dissemination. Zimbabwe’s 
media infrastructure is however predominantly state controlled and at the same time not highly 
developed. As at the end of December 2016 the state controlled one television and six radio 
stations, had influence in six commercial radio stations because the owners had links to the 
ruling party and controlled 11 national and regional newspapers and one news agency. The 
media landscape also featured six independent newspapers, two foreign-based radio stations and 
over 50 internet/online news outlets. However, it was mainly urban populations who had access 
to the private media as the papers were banned from rural areas by ruling party structures. 
 
Radio has remained the primary means of accessing information (Mano,2004, 2009) for most 
rural and urban populations but because all state radio stations broadcast on medium range 
frequencies, and only inside the country (MISA, 2015), civil society regards this as a form of 
information control by the state. Inadequacies in physical broadcasting infrastructure are not 
helpful. In 2010 radio uptake in rural areas was 35,8% while television penetration was only 
12,5% (ZIMSTAT, 2010: xiv). Some rural areas with weak ZBC signals resort to foreign 
broadcasts on short frequencies but government censors them by jamming the frequencies (for 
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example Radio Voice of the People, Voice Of America) or confiscating the radio sets from rural 
populations. The state controlled media has ostracized human rights NGOs, forcing them to 
consider alternative communication platforms. Mobile network operators provide those 
platforms. 
4.3 Transport and telecommunications 
 
Transport and telecommunications infrastructure have significant influence on NGO programme 
delivery, thus on human rights promotion and protection. Road, rail and telecommunications 
infrastructure, which had deteriorated during the crisis years underwent rehabilitation (Zunguze, 
2009:6). Telecommunications network upgrades ran parallel to highways and railway lines, 
connecting cities and towns, an infrastructural growth pattern that some NGOs simulated when 
they were establishing offices and projects. The country’s major telecommunications companies 
also located in cities and towns, taking advantage of the electric grid, transport, street, and other 
service infrastructure to grow their ICT products and services further. Most NGOs are located in 
the peripheries of city Central Business Districts.  
 
Three Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) Econet, NetOne and Telecel have dominated the 
country’s telecommunications landscape since the mid-90s, the last two wholly or partially-
owned by government. State-owned TelOne is the sole provider of fixed lines although the 
landscape was opened for competition. Econet forced telecommunications liberalisation after a 
court win in 1997 (Takavarasha and Makumbe, 2012). Thereafter mobile phone and internet 
communications grew considerably. The biggest growth though occurred from 2009 (POTRAZ 
Post, June 2013) when the Government of National Unity superintended over considerable 
investments into telecommunications by the operators and government. Econet for example spent 
$1,2 billion between 1998-2013 in network and infrastructural development and expansion, (with 
over $600m alone spent after ‘dollarisation’)19; Net One spent $200m while government spent 
$34 million. Econet’s investment paid off most, resulting in the operator holding twice the 
mobile and internet subscriber market of Net One and Telecel combined by 2015, despite the two 
 
19 Econet’s huge investment has forced it to resist government attempts to force infrastructure sharing 
amongst the operators to solve connectivity problems. Government argues that sharing would reduce 




being beneficiaries of political patronage (Makumbe & Takavarasha, 2012). Mobile 
subscriptions between the networks grew from 266 441 in 2000 to 9.0 million in 2011 and 11,9 
million by July 2015 (POTRAZ 2015) while active mobile internet subscriptions stood at 6.8 
million by the end of 2016 (Internetworldstats, 2016). POTRAZ also reported a 90.8% active 
mobile penetration by July 2015.20 Mobile and internet growth were also boosted by huge 
investments in fibre optic especially in urban areas where, as observed, most NGOs and their 
staff are located. The maps in Figure 4.2: Econet Mobile Expansion; Figure 4.3: Net One Mobile 
Expansion and Figure 4.4: Telecel Mobile Expansion- show attempts by operators to strengthen 
the country’s connectivity through mobile networks. 2G network is widely distributed by all 
operators and is the most prevalent. Econet’s 3G network is stronger in large parts of the country 
and 4G in the major cities. The 3G and 4G network patterns are replicated by the other operators. 
Interviews suggested that most NGO staff are on the Econet network, preferred because of its 
reliability and higher connectivity throughout the country. Last Moyo’s observation (2009, cited 
in Mudhai et al., 2009:59) that the telecommunications growth presented Zimbabwe’s CSOs with 
opportunities for digital democracy, is consistent with these developments.   
 
Growth was also spurred by increased demand for phones by youths, the influx of new, cheaper 
models from the Asian region- particularly from China because of government’s ‘Look East’21 
policy- and reduced tariffs. Sim cards for example dropped from US$100-$150 each in 2007/8 at 
the height of inflation to $1 by 2010; mobile internet access costs dropped from $1,50 per 
Megabyte in 2011 to $1 per megabyte in 2013 and 3G subscription services to 10 cents per MB 
on a pay-as you-go basis. According to POTRAZ, by 2013 between 90% and 98% of mobile 
subscribers were on pre-paid tariff plans, a development that would clearly have been of tactical 
benefit to NGOs and activists. Appendix 5 shows major landmarks in ICT growth that would 
have influenced the adoption of these technologies by NGOs. Of relevance to this study is the 
growth of Facebook and WhatsApp between 2010 and 2016, state and POTRAZ bans of social 
 
20 POTRAZ however cautions that with the emergence of the multi-sim phenomenon, subscriber figures 
do not necessarily reflect increased user access to mobile phones or mobile internet. Because of lower 
connectivity in rural areas, some mobile phone users either use multi-sim phones of purchase multiple 
lines from the different networks to assure themselves of consistent connectivity.  
21 Government’s ‘Look East’ policy was its response to sanctions placed by Europe and the USA. The 
government then turned towards China with whom ZANU PF had developed relations during and after 
the liberation struggle. The Chinese trained units of the country’s army and Arts groups and also built the 
National Sports Stadium and Heroes’ Acre, the burial ground for Zimbabwe’s heroes. 
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media in 2013 and 2016 during crises and the emergence of independent voter-information 
websites in July 2013, 
 
Figure 4.2 Econet mobile expansion map- up to 2016 (source, Econet)
 
 
Econet has the most extensive mobile network coverage in Zimbabwe, with 2G, 3G and EDGE 
connectivity in 70% of the country and 4G connectivity in urban areas, as at the end of 2016. 
State-owned Net One had 2G and internet coverage dominant throughout the country, but with 
3G and 4G connectivity predominantly in urban areas. As a state-owned enterprise Net One 
benefitted considerably from Chinese telecommunications hardware and software brought in as 
part of Chinese investment in that sector. These investments were however to raise concerns 




Figure 4.3 Net One mobile coverage 2016 (source,NetOne)
 
 
Telecel 2G, 3G and 4G coverage is less extensive compared to the other two, but the operator 
has been targeting mining and agricultural communities. These form prime hubs for the ruling 
party’s political activities which coerce workers. 




This significant growth in mobile communications, however only becomes significant when  
 it is viewed in the context of what potential the technology offers to activists and institutions 
working in a legally repressive environment, one full of massive human rights abuses, of  
complex relations between the state and civil society, and even civil society itself. In a way 
mobile communications are a key mediating factor in the issues discussed in the rest of the 
chapter. 
4.4 Legislation: ‘Zimbabwe’s assault on basic freedoms through legislation’ 
 
One of the more serious limitations to human rights protection in Zimbabwe, and hence one of 
the factors motivating this study, is the restrictive legal environment. The birth of the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and 
subsequently that party’s relatively strong showing in the 2002 elections, contributed to ZANU 
PF adopting a strategy that used legislation to control the opposition, the media and civil society. 
The strategy also created pro-state institutions22 and communication platforms which would 
complement and supplement its propaganda. The state would also use surveillance and 
interception tactics which either directly threatened civil society or created an environment of 
risk and fear. This and other sections which follow explore these issues beginning with the laws 
which have been heavily criticised for what Jamal Jafari (2003) describes as an “Assault on 
Basic Freedoms”. Each of the legal instruments has relevance in one or more of the case studies. 
To highlight the impact of the laws I present, in Appendix 6 a select list of human rights 
defenders (HRDs) whose rights were violated under some of the instruments between 2007-
2013. Of note though is the wide nature of ‘crimes’ under which the Criminal Law (Codification 
and Reform) Act (CODE) could be used, giving rise to its notoriety as a law that could 
criminalise anything. 
 
The laws fall into three broad groups: those relevant to media freedom, free expression and 
access to information; those relating to freedoms of assembly and association, and finally the 
 
22 One of them was the Federation of Non-Governmental Organisations-FONGO- led by Goodson Nguni, a ZANU 
PF stalwart, was one of the CSOs strongly pro-ZANU PF and believed to be sponsored by that party.  At the end of 
June 2014 Nguni urged government to deny South African Public Prosecutor, Tuli Madonsela permission to enter 
Zimbabwe to address civil society about her report which followed investigations into Jacob Zuma’s alleged abuse 
of state funds.   
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Electoral Act, with relevance to political participation. Zunguze (2009:229) described laws 
regulating the media and ICT environments as having the potential to paralyse the media and 
civil society’s capacity to advance human rights and democracy. These include the Postal and 
Communications Act (2004), the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) (2001), the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (2002), the Interception of Communications 
Act (ICA) (2007) and the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act (CODE) (2004). The other 
laws, but non-media related, with similar constrictive power are the Private Voluntary 
Organisation Act (PVOA) (2002) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (2002). 
 
One of the reasons for the criticism against the media laws was the restrictive power invested in 
authorities regulating their operations. Table 4.2 shows these authorities whose Board members 
were all chosen by the Ministers administering the Acts. 
 
Table: 4.2 Regulatory Authorities 
          Existing Laws  Regulatory Authority 
❖ Postal and Telecommunications Act  POTRAZ 
❖ Interception of Communications Act  MICC 
❖ Criminal Law Reform and Codification Act  Courts/NPA 
❖ Broadcasting Services Act   BAZ 
❖ Censorship and Entertainment Act  Censorship Board 
❖ Public Order and Security Act Min. of Home Affairs 
❖ Electoral Act  ZEC 
❖ Access of Information and Protection of Privacy Act MIC 
❖ Private Voluntary Organisation Act Min. of Labour. 
 
MISA Zimbabwe, one of the case studies, saw the Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act (AIPPA, 2002) as “…the leading weapon of the government and the ruling ZANU 
PF party in their campaign to stifle independent media reporting in Zimbabwe,” (MISA 
Zimbabwe and Article 19, 2004). The instrument stifled media freedom and free expression by 
controlling media outlets and censoring information. Between 1999 and 2007 the instrument was 
used to harass dissenting medias voices so much that there was a great trek to the diaspora 
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(Ruhanya, 2014; Dumisani Moyo, 2010; Manganga, 2012). AIPPA’s impact in this case was 
therefore not all negative. The journalist trek to the diaspora spawned a vibrant innovative media, 
beyond the control of ZANU PF, creating space for the voices of Zimbabwean human rights 
NGOs and political opposition back home (Chari, 2009). Other media NGOs like Zimbabwe 
Association of Community Radio Stations, Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe and Media 
Alliance of Zimbabwe emerged to support MISA’s contests against this and other restrictive 
media laws.  And despite the requirement by the 2013 Constitution for the creation of a free 
media environment, the law had still not been completely repealed by the end of 2016. The 
diaspora-based paper, The Zimbabwean of November 5, 2014, noted MISA’s concern that 
AIPPA was going against African media freedom instruments: the African Commission's 
Declaration on the Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa 
specifically.  
 
The Broadcasting Services Act (2001/2) regulated licencing, ownership and broadcasting 
content, the licencing element being regulated by the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe, 
BAZ. At face value, the Act appeared to open communication space (Ncube 2010:123 citing D. 
Moyo.2004) with potential for democratising the broadcasting environment. CSOs however 
criticised the power the law gave regulatory authorities to rule out external media ownership as 
well as external content from broadcasters like CNN and BBC. This effectively entrenched 
ZBC’s monopoly (MISA, 2010; Ruhanya,2014:256) and inhibited media freedom, freedom of 
expression and access to any other information sources-other than that disseminated through 
state controlled media (ZBC/TV and Zimbabwe Newspapers Group). For human rights NGOs 
ZBC’s monopoly sadly meant NGO-government conflicts were reflected in NGO-broadcaster 
relations because of the state media’s partisan stance. Both the Minister and BAZ Chairman were 
also ZANU PF appointees and anti-NGO, their views therefore likely to be reflected in the 
policies and practices of the broadcaster. 
 
The Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (CODE) of 2006 gained notoriety as the most 
consistently invoked piece of legislation between 2007 and 2015. It also became commonly 
known as the insult law under which almost any criticism of the President was interpreted as an 
insult and became criminalised. Willems (2010:5) notes that some elements from POSA, 
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detrimental to the cause of free association and expression, were discretely moved from that 
instrument and sneaked into CODE. Between 2014 and early 2016 the Constitutional Court 
(ConCourt) made several judgements which struck down sections of the CODE criminalising 
defamation and insulting the President. One was in July 2014 dismissing the case against 
journalists Constantine Chimhakure and Vincent Kahiya charged with criminally defaming 
police by accusing the force of abducting opposition and human rights activists in 2008. The 
second in January 2015 dismissed a case against Gilbert Dokora, a political rights activist 
accused in 2010 of undermining the authority of, or insulting the President by using local 
language words which were interpreted to suggest threats against the First Family.23 The third 
was in January 2016 when, in dismissing criminal defamation as a charge not to be levelled 
against journalists in future, the ConCourt gave MISA its biggest win for media freedom and 
freedom of expression. 
 
Like AIPPA, the Interception of Communication Act, (ICA), has implications for privacy 
(Gwagwa, 2013). The instrument has invested the power to monitor and intercept online, postal, 
radio, telephone, and e-mail communications in the Monitoring and Interception of 
Communications Centre, MICC. The Act enforces operators to install interception hardware and 
software (at their cost) and to store data and content in case the MICC, police or revenue 
collection authorities require it during investigations into national and economic security threats. 
Through the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, the law also enforces 
operators’ storage of mobile subscriber data (such as subscriber names, ID and address) obtained 
through sim-registration.24 Human rights organisations argue the requirement impinges on 
privacy rights and could expose HRDs to state surveillance (ZHR NGO Forum, 2013; Gwagwa, 
2013; Gwagwa & Mudavanhu,2014). A parliamentary committee used the argument below to 
recommend the removal of the empowering Statutory Instrument (142 of 2013): 
Regardless of their stated objectives, the Regulations infringe on people’s right to privacy by 
eliminating the anonymity of communications, facilitating location tracking and simplifies 
 
23  Kagodora was an MDC-T activist who, in his address to party supporters in Mashonaland Central province on 11 
March 2010, was alleged to have said in Shona "Mugabe mudenga, Grace mudenga, vabatanidzei, roverai pasi," 
translated by police as "Mugabe up, Grace up, bring them together and drop them on the ground." Police   
interpreted the statement to be a threat against the President. 
24 On its part POTRAZ argues that sim registration increases security for users, combats criminal activity, abuse of 
mobile phones by individuals, combats transmission of offensive, obscene or threatening messages and stops 
falsehoods which could cause annoyance, inconvenience or unnecessary anxiety to other persons. 
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communications surveillance and interception by using the powers granted by the Interception of 
Communications Act. This is achieved by the creation of data bases by the service providers who, 
in turn, are required to hand over the collected data to a government agency, POTRAZ. 
The committee’s recommendation was never implemented though. 
 
The Public Voluntary Organisation (PVO) Act governed the activities of NGOs in the country 
and some of its sections created challenges for the sector. For example, requirements that NGOs 
must have organisational structures, established and physically traceable offices, constitutions to 
guide their operations and clear sources of (local) funds to support their operations, created 
vulnerabilities for them, one of which was that they exposed the organisations to easy monitoring 
and surveillance by the state. The Act gave the Minister so much power to determine how NGOs 
would operate that, according to Cornelius Ncube (2010:107), it was “an attempt by the regime 
to outlaw civil society advocacy on governance, democracy and human rights issues.” It made it 
difficult for NGOs to demand state accountability in governance and human rights issues, 
including in issues where the NGOs themselves were the primary sponsors of rural projects. 
Provincial Ministers and lower political elites for example, acted as though the law gave them 
authority and power over NGOs in their areas. In 2008 and 2010 for example two Ministers 
banned the field operations of several human rights NGOs accusing them of involvement in 
illegal activities and therefore breaching the Act.25  
 
State media and state apparatuses also colluded, both spurring claims that CSOs were 
deliberately violating the Act and attempting to destabilise the government. On July 29, 2013 for 
instance the Zimbabwe Herald published what it called ‘evidence’ of EU and International NGO 
financial support to CiZC and ZESN to distort the election results and thus subvert the Electoral 
process. This example is discussed in another section in this study. As I note under the ERC Case 
Study, Director, Tawanda Chimhini believes his arrest on July 31, 2013 on the eve of elections 
may have been spurred by the Herald article as his NGO was also considered to criticise the 
 
25 On 4 June 2008, the then Minister of Labour, Nicholas Goche suspended the field operations of all NGOs 
involved in humanitarian work in the country citing breach of Section (10), Subsection (c), of the Act: “...if the 
organization has failed to comply with any condition of its registration.”  Although ZLHR won a court challenge 
against the Minister’s powers, NGO rural programmes were disrupted for months. In mid-February 2012, Masvingo 
Provincial Minister, Maluleke banned 29 NGOs from operating in the province, accusing them of operating without 
registration. ZPP was one of the victims.  
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electoral processes and involved in voter education activities which breached the PVO and 
Electoral Acts26.   
 
The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) replaced the Law and Order Maintenance Act which 
had been used by Rhodesian authorities to contain the political activities of black citizens. From 
that law, POSA however retained provisions which criminalised a host of forms of 
communication considered to undermine the President, his office, security forces or the country’s 
economic interests. Some comments, statements broadcast or printed material were deemed 
negative, derogatory, indecent, obscene or false (Jafari, 2003; POSA, 2002). Wendy Willems 
(2010) said POSA’s prohibition of some communication material or statements was a form of 
control on public speech, and therefore on freedom of expression. Other sections of the act 
strangled civil activity by constraining demonstrations and public gatherings or through limiting 
the number of people that could be seen gathered together. Police permission to hold public 
meetings by civil society was required, but often denied or withheld, forcing organisations like 
Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) to have running battles with them. The example is also 
quoted of POSA being used by the police during the 2008 elections to allow only three rallies for 
the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to ZANU PFs 80 rallies. In short 
POSA’s regulation of public gatherings, public statements, and communication materials, which 
essentially form the organisational, mobilisation and action platforms for many NGOs, 
undermines activism. 
 
The Electoral Act, designed to facilitate citizens’ participation in the choice of their political 
leadership, was repealed seven times, but, despite the reviews, has remained contentious in terms 
of application. Civil society and opposition political parties have protested election outcomes 
since 2000, charging unfair electoral practices and thus violation of citizens’ political rights. The 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), charged with overseeing electoral processes, describes 
four principles of democratic elections: efficiency, freeness, fairness and transparency; the right 
of the citizen to participate in peaceful political activity and the voting process; the right of 
political parties to access information and participate in lawful political activities and finally the 
 
26  It was the ERC’s argument that one of the points of conflicts with the government stemmed from the fact that the 
state views the organisation’s programmes designed to encourage citizen participation in electoral education as a 
strategy designed to mobilise citizens to vote for the opposition. 
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right of candidates to access information.27 These are the principles embodying the spirit of the 
rights captured in Section 67 of the Constitution as political rights and ZEC has been accused of 
failing to uphold any of them. Human rights NGOs have consistently demanded that the 
Electoral Act ensure what it promises through ZEC: that voting methods be made simple, 
accurate, verifiable, secure and transparent and that all political parties be given opportunity to 
campaign freely and through-out the country. These are also amongst regionally and 
internationally accepted standards of elections that NGOS and political opponents criticise the 
government for failing to uphold, or deliberately subverting.  
4.5 Civil society and NGOs in Zimbabwe 
 
The Franklin Pierce Law Centre’s understanding of civil society as an arena of diverse 
organisations but with shared interests, purposes and values and where collective action is not 
forced, shares close affinity to the understanding shared by Zimbabwe’s organisations. The arena 
embraces diverse actors, spaces and institutional forms with varying degrees of formality, 
influence, autonomy and power. Zimbabwe’s civil society organisations are divided into three 
broad groupings: organisations involved in general development, welfare, relief and community 
services, church, or faith-based activities; second, those involved with political, democracy and 
human rights issues and, finally, international NGOs (Moyo et al., 2000). The NGOs in this 
study are in the second broad group of CSOs.The term NGO is understood to mean, or equate 
with, not-for-profit or charity organisations, a definition which aligns the organisations to the 
requirements of the Public Voluntary Organisation Act. The definition also embraces political 
parties (Moyo et al, 2000). This study however applies the term NGO to non-political 
organisations to create a distinction. It is also to distinguish between activists belonging to 
political parties and those without political alignment but still fighting for human rights, although 
both will be referred in this study as human rights defenders (HRDs).  
 
Civil society activism in the country has tended to grow in response to political, economic, and 
social developments, beginning with the era of Rhodesia through to Zimbabwe (Tendi, 2010; 
 
27  ZEC is the successor to the Electoral Supervisory Commission. The country’s supervisory body has always been 
accused by CSOs as being partisan, pro-ZANU PF and manned senior security agents who could bend standard 
practices to ensure positive election outcomes for the ruling party. 
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Ncube, 2010:108). Black activism to Rhodesian oppression, for example, was reflected in the 
formation of cultural and social associations which were effectively designed to hide aspirations 
for political rights. This was followed by the liberation struggle in which various civil society 
groups played critical (covert) mobilisation, welfare, violations monitoring and healing roles 
(Dorman, 2002, 2003). Some NGOs showed slow but clear shifts from purely development and 
service orientations to strong lobby and advocacy orientations designed to pressure government 
to pay more attention to human rights. Now there are between 2 000-3000 NGOs in the country 
although this figure is difficult to confirm because of the multiple centres under which they are 
registered: Ministry of Labour- which administers the Public Voluntary Organisation Act- and 
the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Education, Sports, and Culture. But Moyo et al (2000) offer a 
fairly distinct typology of NGOs and the focus of activities up to 2000 when the three authors 
wrote their book, NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe, arguably the country’s prime 
source of information on the history of NGOs. The researcher-summarised typology which 
follows highlights the various foci of the NGOs. 
 
Table 4.3 Researcher-summarised typology of Zimbabwean NGOs (source Moyo et al,2000). 
❖ Community Based Organisations (CBOs)-which are primarily community organisations 
involved in marketing and supply activities to sustain community members. Co-
operatives are a key element of this grouping.  
❖ Intermediary NGOs which existed to facilitate the activities of smaller groups, or to 
mediate between the small groups and government (many of which have vanished, for 
example ORAP). 
❖ Service NGOs which provided support services like project design and implementation, 
consultancy, specialist training and education. 
❖ Trusts and unions which aimed to facilitate access to credit and funding for individuals 
and groups to implement income generating projects. 
❖ International and regional NGOs which were involved in various activities, including 
volunteering, social welfare, relief and development and often competed with national 
NGOs. 
❖ Human Rights NGOs involved in advocacy and lobbies to pressure the state to respect 
human rights, rule of law and good governance. 
 
Of specific interest to this study is the typology’s last grouping which, according to Moyo et al 
(2000:125) involves those NGOs with a lobby focus on “Human rights, justice, and peace 
through-out the country,” including gender rights and the rights of people infected with 
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HIV/AIDS.28 Ncube (2010:134) describes this group and other post 2005 CSOs as the counter-
hegemonic group because they became the most active, most critical, and even antagonistic 
towards state failures. Matyszak, (2008)29 says that with time, it is this group’s activities in 
monitoring, documenting, exposing violations and aiding victims, that brought it into more 
conflict with the state. 
 
On their part ruling authorities attempted to subvert the NGOs by using an empowerment agenda 
pushed by party-aligned constituents like the Federation of NGOs (FONGO), Indigenous 
Business Development Council (IBDC), Affirmative Action Group (AAG), Zimbabwe 
Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) and even student bodies like the Zimbabwe National 
Students Union (ZINASU). Even though some of these institutions had genuine agendas to 
promote black empowerment or support marginalised groups, the majority adopted a strongly 
pro-state attitude. The challenge for human rights NGOs was that when these NGOs criticised 
government, both state and media often tolerated their voice because many of their leaders were 
either within the ruling power structures or were viewed to be empathetic. Some, like the War 
Veterans Association, became the party’s storm troopers, subverting elections and generally 
committing numerous acts of violence against civil society and the public with impunity 
(McGregor, 2002; Moyo and Yeros, 2007; Kriger, 2003) 
4.6 ZANU PF hegemony: the right to rule in perpetuity, source of human rights abuses. 
 
This conflict between the state and human rights NGOs has a history, in small part spurred by 
top government statements against the sector, but in large part emanating from the ruling party’s 
post-liberation political ideology of entitlement. In 2006 Zimbabwe’s then Minister of Justice, 
 
28 Within this broad group fell such institutions as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (1972), Legal 
Resources Foundation (1984), Zim Rights (1992), MISA-Zimbabwe (1995), Transparency International (1996), 
Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (1995), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (1996) and the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum (1998). 
29 Matyszak (2008) says the Human Rights NGOs’ programmes include “measuring the extent of freedom of 
assembly, association and expression, and freedom from arbitrary and wrongful arrest; examining the nature, extent 
and effect of undemocratic legislation; documenting and providing legal and medical assistance to victims of 






Patrick Chinamasa said this about Zimbabwe’s civil society organisations (CSOs) to the UN 
Human Rights Council:  
“Their (NGOs) objectives include destabilisation and interference with the evolution of our 
political processes, undermining our sovereignty, creating and sustaining opposition groups that 
have no local support base, and promoting disaffection and hostility among the local population 
against their popularly elected government,” (Human Rights Forum. 2007:37). 
 
In July 2009 Zimbabwe’s President made similar comments at the Global Dialogue conference at 
Munyonyo resort on Lake Victoria, Tanzania. 
 “We have now a phenomenon of NGOs, or shall I call them phenomena, for they really are a 
type of government in the background of a formal government. I don’t know whether this 
creature is for the better or for the worse, but in our country, we have seen a situation where 
they have exceeded their terms of reference, and perhaps we might have to reconsider the 
advisability of NGOs.” (President Robert Mugabe, July 27,2009, Lake Victoria) 
 
Both views reflected a continuing shift from the liberation and post-liberation struggle 
relationship between the state and civil society organisations. Several other ruling party leaders 
repeated the sentiments whenever human rights NGOs conflicted with the party’s position on 
human rights. Mashingaidze (2016:4) says government saw and continues to see NGOs and the 
opposition as ‘stooges’, ‘puppets’, ‘dissidents’, ‘neo-colonial agents’, ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘enemies 
of the state’, particularly when they are viewed as recipients of Western sponsorship. Tendi 
(2010:210) says government saw the opposition and CSOs as sell-outs.  
 
The early years after independence had been marked by cordial relations between the state and 
NGOs. They reflected a relationship of NGO accommodation of government’s failures due to 
what Brian Raftopoulos described as a “...perspective of shared goals and a belief of having 
emerged from a common tradition of struggle,’ (2000, cited in Moyo et al, 2000:45). The 
accommodation resulted in a degree of NGO subordination to government thinking and 
programmes and did little to disabuse ZANU PF of its sense of political entitlement to rule the 
country because of its role in liberating it. Jonathan Moyo (1993:7-8) charges that ZANU PF 
believed that because of the liberation role it alone understood and represented the will of the 
people and entitled it to govern for as long as it chose to. Heather Chingono (2010:68) describes 
the stance as ‘partocracy’, the notion that as the liberator, ZANU PF alone knows the needs of 
the Zimbabwean people and therefore that it alone can build providence, the future of the people. 
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In a paper titled “From Liberation movement to government: past legacies and the challenge of 
transition in Africa,” Clapham (2012) says the issue of entitlement, is a problem with post-
liberation governments in Africa: they have ‘an intense sense of entitlement to the state and 
exclusive vision for its future,’ which makes them intolerant of opposing views. While liberation 
ideals provide strong foundations when transiting into post-struggle governments, they can 
equally trap these governments if they are not prepared to move towards new (liberal and 
democratic) ideals. 
 
In an article “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony,” Bratton and Masunungure (2008:41-42) make the same 
point, that ZANU PF had an ideological belief in a right to rule in perpetuity, that its staying 
power depended on what they described as a destructive mix of ideology, patronage and 
violence. State structures were heavily politicised, and, critically, a conflation or fusion of the 
party and government resulted in “… a party machinery that penetrates the organs of state; a 
corrupted economy vested in the hands of party loyalists; an instutionalised role in policy making 
for military commanders, and a heavy reliance on violence, increasingly outsourced to auxiliary 
forces” (ibid,42). The auxiliary forces included war veterans and the para-military youth group 
commonly called ‘Green Bombers’ because of their affinity to violence, especially amongst rural 
communities. The toxic concoction was bound to present a disastrous recipe for Zimbabwe’s 
human rights.  
 
Tendi (2010a and 2010b) suggests that the liberation narrative was part of the ruling party’s 
narrative of ‘patriotic history’, one also used to justify ZANU PF’s stance that human rights were 
subordinate to patriotism and nationalism. Tendi argues that ZANU PF in-fact viewed the issue 
of human rights as a threat to nationalism, a form of ‘moral imperialism similar to the historical 
justifications for colonisation of Africa,’ (Tendi, 2010:2,5). Sovereignty was seen as a means to 
defend against external criticism or threats. Tendi’s observation is neither an oversimplification 
nor under-simplification. The ruling party’s view of human rights appears to differ from that of 
the UN, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) and other human rights 
institutions, despite the government being a signatory to several conventions subordinate to the 
broader instruments. ZANUPF’s overarching imperative was patriotism (to the land ownership 
and racial equality themes) (Tendi, 2010:2), while that of human rights organisations was that the 
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state should protect and respect the rights of citizens. Land ownership and racial equality were 
undoubtedly critical issues, given that they were the drivers of the liberation struggle, but the 
issue was that there was no improvement in human rights. Analysts also argued that the issues 
were compounded by conflation of the party and state. The party had captured the state, making 
the latter less accountable for citizens’ rights. When military structures, which often brutalise 
citizens, also claimed a symbiotic relationship with the party, as the country’s defence chiefs 
often did, then human rights totally lost state protection. 
 
Human rights lawyer Farai Chiweshe said in an interview on January 23, 2014 that there are 
other issues such as lack of capacity (funds) and will and commitment, which inhibited 
government from following through UN and African Union human rights protocols and 
directives which it had ratified. At the October 2011 UN Universal Periodic Review of human 
rights, Zimbabwe agreed to implement 130 recommendations to improve human rights. Five 
years later, in 2016, Zimbabwean NGOs pointed to 25 broad areas where implementation still 
lagged. Most important though was the non-ratification of the UN Conventions against Torture 
and Enforced Disappearance and the failure to align domestic laws with several ratified human 
rights treaties. Three years after introducing its new Bill of Rights, the government had also not 
repealed in full the laws discussed in this thesis. 
 
One of civil society’s responsibilities in promoting democracy and human rights is to mobilise 
domestic and international pressure against recalcitrant governments. Some Zimbabwean 
academics have criticised civil society for failing to reclaim critical civil spaces occasioned by 
the GNU in 2008, a period in which regional and international “oversight” was strongest on 
ZANU PF and during which human rights NGOs could have resisted state power more strongly. 
Gwagwa (2014:2) observed that civil society should have focused beyond the problems of the 
constitution, transitional justice, and elections, or enmeshing itself in opposition politics, at the 
expense of broader issues of long-term justice, governance, and democracy. Ruhanya (2014:6) of 
the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute agreed with Gwagwa on the issue, arguing that civil society’s 
effort was instead diverted from mobilising citizens in a bottom-up approach which would have 
forced good governance and accountability. The mis-focus, instead, gave ZANU PF additional 
ammunition to trumpet its old song of ‘NGOs and their regime change agenda’ while violations 
89 
 
continued. Raftopoulos (2013:986) infact saw the post-July 2013 election period introducing new 
social and political challenges for civil society because of ZANU PF’s new total political 
dominance. The opportunity for civil society organisations to push for democracy presented by 
the balance of forces under the GNU was lost. 
4.7 A plethora of violations (2000-2014)  
 
Zimbabwe enjoyed fair stability for a little more than a decade after independence but went into 
crisis after 1998. Lasting until 2008, when the Government of National Unity was installed, the 
crisis had its genesis in several developments. Key among them were droughts, Structural 
Adjustment Programmes- the major one being in 1991-1993 (Rich-Dorman, 2001:166; Zhou and 
Zvoushe, 2012)- corruption, unbudgeted pay-outs to war veterans in August 1997, costly military 
interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 199830, social protests mobilised 
by the coalition of CSOs, the National Constitutional Assembly and the political opposition, the 
Movement for Democratic Change,31 commercial farm seizures by war veterans, massive 
displacement of farm workers from these farms, and several other events. Farm invasions resulted 
in the deaths of many white farmers and black farm workers and decreased agricultural 
productivity (Howard-Hassmann, 2010:900) as work on the farms stopped32. The productivity 
graph in Figure 4.5 shows the plunge. The displaced workers and their families largely became the 
burden of NGOs who then had to provide welfare relief as well as protection from political 
violence. The productivity plunge between 2001 and 2008 coincided with violence on farms 
which peaked in the 2008 elections. At the same time, NGO interventions in these crises brought 
them into more conflict with Provincial political structures who sought to control the NGO relief 
 
30 It has been suggested that Kabila’s war cost Zimbabwe $4 billion but Zimbabwe’s then Finance Minister, Simba 
Makoni gave a figure of only $200 million in the two years 1998- July 2000. CSOs were deeply opposed to 
Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC war, one of the root causes of the conflict with ZANU PF.  
31At its formation in 1999, the MDC had a broad base of alliance partners who included trade unions, student 
movements, Human Rights and Faith based Organisations and white commercial farmers. By 2014 however, the 
MDC leader, Tsvangirayi’s allies and lieutenants like Elton Mangoma, Elias Mudzuri, Ian Kay, Tendai Biti and 
Bennet were demanding his resignation from the Presidency after three successive losses to ZANU PF in 2000/2, 
2008 and 2013. 
32 Howard-Hassmann says 60 white farmers and hundreds of black farm workers had been killed by 2006. 
Productivity dropped because black farmers who took over the farms lacked farming knowledge, skills capital for 
agricultural inputs and production. The land seizures also displaced farm workers who had the skills, but who, 
displaced and without any other source of income or food, became desperately hungry and impoverished. They also 
became vulnerable to political manipulation! 
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programmes both as tests of power and as vote inducement tools.   
Figure 4.5   Agricultural production graph (copied from NewsDay, Sept. 19, 2013) 
 
 
Although Zimbabwe experienced massive killings during Gukurahundi between 1983-88 (CCJP, 
1999 Report; NGO Forum Reports 2000-2003; New Zimbabwe, June 2003; Sachikonye, 2011), 
the period 2000-2013 saw many other violations. Major milestones on the country’s bleak human 
rights road included abductions of activists, displacements and co-erced voting. An operation to 
clean up urban centres described as “Murambatsvina” or “Operation remove the scum” in 2005 
displaced over 700 000 people and made many of them destitute (Howard-Hassman, 2010). 
Similar operations occurred when diamonds were discovered in Chiadzwa, in the Eastern part of 
the country in 2009/2010, leading to the eviction of thousands of villagers to pave way for 
mining companies. Up to 2016 the villagers were complaining over broken promises of 
compensation and relocation. In 2014 over 14 000 alleged squatters were evicted from the 
Harare satellite towns of Epworth and Chitungwiza while another 18 000 families were moved 
from an area called Tokwe Mukorsi to pave way for a dam. The problem with all these evictions 
was that poor families were not properly relocated or compensated, inviting criticism from local 
and UN human rights agencies (Freedom House Report, 2015, Chitagu, 2014). Civil society 
groups also criticised the ruling party’s reluctance to accept accountability and culpability for 
human rights abuses perpetrated during election-related periods. The military for example 
launched an operation in 2008 to force private satellite dish owners to pull them down and stop 
watching foreign tv stations. There were also violent campaigns to identify and punish those 
suspected of having voted for the opposition during the first round of the 2008 Presidential 
election and intimidating them to vote the ZANU PF leader in the run-off. Other campaigns such 
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as “Operation Chimumumu” (keep dumb, don’t express your views) were orchestrated in 2010 
by state agencies to intimidate citizens from expressing views on the constitution when civic 
society and the constitutional team were soliciting the public’s views on what should be included 
in a new constitution (Sachikonye, 2011; Raftopoulos, 2013).  
 
The levels of ruling party violence against human rights defenders between 2000 and 2016 was 
unprecedented, no doubt intended to intimidate and quell dissent relating to the crises discussed 
above. According to the civil society report for the 2016 UN Universal Periodic Review, 3 629 
HRDs were arrested and detained by police between January 2012 and December 2015, of whom 
1005 were released without charge. In the same period 520 victims of torture received treatment. 
Another report, titled ‘Political Abductions in Zimbabwe 2000-2016,’ published in the 
Zimbabwean of 10th March 2016 by opposition politician, Eddie Cross, gives a figure of 5894 
documented abductions in the 17- year period. Of this figure 300 abductees were disappeared, 
80 of them later found dead, the rest never found. Amongst the abducted were 13 children and 21 
human rights activists from CSOs which included ZimRights, the Zimbabwe Election Support 
Network (ZESN), the Zimbabwe Union of University Students, ZINASU, and Women of 
Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA). The report presents the following graphs and map (courtesy of the 
Zimbabwean) to show the extent of the violations. The month of the Presidential run-off, June 
2008, alone recorded 3000 abductions, (Figure 4.7) or 51% of total abductions in the 17-year 
period, something reflective of the ruling party’s behavioural pattern of unleashing violence 
during elections or crisis periods. The peak in 2002 (Figure 4.6) reflects the violence in that 
year’s elections, while the rise in 2007 reflects the violence unleashed in the build up to the 2008 
elections. In the period 2009-2015, (Figure 4.8) the year 2011 recorded the highest abductions 























   










       Figure 4.9 Distribution of politically motivated abductions by district, 2000-2016.  
        
                 (Map courtesy of the Zimbabwean, March 2016) 
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When this study discusses the MISA Case, it will be noted that there are overlaps in the location 
of the Newsletter publications and the districts which have recorded high violations. The most 
violent districts were in Manicaland, Mashonaland East, Masvingo, Mashonaland Central, 
Midlands and Mashonaland West provinces. To me the overlaps suggest a sync with MISA’s 
attempts in 2007 and 2008 to introduce alternative information sources, other than state media, in 
the marginalised and violated communities in these districts. 
 
Yet another report on 28 February 2014 by ZLHR and the Zimbabwe Law Society, indicates 
atrocious treatment of prisoners and their children by the prison system:30% of the prisoners 
comprised pre-trial detainees; female inmates were incarcerated with their innocent children; the 
prisons were overcrowded, run down and poorly resourced for food, clothes, and other basic 
prison services (Dzimbabwe Chimbga, ZLHR, 2014). These revelations are an indictment on the 
government’s indifference to standards demanded by international human rights statutes which it 
ratified (Makwerere et al., 2012) notably the African Charter and Article #6, which enshrine the 
rights of citizens: “…to liberty and security of his person including freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention.” The NGOs’ findings also hint at what O’Donnell’s (1998) vertical and 
horizontal theory suggests is a result of the failure of judicial and law enforcement systems to 
network, monitor, correct or sanction each other in pursuance of justice and the rule of law. To 
the credit of the Judiciary however, in January and February 2015, Chief Judges of the 
Zimbabwe High Court and the Constitutional Court acknowledged failures in the system and 
urged expeditious, just, and fair processes to ensure justice and respect for victims’ rights. 
Appendix 4 highlights UN and African Union treaties, together with policing standards, that 
Zimbabwe has ratified while Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 show UDHR and Zimbabwe’s lists of 
human rights. Zimbabwe’s list almost mirrors the UDHR list. However, the gap between the 
spirit of ratified conventions and the actual implementation has been the cause of concern for 
civil society. In that respect, and in the context of this study, it is useful to note that one of the 
criticisms against the government relates to its failure to uphold policing standards, such as those 




What compounded the violations was what opposition politician and human rights lawyer, David 
Coltart described as the Zimbabwean psyche of accommodating a culture of ZANU PF violence. 
On May 26, 2006 Coltart wrote:  
We have become so accustomed to violence being used as an acceptable political weapon 
that we have lost sight of the fact that the democratic world has moved on and that such 
methods are anathema elsewhere (http://www.davidcoltart.com/2006/05/the-reasons-
why-i-cannot-join-the-tsvangirai-faction/).  
 
The tragedy of this psyche was that it greatly undermined people’s aspirations for a democratic 
dispensation. The use of violence was compounded by the culture of impunity which has been 
encouraged by the absence of punishment for perpetrators:  
Those responsible for use of violence have never been brought to book. Not only is there 
a long history of violence being used successfully to achieve political objectives but also 




The need to create new or re-inforce existing institutions to protect citizens’ rights, democracy, 
transparency, accountability in public institutions and remediation of injustice was highlighted 
during the Government of National Unity (GNU). The 2013 Constitution concretized this need 
by enshrining the creation or re-vamping of six independent Commissions, whose functions and 
responsibilities also straddle some of the areas covered by this study. These were the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), Zimbabwe 
Gender Commission (ZGC), Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC), Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ZACC) and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). The 
institutions’ names describe what they are mandated to do in terms of human rights promotion. 
By the end of 2016 all the Commissions had indeed been established although there was 
controversy about the NPRC. Civil society expressed concerns over the impartiality of members 
of this Commission in national reconciliation issues, particularly given that Vice President 
Mphoko, to whom the commission would report, was viewed as impartial after he repeatedly 
exonerated the President and government of the Gukurahundi killings. Civil society argued that 
whether he was directly responsible or not, as leader of the ruling party, the President needed to 
publicly acknowledge the genocide, to encourage national healing. In any case given the history 
of the Executive ignoring recommendations by some of its institutions, setting up the 
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Commissions was not viewed as necessarily truly allowing them independence. This became 
evident when in 2016 the Executive criticised ZACC for bringing corruption charges against 
some politicians, and the HRC for criticizing police heavy-handedness against civilians during 
public protests that year. 
4.8 Shooting themselves in the foot: NGOs undermining the potential to protect. 
 
Several ‘internal’ challenges confronted human rights NGOs in their quest to promote and 
protect human rights. Matyszak (2008) for example criticizes them for being “notoriously 
fractured;” lawyer Farai Chiweshe (Interview 23/1/14) criticises some for being obsessed with 
self-preservation while some activists themselves agree that some NGOs have allowed donor 
funding and interests to divide the sector, preventing them from building efficient collaborations 
and networks. Diaspora-based Zimbabwean journalist Lance Guma, interviewed in October 
2014, suggested that cross-membership amongst NGO leadership can also negatively impact 
institutional positions, the activities of the NGOs and relationships amongst the individuals or 
with state actors. It is not uncommon for a director at ZimRights to be chairman of Zimbabwe 
Election Support Network, or a programme manager at that NGO to be a board member at 
ZimRights or ZPP. While such cross-membership is generally expected to result in positive 
information sharing, antagonism amongst the leadership could just as easily cross over into and 
poison institutional relationships. The state has naturally manipulated these fractures to its 
advantage, for instance by encouraging or supporting the formation of parallel or counter NGOs. 
 
Cross memberships could also promote collusion and what some activists described as 
“factionalism” amongst the NGOs. An instructive example emerged in early 2016 when 
international sponsors discontinued support for the NGOs over alleged abuse of millions of 
donor funds by the umbrella NGO Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiCZ). A boardroom battle 
ensued between the NGO’s chairman and the director following an audit of the funds. Affiliate 
NGOs took sides along what the media and civil society saw as factional lines, resulting in the 
350 affiliates almost splitting up and personal social media platforms being deployed by either 
individual and their followers as they attempted to defend their positions. These internal conflicts 
blinded the organisations, for almost a year, to critical human rights issues while external 
funding was also lost. Another challenge arose from NGO relegation of economic and cultural 
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rights to secondary position in favour of political and civil rights, something that writer Bertha 
Chiroro, (2013, in Raftopoulos, 2013:136-137) criticises as a negation of those bread and butter 
issues that reflected the true and realistic needs of the common person. Chiroro’s criticism was to 
be echoed by Mukoko and other activists in my interviews with them.  
4.9 Activism and coping with elite threats and surveillance  
 
In addition to physical violence civil society dreads the threats of surveillance. This is 
particularly so given the big number of activist abductions and disappearances, which meant they 
were under surveillance. McGreggor (2013)33 and Tendi (2016) contend that state security 
structures like the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and Military Intelligence (MI) have 
such invasive surveillance and intelligence gathering tentacles that urban and rural populations, 
public institutions, and civil society are all threatened. McGreggor points to an expansive CIO 
intelligence infrastructure that co-opts militia, War veterans, retired military officers and ZANU 
PF Youths to surveille and intimidate rural populations. Tendi (2016:16) observes that Military 
Intelligence was using surveillance technology which included electronic bugs, hidden cameras, 
phone monitoring technology, voice cloning software and drone cameras.34 They were also 
importing chemical poisons (ibid,16). Their involvement in the subversion of human rights was 
also alleged in May 2016 when Partison Dzamara, brother to the disappeared human rights 
activist, Itai Dzamara, presented a picture of his brother allegedly in MI captivity. The picture 
was the first ‘evidence’ by Dzamara’s protest group, Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUS), of 
military intelligence involvement in clandestine, subversive activity against civil society. The 
Military denied involvement but OAUS insisted they had obtained the picture and other 
information from sources within the security structures. 
 
The Zimbabwe Independent of August 30, 2013 said the Central Intelligence Organisation 
(CIO)’s surveillance methods and tactics included interception of e-mails, listening into and 
 
33 JoAnn McGregor (2013) has written extensively about the threat of the CIO to public service structures 
and opposition parties, describing how they can be undermined and co-erced, through various forms of 
threats-including being placed under surveillance. 
34  Tendi reports his findings in a (2016) report titled “State intelligence and the Politics of Zimbabwe’s 




taping phone conversations and scrutinising citizens’ activities on Facebook and Twitter. In 2016 
ZLHR reported that between 2010 and 2016 more than 150 citizens had been arrested for 
allegedly insulting the President, including on WhatsApp and Facebook platforms, suggesting 
that these platforms were being monitored. Appendix 11 describes a few cases, if only to 
illustrate state online interception capabilities. Online activities of hacktivists were also targeted. 
The Africa Chapter of the hacktivist group, Anonymous, for example, feared that their 
hacktivists in Zimbabwe were being monitored by intelligence agencies in 2015. The group itself 
had, between 2008 and 2016, brought down websites belonging to government ministries and 
ZANU PF-aligned institutions for electoral fraud, government brutality and SMS ban and 
WhatsApp block in 2013 and 2016 respectively35. The Herald, military intelligence, and ZANU 
PF were among the institutions whose websites had been brought down 7 times in 2016 alone. 
Local media and Freedom House reports in August 2013 and 2014 also said the CIO was 
conducting surveillance from listening posts in Mount Pleasant, a suburb in the capital. There 
were also reports from New Zimbabwe, AFP, Al Jazeera and the UK’s Guardian, covering the 
years 2006 and 2014, about collaborations between Zimbabwe’s CIO and South Africa’s State 
Security Agency (SSA) in monitoring and exchanging information on media and NGOs 
considered rogue and subversive in the two countries. The information was reported to be shared 
with other world intelligence services, including MI6, CIA and Russian intelligence. Police were 
also involved, monitoring NGOs and independent media. Fifteen journalists, several of whom 
now work for human rights NGOs, had been put under a government surveillance hit list. In 
February 2013 a senior police officer, Innocent Matibiri told a Parliamentary Committee that 
NGOs were being placed under surveillance (under an “intelligence network” as he put it) 
because 99% of them were considered a threat to national security. He accused some of them of 
clandestinely importing radios and distributing them to rural communities in breach of the 
country’s laws, an admission that the state was controlling information flow.  
 
Most significant though were threats by the President himself in early April 2016 that 
government might adopt a Chinese-style clampdown of social media to curb a surge in the use of 
WhatsApp and Facebook by activists protesting government’s failure to contain corruption. The 
 
35  The article ‘Mugabe websites hacked, activists claim revenge for protest bans,’ suggests these counter 
tactics by hacktivists in support of civil society because of the SMS and WhatsApp bans showed anti-
state online activity could be successful.  
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President’s threats brought fears amongst CSOs that government would use Chinese surveillance 
and interception equipment and strategies, given that there was already a history of Chinese 
support for Zimbabwe’s military and intelligence. In 2012/13 China had bankrolled the 
construction of a $98-million-dollar National Defence College (Mano, in Zhang et al, 2016:163-
180) to train Zimbabwe’s defence forces, CIO, MI and regional intelligence operatives with the 
support of Chinese intelligence services and equipment. Media reports suggested the facility 
would also be used to monitor diplomatic, domestic, commercial, and military communications 
(Karombo, 2013). The reports had some credibility especially given that Chinese companies ZTE 
and Huawei have supplied most of the country’s internet equipment. Freedom House (2016) also 
warned of a Chinese style ‘Great Firewall’ following government intentions to introduce 
Cybersecurity acts and warnings against the use of social media to criticise it. 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
As the study moves towards a discussion of the Methods used in the research, this Chapter has 
attempted to present issues in four key areas that I believe influence the use of digital media 
technologies: the country’s political, social and economic background, media and 
telecommunications opportunities and challenges, the limitations to human rights claims placed 
by constrictive legal instruments and human rights violations and threats to NGO coherence and 
effectiveness. The threats include internal fissures within CSOs and state surveillance. There are 
landmarks of both physical and non-physical violence against citizens which bear testimony to 
the authoritarian character of the state and restrictive nature of some of the legal instruments and 













5.  Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the research methodology that was adopted by the study. It explains why 
particular methods or techniques were selected and some of the challenges faced in 
implementing some of them. Recognizing that the political environment in Zimbabwe was 
constrictive, the study sought answers to three broad research questions. These were why and 
how the country’s human rights NGOs were deploying mobile phones to protect citizens’ rights 
to life, human dignity, and personal safety; to free expression and accessing information; to 
uninhibited interaction with others and to free participation in politics, including free choice of 
political leadership. It also sought to explore legal and other impediments that inhibited the 
potential of the technology in the contest for these freedoms, and finally, how the NGOs were 
using the medium to facilitate interactions with networks of partners that would enhance efforts 
to protect these freedoms.  
5.1 Qualitative research and case study design  
 
The study adopted a qualitative research approach which used case studies (Travers, 2001; Yin, 
2014) and interviews to understand the phenomenon of mobile phone deployment in the 
protection of human rights in restrictive environments. Creswell (2013:44) has argued that 
qualitative research is a form of inquiry which seeks to find answers to a social or human 
problem by collecting data “in a natural setting sensitive to the people and places under study,” 
something that Yin’s ‘real world’ (2014:2) explanation also suggests. Creswell further suggests 
that data analysis from this type of inquiry is inductive and aims to establish patterns or themes, 
with its final output incorporating the voices of the participants, the researcher’s reflexivity, and 
what he also describes as a complex description and interpretation of the problem (ibid, 44). 
Burns (2000:391) makes similar arguments, contending that qualitative research sees reality as 
being socially constructed and the researcher’s understanding, interpretation, or contextualization 
of the phenomenon, is based on the perspectives of the informant. Creswell (2014) suggests that 
qualitative research may be suitable when one is investigating unknown variables or if the 
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subject is new and has not been addressed with a known group or sample. Human rights NGO 
conflicts with the state over human rights abuses were a matter of global record, but the 
institutions’ use of new technologies in the restrictive Zimbabwean context had not been 
sufficiently explored. It was also important that the study be undertaken in an environment as 
closely representative of the actual setting as possible.  
 
Although there are still arguments that qualitative research methods have expanded with the 
advent of new technologies from the primary five- identified by Travers (2001) as observation, 
interviews, ethnography, discourse analysis and text analysis- to include digital storytelling, 
internet ethnography, digital media, interaction analysis and dilemma analysis (Marshal and 
Gretchen, 2016:179) scholars maintain that the new methods can still be incorporated in the 
primary five. These incorporated methods, techniques or materials are what researchers now 
commonly employ to get information or data to support their findings and conclusions (Baxter 
and Jack, 2008). This study’s design incorporated a primarily descriptive but analytical 
interrogation of information and data obtained from interviews with staff and volunteers from the 
case studies, other NGOs and activists, ICT users and media and legal professionals as well as 
from documents and archived material. More details on these data sources is provided in 
subsequent sections. 
 
Where a decision has been made to use qualitative research, it can be implemented through a 
variety of designs, one of the more popular being the Case Study. This format can in turn be 
adopted as a study of single or multiple cases. There are various reasons why the case study, seen 
as a qualitative methodological approach, is preferable over other methodologies, but one stands 
out. In general research practice, if researchers require a detailed understanding of complexities, 
circumstances, and dynamics of institutions, they may focus on one or a few selected cases, for 
in-depth study. The results from the study are then used to make inferences about other cases 
with similar characteristics. I chose multiple cases for study because I felt that investigating the 
deployment of mobile phones by organisations which referred to different and specific aspects of 
human rights protection would yield more informative results than one case. Although not 
necessarily always the case, instructive case studies tend to use multiple data sources and Baxter 
and Jack (2008:554) suggest that this strategy enhances the credibility of the data as a whole. 
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 In proposing the case study approach, Yin (2014:2) suggests that some conditions should exist 
for the researcher to adopt it. Among the conditions are that the focus of the study should be to 
answer “how” and “why” questions; that it must not be possible for the researcher or research to 
manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study (the respondents) or the events, and that 
the study focuses on a contemporary-as opposed to a historical- phenomenon (ibid, 2). Further, 
that the phenomenon being studied should also be in its real-world setting. Contextual conditions 
should therefore be important or relevant and the distinction between the phenomenon and the 
context needs to be sufficiently unclear to warrant an investigation. Of particular relevance in 
this study was that two of the critical questions were “how” and “why” NGOs were using mobile 
phones (as opposed to other digital media) to protect human rights. The ‘phenomenon’ was also 
contemporary and other contextual conditions significant. The study was premised on an 
environment characterised by human rights violations since Gukurahundi (1983-87), an active 
human rights NGO sector and a growing mobile phone network. However, there was also the 
fact that the four cases identified for study could, broadly, be considered representative of other 
NGOs in Zimbabwe involved in promoting and protecting human rights. Under those 
circumstances, it became relevant to see whether any findings from the four case studies could be 
used to make inferences about other human rights NGOs. If inferences could be made, it would 
be in the context of how Thomas (2011:23) defined case studies: 
..analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions or other 
systems which are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the 
subject of inquiry will be an instance of class of phenomena that provides an analytical 
frame-an object- within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and 
explicates.  
 
Thomas definition draws from Stake’s (2005) which highlights the aspect of focus on a singular 
subject or object:  
Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied...By 
whatever methods we choose to study the case (Stake, 2005, cited in Thomas, 2011:9). 
 
Stake suggests that a case study calls for investigation into “particularity and complexity of a 
single case” so that one can have an in-depth understanding of it and within particular 
circumstances (Stake, cited in Thomas, 2011:10). A case study is good for “getting a rich picture 
and gaining analytical insights from it,” (Thomas, 2011:23). In-depth exploration especially in 
social research projects, helps in understanding complexity and uniqueness of a particular project 
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and, for professionals, “to (then) generate knowledge and/or inform policy development, 
professional practice and civil or community action,” (Simons, 2009, cited in Thomas, 2011:10). 
In the case of multiple cases, the concept of a case study is expanded to case studies, where 
multiple cases can become subjects although the search for particularities in each case remains. 
 
The programmes or activity agendas for the four NGOs represent three broad areas in civil and 
political rights. These are electoral rights, represented by ERC; rights to privacy, free expression, 
media and information access, represented by MISA; and rights to human dignity, life, liberty, 
movement and assembly, represented by ZPP and ZLHR. It nonetheless remains that for the 
NGOs these rights represent very specific agenda areas: each NGO focuses on promoting and 
protecting specific rights, although ZPP efforts may straddle more areas. While I hoped that I 
would use the findings to make comparative analysis of the case studies, I also hoped that I could 
use them to make inferences and generalisations about the link between human rights NGOs and 
mobile phone use in repressive environments elsewhere.  
5.2 Reviewing research direction. 
 
Field work was conducted between early 2014 and early 2016 in short separate visits to 
Zimbabwe. However, during my first trip developments with the initial list of case studies forced 
a review of the cases studies, participants and the direction of the research. When I arrived in the 
country my initial research focus had been on how NGOs were adopting ICTs to promote social 
change and development. Then I sought to solicit responses from a wide spectrum of actors, 
including CEOs or communication officers of NGOs, executives of Zimbabwe’s mobile network 
operators (MNOs)-namely Econet, Net One and Telecel- internet cafe users and legal and media 
professionals. From the first group of respondents I hoped to get insights into the digital 
technologies that NGOs were deploying in general to promote social change and development. 
MNOs could offer insights into factors driving ICT and internet growth as well as challenges 
they faced. I also believed internet cafe managers and users could offer insights into the nature 
and motivations of internet surfing. It was during the interviews with internet café surfers though 
and other non-NGO participants, that I realized that the mobile phone, SMS and WhatsApp 
applications were much more prevalent in daily use, in online activity and social and other 
communication than I had believed might be the case. In-fact even as they used PCs in internet 
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cafes I noticed that many surfers were also using mobile phones to go online and communicating 
through WhatsApp. The move from investigating the internet and other media towards 
investigating the mobile phone, specifically, thus had its genesis in the internet café and other 
early interview experiences.  
 
But another development, even more significant, also emerged, one that led to a shift from an 
initial list of generalized NGOs towards the specific human rights NGOs in this study. During 
pre-field work planning, and using non-probability convenience sampling, I had settled on six 
NGOs for my case studies. These were the ZLHR, the Girl Child Network, the umbrella NGO 
body, National Association for non-governmental organisations, NANGO, the radio station, 
Radio VOP, the community wildlife conservation organisation, Campfire and UNICEF. I 
preferred this sampling method because it involved a controlled, managed selection of NGOs 
operating in fields I was keen to research, had indicated willingness to co-operate, and were 
easily accessible in the capital, Harare.  
 
However, when I arrived in the country for face-to-face interactions only ZLHR and Radio VOP 
were accommodating despite earlier indications of willingness to support the research. The opt-
outs left me in a difficult position, which was partially resolved when the contact from ZLHR 
offered to introduce me to his colleagues from other human rights NGOs. These in turn 
introduced me to yet others whom I later deduced were in their interpersonal networks, but still 
in the human rights sector. Referrals thus became a useful technique not just for building up the 
final list of cases, but for introductions to several other NGOs and activists, outside the human 
rights sector, whose contributions enriched my findings. These developments became a 
significant factor in reshaping the focus of the research topic, target participants and research 
techniques. The research focus now shifted specifically to human rights NGOs and specific 
human rights issues. But this was also the time when issues around democracy came more 
clearly into focus. The final list of case studies thus became representative of NGOs whose work 
focuses on human rights issues now explored by this study. Additionally, I also had to appeal to 
personal relationships with some of the participants, a typical example being how past 
professional and personal relations with the ZPP Director resulted in her willingness to support 
the research. The final list of case studies became:  
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• ZPP, which has developed a reputation for monitoring and producing the most reliable 
reports on politically motivated violence in the country as well as for promoting peace 
and harmony.  
• ZLHR, which focuses on protecting political and civil rights by challenging 
unconstitutional acts by state actors and giving free legal support and information to 
human rights defenders (HRDs) and ordinary community members.  
• MISA Zimbabwe, which has championed review of repressive media laws to achieve 
democratisation of the media, freedom of expression as well as information access by 
marginalised communities.  
• ERC, which champions review of electoral laws and any practices undermining 
democratic electoral processes.  
5.3  Selecting more representative voices 
 
During discussions with my Supervisors on my findings from the field visits in 2014 and 2015 
some weaknesses in the representativeness of my samples (participants) came to the surface. The 
major weakness however was reflected by the limited presence of the “actual voices” from the 
communities, what Holliday (2007:165) describes as the “ordinary” voice of the people from the 
research setting. The need to have more voices of the community monitors, human rights 
defenders and community journalists- the ones that could be described as the mobile phone 
activists who were more exposed to the threats of a restrictive political system daily at grassroots 
became an important issue. The problem of accessing these people- and hence the reason for the 
limited number of participants from the case studies- arose from the organisations’ reluctance to 
expose their grassroots activists to unknown and unquantified factors like myself, and the 
overriding need to maintain their anonymity because of hostilities in the politically polarised 
village environments (Fielding, in Seal et al., 2007:25). When eventually the respective 
organisations agreed on the participation of a few of their volunteers- ZPP monitors, ZLHR-
recommended HRDs from the organization Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUS) and 
Community Newsletter journalists- an ethical consideration that then arose was how best to 




Three possible solutions offered themselves: protecting the identities of the participants by using 
pseudonyms or numbers, protecting some of the information which NGOs might consider risky 
if it was to be included in the thesis, and interviewing willing participants in safe environments. 
In the last case, for example, the interviews with ZPP monitors were conducted at a location 
considered safe by the organisation. The participants were also not randomly selected. They were 
purposely chosen and represented experiences from some of the most violent and violated 
communities/provinces, and in this case Mashonaland East, Harare, Mashonaland Central and 
Mashonaland West. The selection also considered gender and secular representation. The 
participants were all consulted by the NGO on the phone and agreed to the interviews. It was 
also considered neither wise nor feasible to select monitors from very remote parts of the country 
when provinces evidencing both high mobile penetration and violations could be conveniently 
selected, and the volunteer monitors easily brought to a central venue for the interviews. They 
were therefore, additionally, selected for the convenience of managing travel costs and time. I 
had initially planned to conduct a focus group-type discussion because I thought the method 
would allow interactivity and sharing of experiences amongst the group which I thought might 
yield better results than individual face-to-face interviews. However, the participants arrived at 
different times, leaving me to opt for a one-on-one and semi structured interviewing format. I 
believe these arrangements would have influences on personal reflections or reflexivity. Hennink 
et al. (2011:20) suggest that personal reflexivity emphasizes the establishment of interview 
settings in which both interviewers and participants feel sufficiently comfortable to participate in 
an intercourse that creates genuine knowledge. I believe the location for the interviews and the 
fact that I also had the ‘blessing’ of ZPP made the participants feel more comfortable, and our 
interaction productive. I was introduced as a friend of ZPP. In the case of MISA, in addition to 
the NGO’s officers, media activists producing community newsletters were considered the most 
representative voice to talk about their medium, its role in the communities and the challenges of 
producing it. This group was also difficult to access, but, as a later section observes, access was 
eventually facilitated and the journalists contributed considerably to knowledge about the risks of 
sourcing and producing content for polarized communities, among other things. 
 
Where case studies presented few informants, as with ERC, I had to turn to information obtained 
from interviews with other activists, media and other NGOs. Interviews with institutions like 
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Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), MISA, Daily News and the radio station ZiFM, 
media articles and other documentation provided information which became invaluable in 
building a more comprehensible picture of the activities of ERC. For example, because they 
work in the same field and often co-operate, ZESN could talk intelligently about the NGO; the 
radio station ZiFM could confirm ERC broadcasts and MISA could talk about digital security 
training for the NGO. Documents from Kubatana.net archives also became sources of additional 
information on ERC’s conflicts with the state. 
5.4  Data sourcing methods 
 
Yin proposes that evidence used in case studies in general, comes from six sources which he lists 
as “documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation and physical artifacts,” 
(2014:102). It may not always be the case that all sources are used in a study but it is highly 
probable that triangulation, or a mix of these sources will be considered a more trusted form of 
information sourcing. Documentary evidence may be in the form of e-mails, news articles, 
administrative documents like annual reports, internal reports, organizational plans, legal 
instruments or laws and activity reports. Many such documents are now located online on the 
websites of organisations, in digital media format or as hard copy. Archival records may be in 
the form of organizational records, computer files and maps and charts amongst several. Data 
from these sources presents various advantages for the researcher: the information is clear and 
precise; it can be reviewed as often as possible and easily checked for accuracy. Archival records 
are important for a researcher who may be seeking links between the present and past, using 
historical data to help understand present phenomenon. The case studies in this thesis found 
Yin’s observations applicable and relevant. Yin (2014:102) warns though, that in relation to 
archival records, the researcher must understand the circumstances under which the 
data/information was compiled to be assured of its accuracy and relevance. As with 
documentation, many organisations now store their archival material on their websites, apart 
from keeping it as hard copy or on computer files, storage modes that make access reasonably 
easy for researchers. Interviews were a crucial source of information in the triangulation method 
I employed and are discussed in subsequent sections. Observations and artifacts did not form part 




5.4.1  Interviews as a qualitative research tool 
 
The shift from researching a mix of conservation, services, gender, and political rights NGOs to 
NGOs primarily involved in promoting and protecting human rights, required a reassessment of 
some of the data sourcing methods. My initial aim had been to use face to face, semi-structured 
or open- ended interviews, as the primary tools for sourcing information but I eventually adopted 
several other interview formats, discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. These included 
conducting interviews through Skype, WhatsApp calling, voice calls, email, and WhatsApp text. 
The choice of tools for inquiry was dictated by such circumstances as whether the participants 
also had access to similar technology, whether they had the time, whether they had the financial 
means (airtime) to meet the costs of conducting interviews with me and whether they felt 
comfortable.  
 
According to Berger (2000, cited in Burns, 2000) interviews allow researchers to obtain data that 
they may not be able to collect through observation alone. Berger identifies “informal” and 
“semi-structured” interviews as examples. The semi-structured interviewing technique allows the 
interviewer flexibility in directing the interview. I preferred the technique’s format where the 
interviewer has some broad guiding questions to help him focus on key research issues while 
retaining flexibility to go outside the structure to encourage “… valid response from the 
participant’s perception of reality,” (Burns, 2000:424). In the process of interviewing, I 
explained to the respondents the research topic, the reasons behind the study, its objectives. I also 
explained that because I was aware of the sensitivity of their sector, I needed their consent for the 
interviews and, where they felt my questions made them uncomfortable, they should advise me. 
With some I even showed them the letter of introduction from my University Programme 
Director, Dr McNicholas. I recall that in the case of one respondent based in the UK, Arthur 
Gwagwa, he decided to seek independent confirmation with the University that I was indeed a 
registered student. Afterwards he became a particularly useful contact in terms of suggesting 
additional sources of information on human rights, including his own work published on 
Academia-edu. But Kavada (2007:107, citing Blee and Taylor, 2000) also hints at how semi-
structured questions can influence new shifts in the direction of a study. Because analysing data 
from semi-structured questions is an ongoing process, the analysis can influence a shift in the 
researcher’s perspectives and thus in the study. To some extent I would argue that this was 
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another cause of the ‘change of direction’ in my research after the interviews with café internet 
users and a few other respondents. 
 
With human rights defenders, particularly ZPP’s monitors as well as HRDs assisted by ZLHR, I 
wanted their experiences to come out freely but also strongly, not to be forced out or constrained 
by structured questions. This was not easy, as understanding the potential of a new technology 
like the phone in resistance and social change campaigns might not be that easy given the 
varying literacy and skills levels amongst the HRDs. I found this evident in at least one interview 
with a ZPP monitor who preferred to be interviewed in the local language even though her 
English was good. She expressed herself much more effectively in her understanding of the 
usefulness of the technology in the local language. The interaction encouraged by semi-
structured interviewing appears limited compared to the openness promoted by open-ended or in-
depth interviewing (Burns,2000:423) but a focused researcher should still be able to affect a 
relaxed enough atmosphere for the participant to feel comfortable and open up. Open-ended 
interviewing was therefore the method I used in the majority of interactions with participants. 
 
There were also interviews with participants whose personal experiences with state agents I felt 
could be motivated to yield far better results through open-ended interviewing. Open ended, in-
depth interviews yield better results because they allow for conversational- style interactions 
between interviewer and interviewee, creating atmospheres that encourage personal experiences 
to reveal the interviewee’s true attitudes and views (Burns,2000:423). Tending to be longer than 
semi-structured interviews, they allow the interviewer to adapt questions to suit the informants’ 
experiences, expertise, backgrounds, and languages thereby building up mutual trust and 
empathy between researcher and participants (ibid,423). Flexibility, rapport with interviewee and 
active listening are thus critical interviewer characteristics of this qualitative method of inquiry 
(Silverman, 2014:166). I had two interviews each with the ZPP and ERC directors, the first ones, 
more informal, more relaxed and more conversational than subsequent ones. Even though both 
interviews focused on their organisations’ use of the mobile phone, I encouraged the activists to 
explore their personal experiences more than using my questions to push the discussions towards 
particular experiences. Kavada (2007:107 again citing Blee and Taylor, 2002:100) also discusses 
the issue of personal experiences in the selection of candidates for open-ended interviews, 
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suggesting that samples for such interviews are often deliberately chosen and often based on the 
subjects having had particular experiences rather than experiences representative of the larger 
population. Jestina was the country’s first female HRD to be abducted, tortured, and incarcerated 
for months by the state. Her experiences were unique. In the case of the ERC director, although 
he had also been arrested, his experiences in leading an organisation targeting youths, its 
orientation towards the use of new communication platforms and being engaged in the hostile 
area of electoral reforms, made his experiences also significant. With Jestina the two interviews 
were face to face while with the ERC director, the second interview was conducted through 
Skype during a period he was outside Zimbabwe and I was in the UK. 
 
Naturally using information or data from interviews has its own challenges not least of which is 
that internal generalizability derived from the method could lead to wrong inferences or 
conclusions. An interview is recognised as a social interaction, subject to influences imposed by 
the relationship between the interviewer and the informant (Huberman and Miles, 2002:54). It 
cannot therefore be assumed to yield perfect results, especially results that could be used to 
generalize. 
An account based on an interview may be descriptively, interpretatively and theoretically 
valid as an account of the person’s actions and perspectives in that interview, but may 
also miss other aspects of the person’s perspectives that were not expressed in the 
interview and can easily lead to false inferences about his or her actions outside the 
interview situation. 
 
The list of 83 respondents who participated in the interviews is shown in Appendix 8. From an 
interviewer perspective, I found the experiences of some of the participants overwhelming and 
sufficiently expressive and informative to help shape opinions about the experiences of other 
activists involved in similar work. Because I was not an activist, and had been out of the country 
for several years- except for very brief periods- I did not feel that I had personal experiences 
which could influence my interpretation of the information I was collecting. I also believe that, 
despite being regarded as an ‘outsider’ my experiences as a former broadcast journalist helped in 
creating atmospheres in which participants could interact with me with more relaxation than had 
I not had interviewing experience and could also speak in local language.  
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5.4.2 Using social media applications WhatsApp and Skype as information-sourcing tools  
 
The methods employed for sourcing data/information from the next groups of informants-HRDs, 
ERC staff, professional journalists and community newsletter journalists, involved using 
different techniques and tools. The OAUS informants recommended by my ZLHR contact had 
used the hotline facility several times and were willing to participate in the research. However 
only three, out of an initial six who had expressed willingness to be interviewed, eventually did. 
One agreed to a face-to-face interview, which I recorded on a tape recorder; the second to an 
interview through WhatsApp calling and the third to a WhatsApp text chat. I only managed to 
communicate with the third through WhatsApp text when I was back in the UK, having failed to 
make physical contact while I was in Zimbabwe. The other three eventually either pleaded busy 
schedules or simply failed to respond to calls or WhatsApp texts. I have already pointed out that 
my second interview with the ERC director was through Skype while he was outside Zimbabwe. 
I also conducted Skype interviews with an activist from Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and a 
professional journalist with the Daily News. The Skype conversations, all conducted from the 
UK, were recorded on tape.  
 
With regards to the newsletter journalists it was only when I was about to return from a 
seemingly unsuccessful trip to Zimbabwe in early 2016 that a meeting with one of the MISA 
community media officers yielded the telephone contacts of 17 of the group co-ordinators. 
Email, which I had then thought would be a more productive form of communication for 
sourcing information given our different locations, was not available to over 90% of them. Many 
of them however were on WhatsApp. Given MISA’s concerns with journalist protection and the 
distances between us, I sought the NGO’s permission to open a WhatsApp group with the 
journalists. Regular WhatsApp text conversations with the MISA advocacy officer suggested I 
might be able to use the application and method of communication to guide a group discussion 
with the journalists. Intention to use the platform was also motivated by the fact that for the 
journalists it was almost free36 and did not suffer the disadvantage of employing limited text that 
SMS did. In using this mode of communication, the journalists had the option of responding 
either through the group platform, or directly to my inbox. The latter would offer more privacy 
 
36  WhatsApp was not totally free because mobile operators only allowed its use through data bundles. 
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for individuals. I texted and broadcast several questions with the objective of motivating group 
conversation, as opposed to individual chats without group participation. Another objective of 
this method of sourcing information was to approximate a semi-structured-interview type of 
interrogation. Unfortunately, the strategy was not successful. 
 
Only 12 out of the 17 journalists became actively involved, but responded mainly to my inbox 
rather than through the group platform I had set up. The response forced a reversion to direct 
communication with each individual journalist, something that lengthened the interview process 
as I now had to carefully assess different responses from the 12 participants, following up on 
each with modified questions. The WhatsApp mode of inquiry was bound to have its challenges. 
Although WhatsApp conversations are instantaneous, they do not allow the researcher 
opportunity to capture the nuances that interviews do. It would not, for example, have been 
possible to capture useful nuances, inflections that the journalists’ voices could have manifested, 
or the body language that could have enriched interpretations from face to face interviews as in 
the case with ZPP monitors or indeed other participants that I interviewed face-to-face or over 
the phone. Having made this observation I was however clear about the general direction my 
questions should take, something that helped me ‘control’ the direction of the conversations. 
Going over the thread of the early group WhatsApp conversations, I also concluded that there 
might have been several reasons for the minimal enthusiasm in a group discussion: some 
participants had begun to dominate the discussion; some typed poorly and lost others in the 
discussion, who then stopped responding; others showed grammatical deficiencies; still others 
moved away from the conversation most likely as they became involved in other commitments 
and were lost by the time they tried to re-join the conversation.  
 
5.4.3 Analysing social media platforms to establish the link with mobile phones 
 
As my study progressed it emerged that social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and You 
Tube might be playing some important role in complementing, if not strengthening, the mobile 
phone’s reporting function. For example, the content of MISA’s Zimcitizenbuzz- a web platform 
for pictures, audio clips and news about what was happening in Zimbabwe before and after the 
2013 referendum and elections-was a direct output of using the mobile phone by community 
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media journalists. The NGO’s Facebook page was also using a link to facilitate discussions on 
the issues. As a follow-up to the interviews therefore, and to understand what links might exist 
between the platforms and the mobile phone, I decided that a small investigation into how the 
NGOs and a few of their key staff were using these platforms, might yield useful information. I 
thus settled on conducting a simple and brief analysis of the use of Twitter. I should make it clear 
that this therefore was not one of my main methods of analysis, but one adopted merely to help 
with reflecting the link between social media and the objects of phone deployment or the 
usefulness of the platforms as additional communication channels on human rights issues. 
 
 The analysis involved compiling figures relating to the number of Tweets made by each NGO 
since it opened its account, the number and profile of individuals or entities following it 
(Followers), those it was Following itself, number of Likes and a simple assessment of the 
contents of the tweets. The same format was used in analysing the Twitter accounts of some 
NGOs staff. The results of the analysis are contained in Table 7.1 in the chapter on ZLHR. The 
selection of this group was determined by the position or responsibilities of the individuals in the 
organisations. In the case of ERC, Tawanda Chimhini is not just the Director but also the most 
prolific twitterer at the organisation, as indeed amongst Zimbabwe’s NGO sector. Tabani Moyo 
and Kholiwe Nyoni of MISA were leading MISA’s two key community media initiatives. I also 
decided to include a few additional accounts outside the case studies as one way of highlighting 
comparisons with institutions or individuals who share links or similar sectoral interests or, as in 
the case of #263Chat, institutions showing important influence in Zimbabwe’s social 
environment through their use of social media. 
5.5 Selecting documents and archival material for study 
 
The aspect of employing the qualitative method which involved document analysis was as 
critical as other qualitative methods. Conducting a comprehensive analysis of documents from 
primary sources such as media articles, government documents like the legal instruments, and 
NGO documents, was an approach designed to yield information which might corroborate 
findings from the interviews as well as allow informative comparative analysis of the digital 
media choices by the NGOs. The analyses would therefore provide information that would 
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answer aspects of the research question, for example mobile phone growth and what effect it had 
on NGO approaches to confronting human rights challenges.  
   
My selection of primary documents, website and archival material for analysis was influenced by 
various factors amongst them the willingness and readiness of the organisations to assist, the 
availability of the relevant documents and the currency of the material. Documents that I 
analysed included monthly, quarterly or annual reports from ZPP and other NGOs, Posts and 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (POTRAZ) and mobile operator Econet. Net One and 
Telecel, the other two mobile operators, were not forthcoming with their annual reports. Some 
information like mobile internet statistics and tariffs was however available on the two 
providers’ websites or in online magazines like Techzim and Technomag. Government printers 
provided copies of Zimbabwe’s laws and new (2013) constitution. This last has been produced in 
abridged and full versions in some of the local languages to cater for language diversity as well 
as literacy differentials. The media NGO Kubatana which archives news releases, statements, 
and activity reports from 350 human rights advocacy and lobby NGOs and also creates links to 
the respective websites of the NGOs, was another rich source of information. A lawyer with 
Veritas also directed me to two unique mobile applications on Zimbabwe’s Constitution and list 
of human rights by two legislative watchdogs, Veritas and Centre for Applied Legal Research 
(CALR). The lawyer said both applications, downloadable from Google Play Store, have become 
invaluable tools for law students, lawyers, and activists with mobile phones.  
 
There were some challenges though with accessing some website content. Some websites 
containing information and quantitative data that I considered important, would lose the content 
when they were taken down for maintenance. When they came back some of the data would 
have been discarded, perhaps because it was no longer considered relevant. In any case it was no 
longer retrievable. A case in point was the difficulty in retrieving important ZPP reports for 
March 2008 which, after the website had been updated, were no longer available. Overall, 
analysing information from all these sources, as a method, helped with exposing developments in 
new media uses in the country and subsequently shaping interview questions that were designed 





Creswell (2013) warns that one of the problems with the qualitative research approach is that the 
researcher’s personal experiences and background can introduce complexity when it comes to 
interpreting findings. Because the approach often requires that the researcher explain his research 
problem and findings in detail that is mainly descriptive, without using data or information that 
could be scientifically tested, this could introduce personal bias or prejudice into the study. 
Subjectivity thus becomes one of the shortfalls of the approach and hence the need for reflexivity 
(Hennink et al., 2011:19). The argument is that just as much as the ‘perspectives of study 
participants reflect their subjective views of their social world,’ (Hennink et al.2011:19) the 
researcher too may also bring his own subjective influences into the research process, 
particularly during data collection and interpretation. Reflexivity thus permits the researcher to 
reflect on how best he can manage his own pre-knowledge, pre-conceptions and subjective 
influences so that they do not intrude into the research process with undesirable consequences. In 
the case of this study adopting an ethnographic approach would probably have been more 
reflective of Creswell’s suggestion, of a research conducted in its natural setting, (Creswell 
2013:44) but the design that I adopted still managed a close approximation of an inquiry with 
participants in their natural settings, respecting the sensitivities of these settings and tapping into 
the participants’ experiences and drawing out their voices. 
 
There was also a challenge in obtaining background information from government about NGOs 
in general. NGOs are registered under two major Acts: the Private and Voluntary Organisation 
Act (PVOA) and the Deeds and Registries Act. Two different Ministries with different record 
keeping capacities administer the acts. The Ministry of Labour and Welfare, which administers 
the PVOA appeared more organised in registration and data management processes. It is 
computerised and makes it easy for researchers to locate information and data around NGOs 
registered under the Act. Infact officials simply downloaded the list of NGOs and relevant details 
onto my mobile disk. The Ministry of Justice, which administers Trusts, on the other hand, 
appeared disorganised in its filing and data management systems, and made it difficult to obtain 




Because of state harassment, many human rights organisations have moved out of the city centre 
to locate their offices in low density areas on the outskirts. The NGOs agree that this move is 
part of attempts to keep their locations as low profile and as secretive as possible. Many offices 
do not carry any signage on their premises, including street numbers, making it difficult to locate 
them. It is a legal requirement by city councils though that residential premises carry locator 
numbers. Additionally, physical access is constrained by high levels of security. High security 
walls or fences protect some offices; they are gated and entry can only be gained after a 
screening process by security guards or CCTV. Use of CCTV may be a security guarantee but 
one which some NGOs acknowledged intimidates, frustrates and irritates state agents, such that 
the NGOs are suspected to be attempting to conceal something. Agents also believe activists 
switch off their phones to avoid being tracked because they want to conceal illegal activities. Or 
they accuse them, if the activists have phones with GPS, of having the capability to track state 
agents themselves, although this seems far-fetched. In the case of CCTV screening I recall being 
held at the gate of one of the NGOs for half an hour until my identity was confirmed over CCTV 
by my interviewee who had been involved in a meeting. But there is a positive side to the 
deployment of the technology: in the same manner that it can be used to deny entry, I found that 
CCTV could also facilitate easy access to the NGO premises once a rapport has been established 
with the institution. 
 
Another challenge related to the level of mistrust by the NGOs towards anybody they were not 
familiar with, somebody considered an outsider. Under the suspicious environment in which the 
NGOs are operating, it appears difficult to have access to key human rights NGO activists unless 
you have some form of referral or prior clearance by another activist or NGO. One has to 
‘conform’ or be a member of the circle to have easy access. Even amongst the activists 
themselves, there appear to be enclaves within which some remain outsiders. Under the 
circumstances, and although disappointing, it did not come as a complete surprise when I spent 
more than six weeks before I could conduct any interviews with activists. It was not until former 
journalist colleagues, and their own friends, recommended me to other activists that I could 
confirm new meetings. For instance, I could only interview Kubatana.net staff after being 
introduced by the Director of Radio Voice of the People (VOP) a colleague from my old days in 
broadcasting. I could also only interview several other activists after being introduced by the 
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ZLHR communications executive. Interviews with staff from Media Alliance of Zimbabwe 
(MAZ), Heal Zimbabwe Trust, Mobile Community Zimbabwe and Digital Society Zimbabwe 
could only be confirmed after I was vouched for by MISA participants, former media colleagues. 
As this study will show I was later to establish that all these institutions were involved in citizen 
journalism and digital security training for volunteers and HRDs. Pedzisai Ruhanya, yet another 
former media and University of Westminster colleague, opened doors for me with activists from 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. Although I requested 
introductions to NGOs in specific human rights fields, when I had lost my initial case studies, I 
also realised latter that personal relationships, collaborations and partnerships amongst the 
individuals and NGOs played a significant part in those introductions and referrals. In short this 
is when I discovered the value of interpersonal networks amongst the country’s human rights 
activists. 
 
There were also challenges with organizing meetings with the NGOs to allow for more 
comprehensive investigations and better understanding of the organisations. Except for ZPP and 
MISA, who accommodated two visits each to their offices, the other NGOs were reluctant to 
accommodate me for more than the one meeting for interviews which often lasted less than an 
hour. There also appeared a ‘gatekeeper’ syndrome amongst some NGOs, where only the 
spokesperson could give out information; some also ignored e-mails, SMS, or WhatsApp 
messages, or were unable to keep appointments for interviews.  
 
Having made these observations, I should acknowledge that I was not the first researcher to face 
the challenge of minimal co-operation from Zimbabwean NGOs. Researchers like Smelter 
(2012), Tshabangu (2009), Mandiyanike (2005) and Rich-Dorman (2001) note that researching 
in conflicted environments like Zimbabwe depends on the researcher demonstrating to 
participants that he is not an ‘outsider’ by being up to date and intimately familiar with current 
local events. In seven years, I had been visiting home for very short periods, mainly for meetings 
at my employers’ head office. Rich-Dorman (2001) and Mabweazara (2010) respectively 
researching NGOs and media institutions, circumvented this dilemma in Zimbabwe by adopting 
an ethnographic approach, immersing themselves into the participants’ environment for some 
time. Even if the environments were not restrictive, an approach that draws from experiences of 
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immersion and familiarity is advantageous, a point sufficiently proved by Kavada’s (2007) study 
of the European Social Forum. 
5.7 Data Analysis 
 
This research involved analysing data from the four cases and other sources.  After the 
interviews, during which I used a digital recorder, I transcribed them into Word and then 
archived them. The data consisted of descriptions of personal experiences of community 
monitors, HRDs and community media activists in deploying the mobile phone in their natural 
settings. It also consisted of violations figures from ZPP; copies of community newsletters 
produced by MISA's journalists and SMS and WhatsApp texts on various issues from all the 
NGOs. It also encompassed my own personal experiences of the challenges of researching NGOs 
operating in this environment, which I had made in note form. I filed all this information into 
marked folders. I viewed all this data as reflecting and summing up the environments or settings 
in which the phenomena being studied existed, and was meant to strengthen my understanding of 
them, offer new interpretations, new perspectives, new meanings and deeper insights (Yin, 2003, 
cited by Mhlanga, 2010:80). 
 
Because the focus was on how each individual NGO was deploying the mobile phone, one 
approach to analysing the data presented itself: identifying themes or key issues, comparing and 
contrasting evidence from the cases, noting similarities and differences (Creswell,2013) and, 
overall, assessing if and where generalisations could be drawn. The format of themes and 
categories of key issues was structured in such manner as to respond to the research questions 
and subsidiary questions. In other words, to show connections with the objectives of the study or 
reflection with any issues identified in the foundational chapters comprising the literature review. 
Except in the case of ZPP where some statistics were analysed to support monitors’ reports the 
analysis was mainly narrative and descriptive.  
5.8  Limitations of the study 
 
This study has a few limitations. The account of the challenges with getting sufficient or indeed 
the most appropriate respondents in some of the case studies suggests one. The ERC case study 
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is built on the ‘evidence’ (interviews) of only two participants from the NGO. While the 
information from the interviews is useful in making some credible conclusions, the case’s lack of 
the perspective of participants from the ‘real world’ setting, the volunteers from the voter clubs 
and citizen reporters, for example, is bound to be absent. A similar argument may be made about 
the absence of more concrete figures or statistics relating to the use of the ZLHR hotline from the 
NGO itself. I believe such statistics, much as an overall figure is quoted, would strengthen the 
case for the potential of this tool. Having made this point, it is also important to acknowledge the 
desire of the institutions to protect their constituents and sensitive information.  
 
Second, I also make the point that I was viewed as an ‘outsider’ by the NGOs, something that I 
believe limited interactions with more important sources of information. Conducting interviews, 
which call for interactions at personal level and where the primary method of sourcing 
information, under circumstances of limited trust, is likely to produce results which may not be 
as patently representative as the researcher would hope for. Third, the research was based on 
convenience rather than random samples, which could limit generalisability, even though I hoped 
that the final selection was such that the case studies might stand for others because they came 
from the same sector. In reality though, human rights is still a broad sector and generalizability, 
if it was possible to make, might be limited to enclaves within that sector. 
5.9 Research ethics 
 
Research ethics can have considerable impact on how we design and conduct our research as 
well as how we report our findings (Nalita James, 2013). Deciding how best to handle issues 
with the potential to bring harm to respondents, to disrupt or change their lives, to create 
problems for them once the researcher has left, presents a very significant challenge to somebody 
carrying out research in authoritarian environments. Although every one of the four cases had its 
peculiar challenges - some of which, as I have already indicated, limited my ability to interact 
with the most relevant, most appropriate respondents- the one common overriding challenge, as I 
have highlighted, involved the need to protect the privacy and anonymity of my informants. In 
Designing Qualitative Research Marshall and Rossman (2016) caution researchers to guard 
digitized data closely, as new digital media used in collecting and storing data can be accessed 
even though researchers are convinced the technologies are robust. I made certain that I kept 
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recorded interviews, transcriptions and data collected from the cases under PIN-protected 
formats. 
 
All the four NGOs want to protect the identities of their volunteers or HRDs because of the 
volatilities and polarization in the communities in which they work. Although I took their names 
and in some cases contacts of the participants during interviews I promised to protect their 
identities. I was concerned that even though some of them work as embedded activists, it is 
possible to inadvertently give details (of incidents) which could lead to the identification of some 
of the volunteers or HRDs. My research established however that some of the community 
journalists are known in their communities, for example those in towns controlled by the 
opposition political party, or in places like Chipinge where disenfranchisement of the community 
tends to bond the members, and the community ignores that the journalists may be a threat or 
nuisance. In-fact some communities chose to work with and protect the activists. 
 
A different ethical issue arose when it came to the ZLHR. The organisation initially politely 
pleaded lawyer-client confidentiality when I asked for names of HRDs whom it had assisted 
through the hotline for me to interview. Although I had picked, through the organisation’s 
Annual Reports, its publication the Legal Monitor, and media reports in general, names of 
activists who had been assisted in courts by the volunteer lawyers, I could not be certain that the 
hotline had played any part in ZLHR’s intervention in the victims’ cases. The same polite refusal 
was repeated when I requested interviews or information from senior lawyers managing HRD 
issues and statistics and data on the hotlines. I was advised that the Executive Director’s 
permission was required for interaction with them, but it was never granted. Writers like Moira 
Carmody and Byrne-Armstrong (1999, both cited in Kerry Carrington, 2010), who researched 
non-political but still sensitive areas, warn researchers to understand and appreciate the 
sensitivities around their topics so that they know how to negotiate with those in positions of 
power over target respondents or other team members. I had not anticipated this form of 
resistance from an organisation which had shown readiness to open its own and other NGO 
doors for me. The polite ‘gate-keeper’ refusals may explain the challenge that I was subsequently 
faced with when it came to interpreting the perspective of only one interviewee from an 
organization whose work has had the most profound influence on the country’s human rights 
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defense activities. However, I believe the participation of OAUS activists helped in enriching 
information on hotline deployment. 
 
Nigel Fielding (2007, cited in Seale et al., 2007:241) observes that resistance and cooperation in 
field work are continually re-negotiated and therefore hardly “invariant” or intractable. On my 
third trip to Zimbabwe my ZLHR respondent relented and gave me contacts from OAUS, the 
organisation of young people whose activism since its birth in 2014 had made it a high-profile 
target for police action. Although the activists themselves expressed no concern over either their 
names or their activities appearing in my report, I still had concern over their well-being and 
decided to hide their identities. These NGOs also manage sensitive personal mobile based data 
on volunteers or members of the public, some of whom send them field reports in the form of 
SMS or WhatsApp texts. One of the reports I was given by ERC was a screen shot of SMS texts 
with user phone numbers visible, a development which clearly would pose a threat to the users 
should the reports be presented in my study without erasing or blocking the numbers.  
5.10  Conclusion 
 
The methodology was influenced by qualitative research and used the case study approach as the 
primary method of inquiry. In discussing the methodology this chapter also examined, among 
several issues, strengths and shortfalls of the case study method, challenges that a restrictive 
environment could pose for a researcher and how he can respond to minimise their effect. The 
challenges relating to researching in a restrictive environment included fear of the state 
machinery and bureaucracy within the NGO sector itself. A range of interviewing techniques and 
tools were deployed to best accommodate the circumstances of the various participants. Some of 
these tools, for example WhatsApp calling and WhatsApp texting, were, interestingly, services 
that the participants were already using for social and other interactions but had not been within 








Zimbabwe Peace Project 
6. ZPP history and mandate 
 
The Zimbabwe Peace Project, ZPP, was formed in 2000 by a group of faith-based and human 
rights organizations37 as a response to the high levels of violence in the 2000 elections which had 
gone unreported and undocumented in any formal ways. ZPP was therefore a mechanism to 
document such violence in the future. The 2000 elections marked the first most serious challenge 
to ZANU PF’s stranglehold on power by an opposition political party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC), after a challenge in 1995 by the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, 
(ZUM)38 also failed (Sachikonye, 2011). ZPP’s founding members had diverse knowledge of and 
experiences in human rights, democracy, and community empowerment issues, having worked 
with rural and urban communities implementing relief, welfare, peace building, civic education, 
and counselling projects. Two of the members, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in 
Zimbabwe (CCJPZ) and Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform (ZLP) had even more unique 
backgrounds. CCJPZ had investigated the 1980s Gukurahundi atrocities in Matebeleland while 
ZLP comprised former freedom fighters from ZANU PF but who disagreed with its intolerance 
for divergent political views. ZLP’s involvement, according to a ZPP advocacy officer I 
interviewed on May 5, 2015, gave credibility and an enhanced identity to the NGO: 
 
Because the stereotyping from the party (ZANU PF) was that this (ZPP) was a western 
sponsored organization, with a western agenda, the presence of an organization with liberation 
history forced a different reflection. ZLP were nationalists… these were pan-Africanists with 
proven credentials of having fought for the country. (Yet) they were coming for this cause. That 
would do very well for the profile of the organization, and the credibility of the organization. 
 
 
37 The founding NGOs comprised Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ)37, the 
Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ),the Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Association (ZimRights), Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), the Zimbabwe Election Support 
Network (ZESN), the Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET), the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP) and 
the Counselling Services Unit (CSU). 
38 ZUM was led by former ZANU PF Secretary General, Edgar Tekere and, although challenging his former leader, 
Mugabe, Tekere and his party were not seen as, at this point in 1995, as a powerful enough alternative to dislodge 
ZANU PF and provide a credible leadership for the country. Tekere was viewed as a Machiavellian figure, 




From my appraisal of documents, interviews and public comments, I believe the NGO gains 
efficiency and effectiveness from several factors, among them a clear governance structure, 
(made up of board members from the founding NGOs) which gives the NGO clear leadership 
and policy direction, an efficient administration/secretariat, permanent deployment of volunteer 
monitors throughout the country’s 210 constituencies, adoption of a credible communication 
strategy and a high level of staff commitment to the organisation’s objectives, values and tasks. 
ZPP’s profile has also become stronger since the Director, Jestina Mukoko’s arrival in 2007, 
because of her people and communication skills, her courage, and the respect she commands 
amongst human rights defenders, the media, and other female professionals. Her abduction 
experiences in 2008 typified the human rights violations that her organization was profiling. 
 
One of the criticisms often leveled against Zimbabwean civil society organisations (CSOs) is 
their lack of serious commitment to, and consistency with their core purposes39.  ZPP advances a 
Vision of peace, justice, dignity, freedom and development, commitment to the defense of 
human rights, protection of the vulnerable and marginalized from violence, gender 
empowerment, integrity, tolerance of diversity and public accountability. The NGO’s work in 
documenting and reporting political violence has gained it respect and trust amongst local and 
international institutions. For example, the aid agencies World Food Programme and Care 
International have adopted food aid distribution recommendations made by ZPP because they 
trust the NGO’s commitment to and demands for transparency and non-partisanship by both 
government and other NGOs in welfare services provision.  
 
As is the case with the founding members, the bulk of ZPP’s work is with rural communities, 
where the ruling party’s political structures seek to co-opt or silence dissenters through physical 
violence or denial of food, drug and education aid40. In these areas, infrastructural and resource 
challenges make issues of human rights, equality, democracy and empowerment imperatives 
 
39 Lawyer F. Chiweshe and Jestina Mukoko both agreed in interviews that many Zimbabwean 
CSOs/NGOs were indeed “singing for their supper” and gravitated towards their sponsors’ agendas, 
rather than keeping faith with their objectives. This explains why NGOs end up following multiple 
programmes many of which are in conflict or duplications of other’s projects. 
40  There were reports that rural school children with parents suspected to be aligned to the opposition 
parties were denied access to education funds provided by the British and European governments as part 
of their aid to the country to support the revival of the collapsed education system. The funds, food and 
drugs provided as aid were reported to be benefitting only those aligned to ZANU PF. 
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(Dren Nupen, 2008).41 Advocacy and information officers are, as result critical actors in the 
NGO’s outreach programmes where they constantly interact with volunteers and other 
community members.  
 
Since its inception in 2001 ZPP has produced numerous human rights violations reports. By 
December 2011 it had produced 96 monthly and four Annual reports, 43 information alerts, three 
research documents, two bi-annual reports and 15 bulk SMSes (ZPP Annual Report, 2011:27). 
The reports are uploaded onto ZPP and, until 2013, Kubatana.net websites, and circulated to 
founding members, other human rights NGOs, international partners, sponsors, and the media. 
These institutions in turn use their distribution channels to ensure wider dissemination. The 
organization is acknowledged as one of the most reliable sources of information on politically 
motivated human rights violations in Southern Africa. 
6.1  Deploying the phone and distinguishing the monitoring process 
 
The findings on phone deployment are presented in several sections. The early sections present 
the steps in the NGO’s monitoring process, followed by organisational and social dynamics that 
shape the relationship between the NGO and its volunteers and against which the outcomes of 
digital media use may be assessed. Subsequent sections assess how the device is deployed, 
including risks inherent in the process and the environment in which the volunteers work. I 
believe it is also important to put into perspective the import of volunteer service, about 
volunteer autonomy and embeddedness and how these issues, negotiated under a formal 
organizing structure with specific mandates, may affect phone use.  
 
The NGO views the monitoring process to involve three steps: monitoring or observing, 
documenting and reporting. Observing involves the monitor simply assessing events and 
incidents in the community, drawing mental pictures of the contexts and noting what may need 
to be documented. The second step involves documenting, or gathering evidence using the tools 
that the monitors have, including the phone. The third step involves reporting the events during 
which the NGO verifies incidents then compiles reports in the form of monthly monitoring 
 
41  Dren Nupen in 2008 looked at the Civic Education Network Trust’s operations in rural Zimbabwe and 
identified these issues as key challenges for the state and NGOs in these areas. 
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reports, media statements, alerts, and other formats. The whole process, described by the NGO as 
MONITORING, is a multilayered approach, which often occurs concurrently. How these steps 
actually manifest, the details of what role the phone plays in the process, is the subject of this 
investigation. 
Figure 6.1 Diagramatic representation of ZPP’s monitoring process
 
6.2  The organising structure: distinguishing the professionals and volunteers and 
volunteer embeddedness  
 
ZPP’s work relies heavily on two levels of the organizational structure: the secretariat’s 
professionals and volunteers. The professional staff- who include Senior Programmes Officers, 
Advocacy Officers, Provincial and District co-ordinators- are charged with liaising daily with the 
public, supporting community volunteers, putting together monitor reports and ensuring they are 
put in the public domain where they expose violations. Volunteers are made up of community 
monitors and Peace Defenders, another group of volunteer activists drawn mainly from urban 
and peri-urban centres but with links to communities.  
 
1.Observing




note; liaises with HQ or
other monitor/s
2.Documenting 
Record violations, take pictures, audio,
names of victims, perpetrators, places and
times; compile report on digital
smartform on phone; transmit to server
when there is signal; advise HQ if
necessary; update HQ through calls,
WhatsApp, SMS.
3.Verifying & Reporting
HQ downloads reports from remote server; Officers
verify reports; compile monthly reports, alerts etc
using monitor information; compile maps, stats to
support reports; distribute reports to constituents;
upload reports and pictures onto website & social
media platforms; Mount domestic and international
advocacy and lobby programmes .
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Conversations with staff indicated that the NGO uses the community-based networking 
experiences of some of its founding members to develop its own network of community 
volunteers. Two local (grassroots) volunteers observe and document violations in each 
constituency, with populations ranging between 15 000 to 25 000. The placement highlights the 
embedded and covert nature of the monitors and their mobile devices. Because they come from 
within the communities, use their own or ZPP-furnished phones, the volunteers understand the 
contexts of their environment, the faces, the community idiosyncrasies, their peculiarities, the 
political structures and power centres, the community ‘culture’, economic and other challenges. 
The mobile phones are an extension of the volunteers, supporting the monitors’ social and work-
related communication needs. In one instant, they are sophisticated pieces of hardware, installed 
with sophisticated software for documenting incidents; in the next they are ordinary, everyday 
technology facilitating social communication, for example Christmas and birthday messages, 
family interactions and more. The recruitment and operational strategy thus suggests tactical 
thinking on the part of the organisation: using embedded locals removes problems associated 
with suspicions towards strangers and possible ethnic, language or cultural misunderstandings. 
The Director’s explanation confirms this assessment: 
Board
National Director
Advocacy Officers (Reports/Data Capture & 
Mapping, Monitoring, Peace Bdg) Info & 
Comms
Provincial/District Coordinator 
(overt /covert staff, supporting 
monitors)
Volunteer monitors
Peace Defenders (bridge between 





 We want them to be resident in those places because it is easier for them to know the dynamics 
in the area in which they are resident…and at times it is very easy to immediately identify 
personalities...ah…who are involved in incidents that take place in their areas (Interview, 
Jestina Mukoko, Sept 8, 2014) 
 
The Director’s response to police accusations when she was abducted in 2008 shows further how 
deeply impenetrable volunteers can become to the state: 
 When I was abducted in 2008, during interrogation...ah...one officer said to me, some incidents 
happen well after midnight, maybe around one or so, but you get them correct. How do you get 
them correct? And my simple answer to him was that well, we have people who are concerned 
Zimbabweans…who live in the same communities with you. And these are the people who bring 
out this information. The next thing was they brought out a piece of paper and they wanted me to 
give them names. I said “There are 420 of them, I don’t know where to begin. And actually I 
don’t even know them. I know they are concerned Zimbabweans who will give the organisation 
information but I don’t know their names. I don’t even know where they live. So I can’t even 
begin to write their names.”  
 
But as I discuss later, embeddedness is not totally free of risks and threats especially when it 
comes to using the phone in documenting evidence.  
 
My analysis of the recruitment of the permanent, professional staff also suggests a tactical 
approach by the organisation, to support monitoring activities. Cultural, ethnic, and linguistic 
representativeness amongst professional staff facilitates two things: first, productive 
conversations with other CSO activists; second, effective moderation of monitor reports by the 
organisation in case there are queries about their accuracy, credibility or integrity.  The 
Advocacy officer explained in a telephone interview on May 5, 2015, that the diversity invests a 
high degree of empowerment in their constituents: 
It (ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity) then allows us to reach out to a broad section of 
people. It means anyone is able to directly get in touch with us and present what they have 
observed in a language or in a way that we and they are both familiar with, (in a language) that 
makes them comfortable (Telephone Interview, Advocacy Officer, May 5, 2015) 
 
At the time of this study the NGO had at any time, one staff member who spoke or understood at 
least one of the 14 official languages, in addition to English and Shona. As a matter of fact, ZPP 
is one of very few NGOs with such diversity in Zimbabwe. The Director herself is fluent in at 
least four of the official languages and has some understanding of more. The same is the case 
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with the data officer who handles numerous reports a month, some of which often require 
verification and moderation in different languages. 
 
Some of the monitors are also drawn, on ‘secondment,’ from founding member organisations or 
new partners. ‘Seconded’ volunteers are HRDs or activists in their own right, some directly 
employed by, or volunteering for other NGOs. However, there is an understanding amongst the 
partner organisations that for the protection of the monitors only ZPP must know the identities of 
such volunteers. Their reports must never be used with the other NGO. This also avoids cross 
monitoring, cross reporting, and the potential confusion that report duplication and 
inconsistencies in reporting styles could cause. Two monitors in this position confirmed to me 
that the arrangement did not create conflicts, threats or compromise their work. ZPP however 
still trains these volunteers in telephone skills and digital security, reporting and documentation 
although previous experience is still invaluable. 
6.3 Gender, age and blending in. 
 
Considerations like age, gender, education level and financial capacity are important factors in 
recruitment, but ZPP says ultimately it is the monitors’ understanding of and commitment to 
human rights issues that overshadows all else. In general monitors are from all walks of life- 
teachers, church goers, township residents and nurses-from both sexes with age ranges between 
20 and 60 years. I was told that rural volunteers are predominantly female and middle-aged. My 
male and female informants ranged between 42 and 60 years old, were high school educated or 
above, rural and urban based and eloquent in both Shona and English (although one preferred to 
converse primarily in Shona). Urban areas are dominated by younger volunteers, a sizeable 
number reportedly clergy, a point also confirmed by one participant. One of the interviewees was 
a university-educated highly placed church leader.  
 
The mix partly reflects the country’s gender spread as well as employment challenges. Women 
form 51% of the country’s population; live mainly in rural areas and represent a larger 
percentage of the country’s marginalized and vulnerable groups. Here politics has created the 
most violated and polarized communities. Unemployment is highest in urban areas where most 
youths and males live. ZPP said young male monitors from constituents along the country’s 
129 
 
southern borders with Botswana and South Africa form a sizeable percentage of these 
unemployed youths. The Director said in an interview on September 8, 2014, that the 
organisation is however careful not to recruit politically-aligned volunteers because of the need 
to maintain objectivity. My interactions with participants, though, showed volunteers with very 
high degrees of political sensitivity. 
 
Traditionally, in rural communities, older women attract less attention and demand more 
deference than younger ones, ideally making it easier for them to blend in to investigate and 
document incidents. A comment by 42-year old volunteer No 3, from Bindura, suggests she finds 
it easy to blend in as a vendor in both town and village markets, rich sources of information. 
It’s easy for me to go into the society and socialise with people, talk to people. I stay in Bindura. 
I can go into town or the farming areas to sell my things. By selling my things I am an ordinary 
vendor…I appear like anyone else…any other woman vendor. But I know what I am looking 
for…what I am doing (Monitor No 3. Jan 14, 2015).  
The 60-year old female monitor (No.1), from Mhondoro Ngezi, operates in the same manner, 
using the marketing of household wares in other villages as a cover to investigate and document 
incidents. This monitor has also ‘subcontracted’ a friend in another village to assist her because 
of the large size of the communities and number of violations she must cover. Typically, it 
appears the volunteers engage in activities that people of their age or gender would be expected 
to, so that they do not become conspicuous and attract attention. I interpreted these actions as 
attempts to blend in, a critical factor of embeddedness. The 60-year old male monitor (No 2) 
from Mashonaland East reported that when there were events organized by war veterans in the 
province-which often presaged violence- he posed as a war veteran or supporter, attending their 
events in their regalia: “Kana zvasvika pekuti ndirikuda kunatso tsvaga nyaya ndinopfekawo 
makhakhi ema war vet ndichirowa slogan zvekuti ndinongonziwo Comrade. (When it comes to it 
and I need to get my story, I wear the khakis worn by war veterans. I chant their slogans such 
that they think I am also one of them and they call me Comrade…”). Church leaders, monitor No 
4’s category, are protected by a general Zimbabwean convention about religious leaders: the 
public has a natural deference and respect for them; they are considered pillars of society, 
involved in ministering to the spiritual needs of the people and therefore shepherds rather than 
threats, to society. 
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6.4  Professionals, volunteers and ‘virtual’ relationships and volunteer hopes. 
 
Before turning to explore the deployment of the mobile phone itself I look at the link between 
the NGO’s organizing structure and volunteerism. The issue is relevant because in the case of 
ERC and MISA a similar relationship maintains. By having professional staff and volunteers, it 
can be argued that ZPP is operating two “structures”: one, the formal structure run by the 
professional staff who are physically containable within the office space and ‘bonded’ through 
constant, daily co-ordination; the other, an informal desegregated structure of the independent, 
autonomous volunteers, free from daily office routines and rules but nevertheless maintaining a 
constant relationship with the main structure through the mobile phone, occasional meetings, 
workshops or community engagement activities. Both structures are bound by broad 
organisational objectives and internal organisational functions. Desegregation of the volunteer 
‘structure’ and the ‘virtual’ nature of the relationship with the ‘centre’ means the volunteers lack 
the daily protection and guidance that professional staff enjoy.  
 
The question that emerged when I was examining these dynamics was: could they breed tensions 
or challenges between the organization and volunteers which could impact the deployment of the 
phone and inhibit effective monitoring? I believe some responses by some volunteers pointed to 
potential sources of tension or challenges. When I asked the volunteers what they expected their 
reports to achieve in protecting human rights one said he expected ZPP to use the reports to 
mobilise network collaborations as well as challenging political leadership: 
ZPP at its highest level has quite a number of people who can make our mind felt, make our 
mind seen….and make our mind probably be put into action. I am simply saying ZPP works with 
other human rights organisations such as Zimbabwe Human rights Lawyers…so our perception 
or hope would be that if we share our stories with our leaders here, these stories would then be 
taken up…either engage the government if it is possible…engage the state. (Interview Monitor 4, 
Jan 14, 2015)  
 
Monitor No 1 hoped the reports would be useful in empowering citizens to seek freedom, 
motivate local solutions to local problems, force national leadership attention and stimulate or 
provoke international intervention in human rights abuses in the country.  
The objective of our reports is to achieve freedom for ourselves, for our children and 
grandchildren. We want peace for Zimbabweans…We want our reports to go beyond our leader 
Jestina, to get to our President...to the United Nations, to help us to get to other organisations to 
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help us. But we (also) want the reports to get the problems in our area here sorted out (Interview 
Monitor 1, Jan. 14,2015) 
 
Monitor 2, from Mashonaland East, wanted ZPP to use the reports to educate the public about 
the evils of violence, but more significant, to force government to accept accountability for 
violations and responsibility for citizen protection. 
I want to know that my reports have assisted the violated. I want the uninformed in Zimbabwe 
and anywhere else to know that violence is not good. It destroys others, the weak and the 
innocent. I want ZPP to tell government to protect its people so that they are less violated, so 
that there is less violence … (Interview Monitor 2, Jan. 14, 2015) 
 
Another possible source of tension arose from lack of financial resources for volunteers. The 
volunteers appeared driven to match or exceed head office expectations in terms of the quality of 
their output. This means they often need more cash than they can raise for transport and airtime 
to investigate, document and transmit reports. One participant said she was unable to document 
as many violations as she would like to because she lacked resources to travel to incidents. This 
was a recurrent theme with MISA’s journalists as well, who also reported that transport 
challenges restricted their sources of news to hearings at headmen and chief’s courts, district 
health institutions, growth points, NGO outreach activities, community and church meetings, 
school events and the occasional political rallies. The ZPP monitor complained that mainstream 
reporters were beating them to incidents in their own constituencies because of this incapacity. 
By the time they arrived to report incidents mainstream journalists would have taken pictures and 
even transmitted details of the incidents. She said this made them look ineffective to HQ. I 
thought this could be compounded by the fact that most newspapers now had online editions 
which reported incidents 24 hours a day.  
 
This complaint raised interesting questions though: were monitors beginning to compare 
themselves to conventional journalists? Were they considering themselves sources of credible, 
competitive information or news? Was an alternative competitive journalism developing? The 
study did not follow this line of investigation because it did not fall within the purview of the 
research but I believed an explanation for this disposition could be traced to the emergence of 
training in report writing and digital security for activists involved in producing reports and 
general human rights defence. I explore this issue in subsequent case studies.  
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My interpretation of volunteer comments was that if ZPP failed to use the reports to achieve 
envisaged objectives, then the organisation and other CSOs could be viewed to be failing the 
monitors. The comments could therefore reflect possible sources of tensions between the 
volunteers as a collective, and the organization, arising from a volunteer perception that ZPP and 
civil society should do more to prevent human rights abuses. Having given this background, 
which I view to be useful in understanding the motivations for volunteer commitment, the next 
sections analyse findings relating directly to the phone’s deployment. 
6.5  The smartphone, reporting platform and their significance 
 
The monitors use a smartphone introduced by the NGO in 2013 just before the elections (and 
replaced every 2-3 years with newer models) to enhance the monitoring and documentation 
process as well as their coordination with head office and provincial coordinators. The Huawei 
Y100 and Y336 smartphone models host standard digital media convergence capabilities: 
internet, email, GPS, Facebook, Twitter, SMS, MMS, WhatsApp, sound, radio, image and video 
recording and transmission and camera flashlights, which the monitors indicate have made their 
work more productive. The models are installed with software designed to circumvent intrusions 
by facilitating instantaneous transmission of reports via the web to secure servers outside the 
country. Before 2013 monitors handwrote or typed their reports, then delivered them to 
Provincial Supervisors or directly to head office. That route involved undertaking long, time 
consuming, costly, tiring and risky journeys on public transport to the offices, a process 
immediately removed by the introduction of the circumvention tool. I gleaned from interviews 
that the platform was introduced to reduce transmission costs, standardize reporting (using 
digital forms) and facilitating quick interventions or follow-ups where necessary. Most important 
though was the hope that by using an external server and end-to-end encryption, the NGO would 
avoid state interception of its reports and, in the process, enhance their security and that of the 
monitors. Instantaneous transmission would minimise the risk of data/information interception 
on the phone or on the person of the monitor, reduce fear and improve morale and confidence 
amongst the volunteers. The tool’s robustness was enhanced further by the use of data access 
protocols. The diagram below shows how the tool, Martus, works. The diagram is copied from 
Martus’ website. 
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 Figure 6.3  Martus Platform (copied from Martus.org website) 
 
 
It is also useful to note that government, through POTRAZ, in 2011 banned providers from 
offering services that use encryption technology, even though there was no legal basis for it. 
Then, POTRAZ targeted Blackberry which was offering encrypted messaging services (NGO 
Forum Report, 2016:10) presumably because government was failing to de-crypt them.  
6.6  Coordination and other uses 
 
Staff indicated that co-ordination is mainly through voice calls, WhatsApp and emails, and less 
through SMS because of high costs as well as the application’s limitations with letter characters 
and inability to support other media like videos and pictures. Outreach activities and urgent 
issues are often arranged through calls and WhatsApp; long term agendas through e-mails (for 
purposes of archiving later). The Director however said some of her staff avoid using SMS and 
emails fearing interception of their communication by state surveillance, something I also noted 
with ERC staff. The fear stemmed from ZPP office raids by police in February 2013 during 
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which some mobile phones, laptops and other office equipment were confiscated42. Staff were 
concerned that police wanted to access information on the equipment.  
 
With Peace Defenders, volunteers who link the NGO with rural communities my assessment was 
that communication is mostly top down and horizontal, with the mobile phone providing Voice, 
SMS and WhatsApp services for co-ordination. In supporting head office programmes Peace 
Defenders have formed their own WhatsApp groups to better co-ordinate activities in the 
communities. Operating openly, they share their contacts with community leaders whom they 
trust can help them mobilise their members to participate in the peace-building initiatives. These 
contacts are then shared with HQ and added to ZPP’s data base. Although the peace building 
programmes are structured by the organisation, I understood these volunteers enjoy some fair 
autonomy in mobilising the community participants. However, the study cannot claim this with 
certainty because Peace Defenders did not form part of my interview sample. 
 
Monitors said they can initiate communication (upwards) with Provincial Supervisors or head 
office as much as the latter can also send messages down directly to them. They also 
communicate amongst themselves, where they have each other’s contacts, often exchanged 
during workshops. The general position from the organisation though was that the critical need 
to maintain anonymity and therefore safety of volunteers, demanded minimum direct 
communication amongst the monitors themselves, except for the pair in each constituency and 
their supervisors. However, the section discussing how rural monitors network to communicate 
warnings about the movement of violators suggested to me that there is much more interaction 
amongst the volunteers than the organisation acknowledges. 
 
Monitors and other respondents indicated they also use the mobile phone for money transfers 
through ‘EcoCash’, ‘Telecash’ and ‘One Wallet’ the money-transfer facilities run by the mobile 
operators. These mobile financial services, now spread to all corners of Zimbabwe, are critical in 
a country where banks are located mainly in urban areas and growth points. Monitors in dire 
 
42  February 2013 reports in the online media Nehanda Radio and NewZimbabwe suggested these were police tactics 
to intimidate human rights NGOs, just before the July elections against mobilising citizens to demand a fair vote. In 
early February 2013 police had also raided offices of the Bulawayo-based National Youth Development Trust, 




need of cash for transport or airtime find the services extremely useful. Monitors however said 
they hardly used the entire range of functions or capabilities on the phone because of 
connectivity and technical skills problems. 
6.7  Documenting, verifying and reporting violations 
 
The UN High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) says effective human rights 
monitoring must be built on accuracy, precision, impartiality, objectivity, sensitivity, integrity, 
and professionalism (UNHCHR Training Manual, 2001). Documentation is meant to provide 
evidence which can also be left as a record for posterity. When using the mobile phone ZPP 
monitors said they are drilled on the importance of keeping the process impeccably accurate. 
Incidents are captured and recorded on the digital formats of the Event Form (EF) and Person 
Form (PF) installed on the phone as part of the circumvention software. Every monitor stressed 
that it was important to present reports with corroborating evidence in the form of images, 
videos, or voice recordings. Some of the images and videos, of which I viewed a few, would 
later be uploaded onto the NGO’s website and social media platforms. One monitor said the 
requirement for corroborating evidence has become so entrenched in the documentation routine 
that if she lacks the evidence she would rather delay sending off/uploading the report, or not 
transmit at all. This was understandable, in case the organization was challenged, for example 
with litigation. The challenge however was in getting that evidence because of the risk of 
exposure when using the phone to record violent incidents, or if the volunteer arrived late to 
witness the incident, or being unaware of the incident altogether.  
 
A rigorous verification or moderation process bolsters the documentation process, where there 
may be doubts about the accuracy of monitor reports. ZPP’s multi-lingual staff fulfil this 
function by seeking confirmation of the reports with other NGOs in the field, trusted community 
members or provincial coordinators. Verification is done mostly through the phone because of 
constraints imposed by distances, travel costs and time. The results of this process explain why 
media as well as international institutions like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and 
Commonwealth Foreign Office have faith in the organisation’s reports. Or, on the other hand 
why the reports raise concern within government: because the process would have ensured 
sufficiently high levels of integrity to deter any criticism. The data office compiles and converts 
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the information from the monitors into maps, tables, and statistical graphs, complemented or 
supplemented by photographic evidence, which makes the reports highly illustrative and 
informative. The tables and graphs in this chapter form part of the incontrovertible evidence that 
Mashingaidze (2016) refers to as the ‘footprints’ of violators. 
 
 My examination revealed numerous reports in the ‘name and shame’ mould, but I did not come 
across any evidence of the organization being challenged legally for presenting inaccuracies or 
falsehoods. Only evidence of intimidation and harassment of its staff. I would conclude that 
absence of such evidence suggests a near fool-proof personal witnessing, documentation and 
reporting process built on some of the UNHCR’s principles of effective human rights 
monitoring: accuracy, objectivity, and precision. In some sections below I discuss a few 
examples of the deployment of the mobile phone in events that some of my respondents 
‘witnessed’ and documented. 
 
6.7.1  Value of ‘Event’ and ‘Person’ smart-forms to human rights protection. 
 
This section presents a brief description of the structure (contents) and value/usefulness of the 
Event and Person smart (digital) forms on which monitors record violations. The new software 
supplied by an international IT company43 highly experienced in developing circumvention 
software for grassroots organisations, and installed on the monitors’ smartphones, carries 
digitalized versions of the organisation’s standard pre-2013 hard-copy forms on which Incidents 
(Events) and Persons (both perpetrators and victims) associated with human rights violations, 
were documented. The Event Form (EF) records details of the Events or Acts/Incidents 
themselves and the people involved: such details as the location (province, constituency, district, 
village) where the violations occurred, the date and basic information about the victim/s and 
perpetrator/s. The Person Form (PF) contains much more detailed information about the victims 





43 The company, Tactical Tech, has vast experience developing effective secure circumvention software for NGOs 
working in sensitive, high surveillance regions in the world. 
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Figure 6.4  Event Form 
 




Figure 6.5  Person Form 
 
 
The Director and Data Officer said Event/Incident reports help in suggesting appropriate 
interventions to heal physical and psychological wounds and bring peace to violated 
communities. They become sources of information for follow up actions such as litigations or 
further medical treatment, counselling, and healing for victims. Because of the sensitivity of 
some of the reports ZPP has set up data/ information access codes and protocols to allow access 
only to and by relevant staff, for example staff who verify, moderate or compile the monthly 
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reports, alerts, or updates. Only the Data officer is permitted to change the data access codes 
regularly to ensure data/information security. The Director explained on September 8, 2014: 
We want as much information as possible on the victim, and as much information as is possible 
on the perpetrator, so that in the case of the victim if they need medical attention or psychosocial 
support, or may be support with litigation, we can then assist them (Mukoko, Sep. 8, 2014).  
 
The following example from ZPP’s 2013 Annual Report illustrates the utility of the information 
collected through these forms in mobilizing interventions. In 2011, a monitor in Masvingo 
discovered a group of villagers who had been tortured by ZANU PF activists during the 2008 
Presidential run-off, but had been warned against making reports or seeking medical help. For 
three years, the victims and their families endured the physical and mental wounds with some 
children becoming so traumatized that the cause of their poor performance in school was only 
discovered after ZPP had carried out further investigations into the monitor’s findings. Amongst 
the victims was a 78-year old man who had wasted gravely from a deep festering wound. The 
group was recommended to the Counselling Services Unit (CSU)44 whose efforts showed huge 
improvements within a short time (ZPP 2013 Annual Report; Interview Mukoko, Sept. 8, 2014).  
Video testimonies revisiting memories of violations are considered critical complementary 
aspects of the healing process. In 2015, the organisation commemorated ‘Sixteen Days of 
Activism Against Violence Against Women’ with a video campaign featuring testimonies from 
16 female survivors of the 2008 political violence. The survivors were identified and recorded by 
monitors or professional staff using mobile phones or video recorders. Audio versions of the 
testimonies could be accessed on the ZPP website in 2016. In March 2016 Jestina threatened to 
sue the former Minister of Intelligence, Didymus Mutasa, for refusing to disclose the names of 
her abductors or those responsible for other disappeared, abducted and murdered activists. She 
argued that as head of Intelligence Services for years Mutasa knew the perpetrators and was 
accountable for the violence attributed to the Services in numerous NGO reports.45 Mutasa 
pleaded protection from the Official Secrets Act, a defence however quashed in March 2017 
when courts ruled that (former) Ministers or Public servants could now be sued in their 
individual capacities for violations which occurred when they were in office and in charge. The 
import of Jestina’s attack was that information from these reports was crucial, but if leaders like 
 
44 The CSU has been harassed by police a number of times. In the first week of November 2012, the NGO’s offices 
in Harare were raided by police and their computers, containing records of victims undergoing treatment for trauma 
and torture were seized, according to the global organisations World Without Torture and International 
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims. www.worldwithouttorture.org.  Accessed April 4, 2016. 
45 In March 2016 Mukoko argued that Mutasa had actually issued a certificate prohibiting the release of the names 
of her abductors when he was still Minister. His defence that he was bound by the Official Secrets Act was 
unacceptable given that he had been expelled from the ruling party and government and therefore had a greater duty 
to tell the truth and offer closure for victims. 
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Mutasa failed to reveal the identities of perpetrators, there would be no emotional healing or 
closure for victims or their relatives. Civil society made the same argument about the 1980s 
Gukurahundi killings, charging that a new Commission on National Healing should provide the 
platform and opportunity for confessions and national healing. Mukoko insisted in our 
September 8, 2014 interview on accountability “Because as an organization the ethos we work 
with is that there are supposed to be consequences for what you have done...” The NGO’s 
message below, to commemorate the 2015 ‘International Day in Support of Torture Victims’ 
reinforced Jestina’s position:  
The healing process for victims of torture is long, expensive and affects most of those 
around them. If perpetrators of torture are either protected under the guise of acting to 
safeguard state security or are simply allowed to walk scot free, the healing process on 
the part of victims is delayed even further by fear of the acts being repeated (ZPP 
message commemorating the International Day in Support of Torture Victims, 2015). 
6.8  Examples of documented incidents 
 
The monitor from Marondera told me that he had used his phone to take pictures of bodies of 
political murder victims who had been dumped by Intelligence agents (CIO) in Wenimbe dam in 
Mashonaland East Province during the June 2008 election violence. He gathered intelligence 
about the murders from friends working at the Marondera provincial hospital mortuary whom he 
said facilitated his taking the pictures following the retrieval of the bodies from the Dam. 
However, because of the risk of interception by state authorities or ruling party youths he deleted 
the images after a while. His report though, appeared to be corroborated by a Wikileaks report of 
September 5, 2008 quoting dispatches by the American Embassy in Zimbabwe (Figure 6.6 
below) as well as by the Zimbabwe diaspora-based publication The Zimbabwean of September 6, 
2008 and July 14, 200946. Both gave accounts of the recovery of political violence murder 











46 The incident was reported by Veritas and MISA in two separate articles which were published by The 
Zimbabwean in September 2008 and July 2009 respectively. 
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Figure 6.6  American Embassy dispatch on the Wenimbe dam bodies: Source: Wikki Leaks  
DETAILED ACCOUNTS FROM WENIMBI DAM 
Date: 












-- Not Assigned -- 
Locator: 
TEXT ONLINE 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires,  a. i . for reason 1.4(d).  -------  SUMMARY -------  1.  (C) Two survivors of beatings 
in Mashonaland East with knowledge of bodies found in Wenimbi Dam near Marondera and one man who 
witnessed bodies al legedly retrieved from the dam at a local  morgue recounted their experiences to poloff (ref 
A).  While their stories are compell ing and believable,  particularly given that Marondera remains one of the 
most tense areas in Zimbabwe, additional facts and eye -witness accounts would further strengthen the allegation 
that numerous bodies were intentionally thr own into Wenimbi and other dams in eastern Zimbabwe. Given their  
lack of first -hand knowledge,  Post does not believe at this  time that their public testimony, if given in the  U.S. ,  
would significantly highlight the violence that has occurred since April .  F urthermore,  public exposure could 
subject them and their families,  as well  as neighbors,  to violent retaliation. END SUMMARY.  
Source: Cable: 08HARARE779_a - WikiLeaks            https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08HARARE779.html 
 
In 2008, and again in September 2013, the same monitor took pictures of huts that were burnt 
down in Mutoko and Suswe (Mashonaland East Province) in politically motivated violence. 
After sharing them with the organization, he deleted the pictures “...because I feared I might be 
caught with the pictures on my phone,” he told me in the interview on January 14, 2015. In 
another incident in Marondera in 2014, the same monitor, afraid of being discovered using his 
phone openly, discretely kept the line open to allow the Communications Officer at ZPP HQ to 
overhear violent threats by war veterans demonstrating against their ZANU PF Provincial 
leadership. In this case, he said he was allowing head office to act as a listening and recording 
post. He was also aware that his action would allow the ‘listening post’ to act as an intervention 
point should there have been a threat against his person. The demos were covered extensively by 
national media between 4th and 5th November 2014. On 27th March 2017 one of the urban 
monitors captured pictures of ZANU PF youths in Mbare, the capital’s most populous high-
density suburb, attacking Movement for Democratic Change-T youths and destroying their 
property. Both pictures and monitor’s report were captured, almost verbatim, in the online 
editions of The Zimbabwean and New Zimbabwe of 28th March 2017. Both media have links to 
over 100 media and human rights organisations, including all major UK papers, the BBC, CNN, 
New York Times, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. 
 
In December 2015, the monitor from Bindura District transmitted a report, supported by pictures, 
about deaths arising from violations in small scale mining in an area called Kitsiyatota. From 
media reports Kitsiyatota is one of the richest gold mining areas in Mashonaland Central 
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province, many of which mines are owned by political elites. Published in the organisation’s 
January 2016 Report- but which only came out in March- it is one of the organisation’s most 
articulate and informative accounts of the dangerous and life-threatening practices in small- scale 
mining which government was ignoring. To my knowledge, the images are the only ones 
published by any media in the country illustrating the dangers of open-pit mining in Bindura at 
that time. The country’s top financial weekly, the Financial Gazette followed up on the report on 
April 18, 2016 with its own story with a slightly different slant, accentuating the dangers of land 
degradation from open pit mining, not on the risk to human life.  
 
I also sought to establish evidence of the capacity of the phone in documenting violence in 
archived ZPP reports. The NGO’s March 2008 Report proved illuminating, showing graphic 
pictures of victims of political violence taken by the monitors. The images included those of 
people with knife wounds, body burns and burnt down homesteads in Maungwe and Mutoko 
constituencies, the latter co-incidentally the constituency served by one of the participants. In 
2008 alone the organisation produced 30 reports, the highest number ZPP has ever produced in a 
single year. The development could be explained by the numerous incidences of violence 
precipitated by the elections and the Presidential run-off. ZPP and RAU tables and graphs in 
other parts of this thesis also confirm this historical fact. The images in Figure 6.7 below are 
from the NGO’s archives and depict (a) a burnt-down hut in Mashonaland East (b) the face of 
violence at a growth point (c) a resident from Epworth urban suburb protesting the demolition of 
his ‘illegal’ home by Council (c) police beating up a civilian during civil protests in July 2016. 
(e) outreach campaign on human rights. The first four images were taken by ZPP monitors, the 




Figure 6.7: Five images-four of violence- captured by monitors’ phones (ZPP website)
    
Burnt hut in Mash East               Violence at a growth point        Epworth houses bulldozed 
 
July 2016 protests-police attack a civilian             ZPP outreach campaign on human rights 
  
 
When I saw the sizeable number of images and videos on the organisation’s website and social 
media platforms- Facebook, Twitter and You Tube- I decided to go further and conduct a brief 
analysis to establish what role the platforms might be playing to complement the monthly 
monitoring and other reports, although they did not form a big component of this study. I 
observed that from 2013 all the platforms became particularly active in sharing the images and 
videos of violations taken by monitors and uploaded by the organization, a development that 
may be explained by the fact that this was the year ZPP also introduced the smartphone and 
digital forms. The organization’s website archives though carried more images because they 
have been up longer than the social media platforms, which were launched in 2012 but became 
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more active from 2013. Among many the platforms carry harrowing images of families shattered 
by the destruction of their homes in Epworth47 in forced evictions in 2014/5; youths terrorizing 
villages during by-elections in various parts of the country in 2015; war veterans being water-
cannoned by police in Harare in 2016 and vendors and activists being beaten up by police during 
public protests the same year. Over 40 images and videos are shared on the four platforms, 
almost all of them reportedly recorded by monitors, according to a clarification on November 21, 
2016 by one of ZPP’s advocacy officers. The rest, by professional staff or from other sources. 
The officer said each of the images can also be matched to a ZPP report.48  
6.9  Mobile phones and protection 
  
Mobile phones facilitate monitors’ personal safety from two angles. The Director and Data 
officer said if monitors who are known for maintaining regular contact with head office suddenly 
cease communicating this could indicate that they are in distress. Total silence or late submission 
of reports flags that a field monitor may be facing challenges. When this happens a follow up 
process involving direct calls or direct visits to the volunteer, is immediately instituted through 
the second monitor, provincial supervisor, or a trusted NGO, to establish the cause. Some 
monitors have indeed been found to have lost interest, others to have exhausted their air time and 
one or two in constituencies along the borders with Botswana and South Africa are known to 
have crossed the borders in search of greener pastures.  
 
The second aspect relates to monitors recognising direct physical danger to themselves or their 
constituents, and then using the mobile phone to call for intervention. The NGO operates two 
mobile hotlines, which are safety channels for monitors and members of the public in distress. 
ZPP communicates this advice to the public: If you are concerned about acts of violence in your 
community, ZPP encourages you to get in touch with us on Hotline and WhatsApp numbers 
+263 774 883 406 and +263 774 883 417; Toll Free: 080 80199. Although monitors can also 
 
47 Epworth is a town adjacent to Harare which developed as an informal settlement accommodating families 
migrating from rural areas in search of urban lifestyles as well as some who had historically been settled here. Even 
though it has its own Town Board the town is severely underdeveloped, compared to the capital, Harare. It should be 
noted that the same Epworth evictions provided the ‘evidence’ of images used by ZLHR in litigations. 
48  However, as I note in the study one of the issues that frustrated investigations was that when some NGOs updated 
their websites, they lost some material. When I went back to retrieve it some of the NGOs were unwilling to assist or 
indicated they no longer had the material. 
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use the hotlines they often phone directly to the Director, data or communications officers. In 
one example, the Director described how a monitor from Matebeleland North Province, 
threatened by a group of ZANU PF activists in 2008, rang her directly and kept his line open as 
the group invaded his homestead and dragged him off to a torture camp. Human Rights Watch 
corroborated the existence of such camps in reports in April 2009. The Director said she was 
helpless to intervene but was relieved when, after inquiries and interventions by NGO colleagues 
in the region, the monitor was released from the torture camp and returned home a few days 
later. In another incident the monitor from Mashonaland East province, who had witnessed 
ZANU PF activists attacking an opposition supporter with a knife, was able to save his own and 
the victim’s lives when, on noticing that the monitor was trying to make a call, the attackers 
panicked and ran away. The monitor then phoned head office to call for an ambulance to take the 
victim to a hospital in Marondera town. The monitor told me that the victim still bears scars from 
the knife attack, but the perpetrators, who the monitor could identify, have never been brought to 
justice.  
 
The Director’s own abduction in 2008, provides another example although she did not trigger the 
intervention herself. The intervention however typifies how the technology can be used to 
mobilise local and international networks to intervene in the longer term. Soon after the group of 
state abductors had dragged her away from her house, Jestina’s son accessed the contacts on her 
phone to seek their assistance. In their hurry to take her away, the abductors had forgotten to 
confiscate Jestina’s phone. Her son’s action started a chain reaction: 
… …I have a colleague who was at Amnesty International in the UK...he said by the time he got 
to his office in the morning, he had already drafted a statement because he knew about my 
disappearance before he got to the office because of the phone….It was from this guy from this 
organisation (ZPP) who then (also) got in touch with the Board members...and he also phoned 
the lawyers, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human rights, who were just there and information just 
went like wildfire (Interview Mukoko, Jan. 9, 2015) 
 
I later established that the statement by Amnesty International became the source of BBC and 
CNN news reports on the day of abduction.  
 
Another subtler but equally significant mode of monitor communication with head office for 
personal and constituents’ security involves the use of pre-negotiated communication in the form 
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of beeps, calls or texts (Hahn and Kibora,2008; Donner,2007; Chiumbu, 2012). Mukoko insists 
that losing or ignoring phone calls, beeps, ‘call-me back’ texts, or missed calls from monitors 
cannot be countenanced. They must be followed up immediately for the sake of the monitors’ or 
constituents’ safety: “…because there is always a reason for them, and we will not take chances 
with people’s lives. It could be that call that we ignore, that spells the difference between helping 
save a life or being sorry afterwards”, she said in a September 8, 2014 interview. The ZLHR 
case study shows a similar communication tactic between the organisation and Occupy Africa 
Unity Square (OAUS) activists but with different outcomes because of ZLHR’s more aggressive 
emergency intervention tactics. But phone calls also boost morale and confidence on both sides:  
“Many phone the Director simply to chat. I know that it could be a security risk given that fone 
calls could be traced but I do not discourage them. It motivates them to feel that they have talked 
to the Director herself and she knows they are alright. It is also good for me to know that my 
field people are still smiling and safe.” (Mukoko Interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
I also understood that monitors use the phone to assure the security of vulnerable communities 
by surveilling known violators and then issuing warnings to potential victims. I was told that 
some of the volunteers have acquired sufficient experience monitoring violations that they can 
predict impending violence by discreetly and accurately tracking and reporting the movement of 
violators. I was quoted the example of monitors tracking and constantly communicating with 
each other and head office the movements of ZANU PF war veterans Jabulani Sibanda49 and 
Biggie Chitoro50. These two, the first of whom was placed on the European sanctions list for 
human rights violations, were amongst the ruling party’s shock troopers during the 2000 and 
2008 election campaigns. Telephone calls and SMS messages between field monitors and HQ, 
working in a form of network, effectively kept the two and their groups under surveillance, with 
alerts sent out to warn other communities of their movements. In this way, vulnerable 
communities were given opportunity to prepare to protect themselves, sometimes by hiding or 
sending away community members they felt were potential targets. In the case of Biggie Chitoro, 
the Director said the volunteer tracking/surveillance system was so efficient that when the war 
veteran became ill and disappeared from ‘political and public radars’ to his home village in 
 
49 Jabulani Sibanda was Chairman of the War Veterans Association and expelled from ZANU PF in late 2014 for 
making remarks deemed disrespectful of the First Lady and the President. He was on the US sanctions list. 
50  Reporter Nomalanga Moyo in 2014 chronicled several heinous crimes, including murders, that Chitoro 
committed particularly during the elections in 2000 against Movement for Democratic Change supporters. When he 
died Chitoro was declared a Provincial hero by ZANU PF, an honour that activists and families of his victims 
attacked for its insensitivity. 
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Mberengwa, Midlands province, in early 2014, it was the only one, apart from his immediate 
family and friends, which knew his exact location and the condition of his health. 
6.10  Challenges and risks in deploying the mobile phone 
 
Deploying the mobile phone is not without challenges and risks and their seriousness varies 
depending on such factors as connectivity, community politics, volunteer’s age, gender and 
education, commitment to human rights issues and technical and mechanical aspects of the 
mobile phone itself. The challenge of connectivity has been discussed, so too volunteers’ 
financial capacity. This last can perhaps be elaborated. Volunteers receive little allowance to 
cover communication (mobile top ups) and travel costs. They also spend many hours 
investigating and documenting incidents. This means monitoring processes can only be as good 
as the monitors are prepared to show commitment, including through using personal resources. 
Self-subsidization is thus common and, often, not an issue: “I love and enjoy what I am doing in 
my community” volunteer No 3 from Bindura told me. “Kana zvanetsa ndinobata kahuku kangu 
ndotengesa ndoona mari yekufambisa,” (If it becomes necessary, I sell off one of my chickens to 
get transport money to travel to report incidents...”). The quote illustrates a level of commitment 
that I found reflecting in most rural volunteers, including in the MISA case. In a case I believe is 
illustrative of this level of commitment, one of the monitors I interviewed in Harare had spent 
seven hours on buses from her rural home 75 miles away, leaving home at 0500 hours and 
changing buses three times to fulfil her interview obligation with me at mid-day.  
 
In terms of phone skills, older monitors tend to be more challenged. Their slow grasp of the 
technical capabilities of the phone can compromise their ability to use the tool competently 
enough to produce quality work, a point stressed by the monitor who holds a university degree. 
There was also general agreement amongst younger interviewees, that “gogos” (older women) in 
rural communities were less skilled in manipulating smartphones than their urban counterparts. 
Literacy levels, connectivity and the digital divide could explain the disparities. Rural women 
show lower literacy rates than their urban counterparts (Zimstats, 2013), and, as the study 




Monitor No.3 also highlighted mechanical and technical challenges which included phone 
freezing and battery depletions, the latter compounded by lack of recharging facilities. 
Depletions are quite common in rural areas where phone charging facilities are scarce and 
usually located only at growth centres, schools or clinics, which may have electricity or solar-
energy charging sources. The monitor said her phone also often froze when she opened too many 
applications.51 These problems could also occur when the monitor was in the middle of 
documenting evidence, and could be compounded by loss of signal when she was about to send 
off a report. The monitor said she prefers to compile and send off her reports at night when she is 
relaxed. But I also deduced that this was an ideal time as there is minimal phone traffic and 
signals are stronger. For volunteers in remoter areas, where there is no electricity, or persistent 
electricity disruptions, ZPP introduced an incentive where consistently good, credible reports 
were rewarded with solar lamps. These help monitors manage household and professional chores 
at night. Infact monitor No.1 from Mhondoro said she has one such lantern.  
 
There are also risks associated with age and gender and the phone’s use in closed community 
environments. Just as much as culture demands respect and deference for older women, there 
was agreement amongst young participants and the monitors themselves that patriarchal 
dispositions and cultural inhibitions, also prevent elderly women from openly using mobile 
phones to record incidents. It is even riskier in polarized communities where perpetrators and 
victims know each other and taking pictures of violence, by any age or gender, would 
immediately arouse suspicion and possibly incite more violence. “You have to protect yourself. 
You must avoid being too transparent. You must be careful, avoid showing excitement and taking 
pictures openly for example,” warned Monitor No 3 from Bindura. However, one monitor 
argued, as did MISA journalists, that recordings could be made, for example, by hiding the 
phones in top undergarments (bras), in bags or in pockets. One female monitor gestured to her 
breast area during our interview and said she can record with her phone hidden in her top 
undergarment. The journalist from Mhondoro Pachena News, another lady, confirmed similar 
tactics when they are recording proceedings at political rallies or other sensitive events. 
 
51 I could not however determine if this problem was a result of a technical competence or skills challenge on the 
part of the monitor or a technical problem with the phone’s hardware. 
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6.11  Using the circumvention platform to neutralize risks of information interception  
 
ZPP introduced the circumvention platform, among other things, to minimise the risk of having 
its reports intercepted. This study has discussed how the Interception of Communication Act, by 
legally permitting information and data interception by state institutions, is a key source of risk 
for civil society (Gwagwa, 2013). Citing the examples of countries like Egypt, Kazakhstan, and 
Tunisia, where media, civil society and opposition parties have faced deep state surveillance, 
Howard (2011:3) however suggests that some of these groups had learned to circumvent 
interception and censorship by moving their online content to servers in safer, more democratic 
environments. ZPP appears to be following this strategy when it adopted the Martus platform. In 
the quotes which follow the monitors present different perspectives on the advantages of using 
the Martus platform and telephone the key point of consensus though, being that the platform 
removes threat of interception.  
 
The volunteer from Bindura (No3) highlighted the platform’s capacity to allow sufficient time 
and opportunity for careful analysis of collected data/information to ensure accuracy, relevance, 
and reliability, before transmitting and clearing the phone. 
 When I have collected my information, I go home, settle down and put my report together. I then 
send the report after which it immediately disappears from my phone. Nothing remains on the 
phone. You could be raided or it could be intercepted somehow (but) Once the report goes it 
could be like any ordinary personal phone…for myself alone, or my personal use. (Interview 
Monitor 3, Jan 14, 2015) 
 
The monitor from Mhondoro (No1) said the platform minimises the risk of interception 
specifically by political activists who are amongst the most serious threats to this group of 
human rights defenders.  
Zvakatiitira nyore kunyanya pakunyora mareports. Taigara takatya nekuti tainge takangoviga. 
Tainge takangoviga tichingoti mai wee tiri padhuze nema activist vakangoda kungouya 
padzimba vachiita misindo amheno!!! Saka zvakatiitira nyore zvakanyanya. 
(It became easy for us (having these phones)...for writing reports. We were always scared and 
kept the reports hidden…scared of interception by political activists…worried that if political 
activists came to our house they might discover the paper reports..and all hell would break 
loose. So it is a relief to us to have these phones. (Interview Monitor 1, Jan 14, 2015) 
 
Paper-work and paper load are also reduced, reports can be compiled at the monitor’s 
convenience, the risk of being intercepted with the material is reduced, and the security of 
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sources, report contents and the organisation, are enhanced. Additionally, PIN protection on the 
phone reduces risk further. 
  
…. I can lock the phone using a secret password known only to myself. Only I would be able to 
access the reports in my home, so I can save the reports if there is no signal or connectivity. It 
becomes easy for me. I don’t move around carrying heap of papers and if I am ready to send the 
reports I simply press send and they are gone. (Interview Monitor 3, Jan. 14, 2015) 
 
Some comments also highlight the strengths of the phone itself as a technology, particularly in 
enhancing evidence gathering and documentation, in addition to guaranteeing personal safety 
 
It is quick, it is efficient and as you are aware in Zimbabwe when you are dealing with human 
rights issues you literally or basically become an enemy of the state. I think the use of the mobile 
phone, if we are looking at the security of the monitor himself or herself is quite a useful tool. 
There is no likelihood of some papers being confiscated or those kind of situations (Interview 
Monitor 4, Harare, Jan. 14, 2015) 
 
The fear of interception was so real that Jestina recalled an incident in 2008 when a monitor, 
afraid for his safety and that of his report, wrapped it up in plastic, and tried to hide it in a dug-up 
hole in a field while it was raining. When he wanted to retrieve the report, he could not identify 
the spot a development that heightened the monitor’s anxiety. The incident partly explained why 
it was necessary to adopt the new platform. 
6.12  Risk of physical surveillance 
  
There appears to be some physical surveillance of activists too. Fears of both car and less 
invasive surveillance were expressed by Mukoko, the ERC Director and other activists. The 
monitor from Harare told me that he and a colleague at one time had been trailed by an 
unidentified car from the Women’s Training Bureau to the ZPP offices. The car sped off when 
they drove into the organisation’s compound. One of the activists with the OAUS group said he 
was certain he was being followed by unidentified persons: 
Q. Do you feel sometimes that you are being followed? That you are being watched? 
A. I know that I am being followed. I know they will be following me…  
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Itai Dzamara52, the OAUS founder was abducted in broad daylight from one of Harare’s low 
density suburbs, presumably having been under physical surveillance. MISA, ERC and some 
HRDs pointed out that whenever they were in workshops or meetings, they turn their mobile 
phones off as a precaution against remote access, because their whereabouts might be known 
through physical surveillance.  
6.13  Networks, information distribution, message amplification and alerts content. 
 
6.13.1 Local and international links  
 
 ZPP’s Information Office at the time of the study had two key distribution lists: one comprising 
sector colleagues (former journalists now working in the human rights sector) and mainstream 
media; the second comprising contacts from international media, international human rights 
watch groups, embassies, research institutions and strategic civil society organisations like 
Kubatana, ZLHR and the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Forum. The NGOs are in 
networks which share reports and experiences opening their links with international partners. 
The NGO Forum for example, has wide international reach, having offices in London which then 
liaise with international human rights watchdogs. Its representative for many years, Arthur 
Gwagwa is an international human rights lawyer, researcher, and activist with an elaborate list of 
international contacts with whom he shares Zimbabwe’s human rights reports.  
 
ZPP considers international partners as important as local networks in terms of sharing 
information and seeking interventions. The NGO is amongst the most media-quoted human 
rights organisations in Zimbabwe because of the consistency, regularity and integrity of its 
reports and accessibility of its key communicators. The 2014 Commonwealth Foreign Office for 
example, adopted ZPP’s report almost in its entirety to represent the human rights situation in the 
country. Jestina herself has received numerous human rights awards53 and addressed many local, 
regional, and international platforms. Between 3rd December 2008 and 30 December 2009, I 
 
52 Up until the beginning of 2016 Itai Dzamara had not been found. Members of the group I interviewed, although 
harbouring hope that he might still have been alive by then, were doubtful that he still was. In May 2016 the brother 
showed pictures of Itai in Military Intelligence captivity but the forces denied any involvement in his abduction. 
53 Jestina has received no less than seven local and international awards, including the Governance & Democracy 
Award by Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, the National Association of NGOs Peace Award, The German City of 
Wiemer Human Rights Award, the International Women of Courage Award by the US and France’s Human Rights 
Prize, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.” 
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counted 25 broadcasts by BBC News, 21 broadcasts by CNN and five reports by Human Rights 
Watch, about Jestina’s disappearance54, while former UN luminary, Mary Robinson, led the 
global lobby for her release, making her first appeal for Jestina’s release on BBC News on 
December 9, 2008.55 These actions can only be interpreted as shows of solidarity with the 
activist.  
 
6.13.2  Disseminating information and SMS content 
 
Both lists received alerts and updates through email or Bulk SMS. A few select media and sector 
colleagues were also on a WhatsApp list for sharing alerts and other information. Some of these 
distribution channels then used their own links to amplify original messages. The highest figure 
of Bulk SMS recipients I noted for 2013 was 744, although the office indicated between 1500 
and 2000 SMS subscribers. In 2011 ZPP produced eight information alerts all of which were 
picked up by the media. Appearances on google and other web analytics were another means of 
assessing the effectiveness of the NGO’s communication strategy although I noticed that the 
interactivity of the website was rather low. Public and media feedback in the form of requests for 
additional information was yet another indicator of the interest and reliance people had on the 
NGO’s information.  
 
Bulk SMS was used predominantly to communicate alerts in 2008 and 2013. A brief analysis I 
conducted of the contents of the 2008 alerts showed that they mainly gave warnings about actual 
or potential hot spots of violence, perpetrators, impending hunger amongst rural communities 
who were being discriminated in food-aid distribution programmes and the possibility of post-
election retributive violence. As things turned out the warnings were confirmed as the year 
recorded the country’s worst post-election-related violence (Hafner-Burton et al, 2014:22-26; 
Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011). Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and Figure 6.8 below show 
2008 and 2009 as recording the highest violations in the 14-year period. Table 6.1’s significance, 
 
54 This figure emerged from brief counts I conducted from the BBC News and CNN websites, trying to assess the 
number of times Jestina Mukoko news items had been run by the influential global broadcasters.  
55  Mary Robinson spoke to the BBC on December 9, 2008, to mark UN Human Rights Day. Mrs 
Robinson also visited Zimbabwe between April 29 and May 2, 2010 (at the invitation of Women’s 
Coalition of Zimbabwe) during which she criticized Zimbabwe’s poor human rights record. Radio VOP 
said Mrs Robinsons had been summoned and attacked by the President during the visit for raising issues 
of human rights abuses. The visit had the effect of raising the profile of human rights abuses. 
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compared to Table 6.2, lies in identifying the types of violations that are monitored by the NGO. 
The tables and graph also show that the largest number of violations occurred in Manicaland, 
Midlands, Masvingo and Mashonaland provinces.  
 
Table 6.1  Cumulative acts of human rights violations 2001-2014 
Violations 
               
2001 2002 
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Murder 7 129   53 21   
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207 8 4 
2 5 6 0 463 
Rape 1 106   95 21   
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61 69 24 
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Abductions 3 14   158 44   
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violations 61 5324 0 4734 2955 0 
 
 














Source- ZPP Data and Statistics. Department 
*2001 figures are only for December 2001  
**The 2005 figures are only for 6 months. The data for the remaining 6 months was lost. 
***Figures for 2003 and 2006 were not available 





















Figure 6.8  Graph of Violations by Province 2008-2014. (Source: ZPP)








































Province 2008 2009 2013 2014 Total 
Bulawayo 391 356 111 93 951 
Harare 1979 2126 217 90 4412 
Manicaland 10842 3057 1152 317    15368 
Mashonaland.Central 1299 1110 601 341 3351 
Mashonaland East 1749 1869 462 240 4320 
Mashonaland West 2493 1268 483 259 4503 
Masvingo 2516 1972 601 238 5327 
Matebeleland North 584 345 139 77 1145 
Matebeleland South 447 336 140 56 979 
Midlands 1955 2286 1106 746   6093 
Total Violations 24255 14725 5012 2457 46499 
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An examination of Figures 4.6 to 4.9 in Chapter 4 reveals a replication of this pattern in the case 
of abductions: that is, the same provinces record the largest numbers of abductions. The monitor 
from Mashonaland East (No 2) attributed the high levels of violence in Mashonaland East, 
Midlands, and Masvingo Provinces to the fact that they are “the homes of the top people in the 
security forces” and being partisan, the officers allow violence to be used to ensure that their 
provinces vote the ruling party. Army generals declared on many occasions that they would not 
give their allegiance to a person who did not participate in the liberation war. The violence in 
Manicaland may be explained by the province’s historical resistance to ZANU PF political 
dominance. The alerts in 2013 invited people to tune in to radio broadcasts on peace building; 
others were about community leaders’ violations of their villagers’ rights. 50% of the 36 alerts 
were issued in July alone, an indicator of political tensions during the election period. There 
were several about party loyalists committing violence on villagers in the districts of Chipinge, 
Marondera, Upanayana, Mvurwi, Bubi, Mberengwa and Mhangura, possibly because these 
districts were not too easily intimidated by the ruling party. There were ‘name and shame’ alerts, 
one of them recounting traditional leader Chief Mahenye dismissing 22 of his village heads for 
allegedly allowing their subjects to vote for the opposition in the July elections; another of war 
veterans evicting a woman and her disabled husband from their home. The alerts could be 
interpreted to be violations of people’s rights to political choice, property and human dignity. 
Other alerts reflected inter-sectoral or network solidarity as they appeared to have been shared 
with several human rights NGOs. In January, April and July of 2013 the organisation sent out 
alerts on the arrests and court appearances of prominent human rights activists Okay Machisa of 
ZimRights, Beatrice Mtetwa of ZLHR and youths from an NGO called Youth Initiative for 
Development in Zimbabwe (YIDEZ). Other alerts were about a police raid on the offices of the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN). Machisa and Mtetwa’s significance to the sector 
was evidenced by the large number of alerts circulated by the sector amongst themselves, the 
media and international community, by solidarity court appearances and street marches. Some of 
the solidarity events were captured and reported in the ZLHR newsletter the Legal Monitor. 
6.14 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed how ZPP has adopted a strategy which draws from the experiences of 
its founding members, the commitment of its volunteers and the language skills within its 
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professional staff and the proliferation of mobile phones in the country to support their efforts to 
monitor politically motivated violence. Significantly though is the organisation’s reliance on the 
volunteers, who, because of their embeddedness in the communities, are best placed to observe, 
document and report violations using mobile phones which have also become part of their daily 
social communication tools. WhatsApp service and bulk SMS have become dominant means of 
communication. The chapter has further highlighted how the integrity of the organisation’s 
human rights reports have made it a respected contributor in this area on the international fora. 
But the chapter has also explored financial, cultural, technical, and political challenges and risks 
for the volunteers and the NGO, which affect the effective use of the mobile phone. In response 
to the challenges and risks ZPP has adopted circumvention software/encryption technology, 
international lobbies, networking, and collaborations with other organisations to publicise and 






















Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights  
7. Introduction 
 
On its website ZLHR describe its core objective as that of fostering “… a culture of human rights 
in Zimbabwe as well as encourage the growth and strengthening of human rights at all levels of 
Zimbabwean society through observance of the rule of law.” Headed by one of Zimbabwe’s top 
female lawyers, Irene Petras since 200756, the NGO’s core values include “… the unimpeded 
administration of justice, free and fair elections, the free flow of information and the protection 
of constitutional rights and freedoms in Zimbabwe…” Put in other words, respect for the Bill of 
Rights or the Constitution. In attempting to foster the culture of human rights ZLHR uses the 
templates of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various UN Conventions, the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and its subordinate protocols. Within the 
Southern African region ZLHR has worked with other civil society organizations and Southern 
African Development Community states for the adoption of a Southern African Human Rights 
Charter and a Court of Human Rights.  
 
The organisation can trace its roots back to 1996 when three lawyers, Arnold Tsunga, Otto Saki 
and Irene Petras got together to foster and encourage the growth and strengthening of human 
rights law observance in the country. Soon other practicing lawyers and law students joined the 
trio, forming a loose association which would assist individuals or organizations, on an ad hoc 
basis, whose human rights were being violated (ZLHR, 2006:4).57 The ZLHR 2003 annual report 
explains that following increasing demands for its services as well as recommendations of a 2001 
evaluation, the association formalized itself and opened a secretariat in July 2002.The secretariat 
worked towards ensuring that the organization functioned more smoothly, responding more 
 
56. Irene Petras and ZLHR have been the recipients of international awards in recognition of their work in defending 
Human Rights defenders and ordinary citizens affected by some of ZANU PF’s actions, such as the uprooting and 
destabilization of close to 800 000 urban and peri urban families under what is now known as Murambatsvina. From 
the article ‘Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights’ (no author); Accessed on Feb 14, 2014. 
http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/research/projects/ripoca/workshop-april-2010/zimbabwe-layers.pdf 
57  One of the early cases handled by ZLHR and Law Society of Zimbabwe-when Tsunga was then Secretary 
General-was that of Murambatsvina in 2005 (Operation Drive out the Filth) which left between 700 000 and 800 





effectively to the changing economic and political environment. By then the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) had become a powerful and credible opposition, while civil society 
groups and human rights activists were increasing pressure on the ZANU PF government for 
various reforms. Irene Petras took over from Arnold Tsunga in 2007, retaining her position as the 
Director of the 160-member NGO up to now. 
7.1 Structure, projects and recognition for human rights defence 
 
The organisational structure in Figure 7.1 features a secretariat manned by the Director and her 
team of professionals most of whom are specialists in human rights issues. The general 
membership comprises over 160 of the country’s human rights lawyers, many of whom will 
assist the secretariat lawyers to offer free legal aid. The programme staff are the most important, 
working daily with human rights defenders (HRDs) and dealing with institutional accountability, 
access to justice, human rights defense, human rights literacy, regional office and 
communications issues. 




















As an institution espousing democracy, governance and human-rights the NGO’s activities are 
designed to promote an understanding of these issues from the lowest (grassroots) to the highest 
institutional levels. The NGO’s human rights training has however tended to focus on civil and 
political rights at the expense of economic and social rights, something I found to have been 
typical amongst the country’s human rights NGOs. The rights to privacy, free expression, 
association and assembly, the right to justice, education and shelter58, to protection from arbitrary 
and forced evictions and the right to work have been prioritised in the organisation’s human 
rights defense activities. In an environment where democracy has been constrained by seemingly 
purposely crafted constrictive laws, ZLHR’s strategic units Legal Aid and Litigations, Public 
Education and Training, Human Rights Defenders and Publications have launched programs 
which have often challenged the government. The NGO’s work in public interest and 
international litigation, HIV/AIDS, human rights and law, institutional reform, human rights 
defense, public education, communication and information, has established the pillars that now 
hold up the NGO to international respect. The following briefly discusses the projects and their 
objectives. 
 
The first is Litigation projects. Although international litigation is an important element in 
demanding state accountability and adherence to international human rights practice, public 
litigation is probably more relevant because in the main it challenges state compliance with its 
own (domestic) laws and international conventions it would have signed and ratified. Some of 
these are shown in Appendix 4. Civil society has been critical of the culture of impunity and 
aversion to accountability and transparency in state institutions. By demanding personal 
accountability from state actors like the police, war veterans, militias, soldiers, intelligence 
officers and other public officials, public interest litigation is designed to protect, promote, 
deepen, and broaden human rights provisions enshrined in the constitution. Most important, it 
attempts to restore respect for the rule of law, public confidence in the justice delivery system, 
 
58  The ‘right to shelter’ has resulted in numerous conflicts between ZHLR and government, particularly whenever 
the latter demolished illegal structures or forced people off their lands for relocation. The infamous Murambatsvina 
of 2005 created displacement challenges that were still being felt in 2014. In 2013 there were further displacements 
of farm workers during further farm invasions in Mazowe and Goromonzi. In 2014 ZHLR challenged government 
over threats to demolish some homes in Chitungwiza and Seke, a satellite town and communal lands bordering the 
capital. ZHLR was also involved in negotiations with government over humane relocation of families displaced by 
floods in Chingwizi. Another case involved the forced removal of families on land that the First Lady had acquired 
for a wild game sanctuary in Mazowe, discussed in this chapter. 
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professionalism in policy-making and depoliticization of public institutions. Litigation is often 
undertaken by members of ZLHR who are experts in litigation and have a right to appear in 
Zimbabwean courts.  
 
International litigation focuses on cases where domestic remedies have been exhausted or are 
inaccessible, forcing the organization to seek remedies for its clients through regional and 
international tribunals such as the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) 
and the Southern African Development Community court. Because litigation lends itself to 
international lobby and advocacy initiatives, the process minimises government’s attempts to 
politicise human rights disputes. For example, between 2003 and 2005 ZLHR petitioned the 
ACHPR to find Zimbabwe guilty in at least eight cases involving infractions on freedom of 
expression, press freedom, the 2000 Parliamentary elections and forced evictions of families 
from Hopley Farm outside Harare. The NGO also managed to mobilize regional law societies 
and legal NGOs to petition ACHPR against Zimbabwe’s land/property rights laws. 
 
The second project deals with institutional reform, public education and training in human rights 
issues. Many of the country’s human rights challenges stem from institutional weaknesses, 
including from politicization of institutions by the state. Some weaknesses stem from poor 
understanding/interpretation of the laws by the actors in institutions like parliament, the senate, 
human rights commission, the police, even law firms. Several laws are also clearly deficient, or 
have been manipulated to serve political ends. Police and security agents have been partisan, 
handling cases with impunity and applying justice selectively, mostly on the basis of political 
affiliation. Indigents and non-Zimbabwean citizens were discriminated under citizenship laws, 
while the judiciary was politicized (Feltoe,2003; Sachikonye, 2011; Simbarashe Moyo, 2013). 
These and more are among the issues that the NGO’s reform and education officers have sought 
to address over the years through outreach mobile legal clinics in rural communities and through 
seminars for parliamentarians, HRDs, media, policing and correctional services.  
 
The third deals with laws and rights for victims of HIV/AIDS and other vulnerable groups. With 
one of the highest cases of HIV/AIDS on the continent, Zimbabwe’s civil society has been 
concerned over the rights of this vulnerable group. ZLHR was one of the first NGOs to structure 
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a programme in 2004 which offers free legal support services and rights education to the group. 
The NGO tracks all new legislation-local, regional, or international- on HIV/AIDS, 
strengthening the victims’ knowledge and expertise on the issues through education, 
collaboration with other civil society organisations, community based organisations, support 
groups as well as through legal representation. Additionally, the organization also looks at the 
plight of other vulnerable groups- women, youths, street children, orphans- its ultimate objective 
being to provide them with information, lobbying and advocacy support to empower them to 
claim or defend their rights. 
 
Of the NGO’s initiatives that this study explores, the Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) 
Emergency or Rapid Response project is the most critical. It is a network initiative under which 
activists can access ZLHR’s emergency legal services 18-24 hours in the day if they are attacked 
or arrested for defending and advancing human rights (Hanzi, 2016). ZLHR defines an HRD-an 
abbreviated form that the rest of this study will adopt- as “any person who actively champions 
the promotion of any of the constitutionally guaranteed rights and, in the process, becomes the 
subject of attack by any organised group, including but not exclusively state agents and other 
functionaries,” (ZLHR website, Hanzi, 2016). On its website, the NGO ZimRights defines HRDs 
as anyone “…who risks or suffers harassment or disadvantage for exercising the rights expressed 
in the international Bill of Rights, and who, in conformity with these instruments, promotes and 
protects the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others, individually or in groups.” The 
two NGOs’ definitions, very similar, are inclusive of any individuals, or groups, working to 
promote and/or protect “fundamental rights and freedoms as provided in the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe, the International Bill of Rights and the 1998 United Nations Declaration on human 
rights defenders,” (Gwagwa,2013:16).  
 
The NGO’s annual reports show that the lawyers are geographically spread, operating into the 
country’s 10 provinces from regional offices in Harare, Mutare and Bulawayo. The geographic 
spread gives the NGO capability to react speedily to violations, no matter the remoteness of the 
area, an aspect which also highlights the critical nature of ZLHR’s Rapid or Emergency 
Response system, which is at the heart of this case. The regional offices also facilitate the NGO’s 
massive outreach programme which involves mobile legal clinics teaching grassroots 
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communities their legal rights under the country’s constitution. The relevance of defence and 
litigation may be reflected in these statistics from the NGO’s 2014-2016 Annual Reports. In 
2014 the NGO gave legal support services to 1386 people, 600 of whom where HRDs. In 2015 it 
assisted 1016 people, 459 of whom were HRDs. It litigated in 247 cases, dealt with 40 
constitutional cases and 138 anti-impunity cases. In 2016, it gave legal help to 1663 people, 1031 
of whom were HRDs. The NGO enjoyed a 93%-97% success rate in all litigations. The annual 
reports show that the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act and the Public Order and 
Security Act were the most frequently invoked instruments 
 
HRDs come from a variety of backgrounds but ZLHR adopts the Front Line (2010) and 
Gwagwa’s (2013:16) classification of HRDs as individuals who include protestors, human rights 
lawyers, rural and urban activists, students, journalists, and trade unionists and are involved in 
defending citizen rights. In Zimbabwe these are typically, groups which are constant targets of 
state persecution and harassment. ZLHR’s literature refers to training organised for these and 
targeted government institutions and professionals, with the strategic objective of increasing 
general awareness of the rights and freedoms of HRDs, the risks they face and the legal and other 
frameworks that can protect them and other victims.  Mobile phones (hotlines) and HRD guides, 
as educational and protection tools for HRDs and other victims, are an integral part of the legal 
framework and thus occupy a significant position in the project.  
 
The NGO has done such tremendous work in championing respect for the rule of law, the dignity 
of the courts and in protecting the constitutional rights of individuals that it has won professional 
recognition amongst local, regional, and international organizations. For example, ZLHR was 
nominated to host the Secretariat of the Human Rights Committee of the Southern African 
Development Community Lawyers Association; it was granted observer status at the ACHPR 
and was accepted as an affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). In December 
2007 then U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, awarded the NGO the first annual US 
Freedom Defenders’ Award in ‘commemoration of International Human Rights Day,’ and for 
being an outstanding foreign NGO to exhibit exceptional courage and leadership in the defense 
of human rights. In 2008 ZLHR won the John Humphrey Freedom Award, given by the Canada-
based International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development for "courageous 
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pursuit of justice for victims of human rights abuses inside Zimbabwe." The Canadian group was 
particularly impressed by the fact that up to 1 500 Zimbabweans at that point were benefitting 
from ZLHR’s free legal services each year, and its volunteer lawyers had yet to lose a single 
case. As the annual reports suggest the NGO’s voluntary and free legal services have been 
benefitting close to 2 000 victims annually with a less than 3 % failure rate! 
7.2 Mobile phones and co-ordination 
 
The secretariat’s lawyers spread out in the country’s provinces often call on the services of 
experienced volunteer members from the general membership. This means the organization 
could be described as functioning with two structures, as in the case of the other NGOs: one 
where the internal staff represent the formal structure; the other, where volunteers from the 
general membership, who work from their own law firms, represent the ‘informal’ structure. 
They are working independently but at the same time with legal counsel from, and therefore 
obligated to the parent structure. Because both structures are made up of professionals, there is a 
distinct difference with ZPP and MISA structures where the external ones comprise grassroots 
volunteers. Almost 75% of secretariat staff are lawyers in specialized areas like domestic and 
international litigation, policy, research, drafting, gender and other specialisations. The 
secretariat’s lawyers however take up a major portion of HRD cases.  
 
My experiences at trying to engage with staff within the organization, other than the 
communications officer, were not particularly successful such that I found it difficult to establish 
a clear picture of the communication patterns within the NGO. However, the NGO’s literature, 
website content and conversations with the communications officer, combined with my 
assessment of the NGO’s involvement with various institutions and HRDs, were indicative. 
Interface between the two groups of lawyers is horizontal and facilitated by various modes of 
communication, but particularly through the phone or face-to-face interactions. A bottom- up 
pattern of communication emerges with HRDs as they are the ones who initiate contact through 
distress calls. SMS, WhatsApp, and e-mails are dominant communication platforms for internal 
communication, while the hotlines are the key platform for communication with activists. 
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7.3 Deploying hotlines 
 
In non-activist situations, business for example, hotlines are often seen as useful tools for 
demanding confidential means through which corporates can be reported for non-compliance 
with business practices that protect specific human rights (Ruggie, 2008). Rees and Vermijs 
(2008), also suggest that they are one of various mechanisms that can be used for mapping 
grievances in human rights arenas. For human rights organisations they play much more 
aggressive roles, which the next sections attempt to explore.  
 
7.3.1  Using hotlines to document information 
 
ZLHR operates three mobile hotlines: one in Harare and two at the regional offices in Bulawayo 
and Mutare, the country’s second and third largest cities respectively. The numbers are 
popularized by advertisements in national media, on e-mails, at workshops, community 
meetings, through HRDs and networks of individuals and institutions that have been assisted or 
participated in the organisation’s programmes. The phones are managed, as much as possible, by 
experienced human rights lawyers. Although the organisation is keen to keep details of its 
“clients” confidential, I was advised that more than 60% of the NGO’s annual HRD case load 
comes through the hotlines. Other clients walk directly in to the ZLHR offices where they fill in 
forms asking for details about the complainant and the complaint itself. Lawyers are then 
assigned to read the notes left by each client, and, after deciding whether they can take the case 
or not, contact the complainant on the phone with the NGO’s decision. Responding to the 
emergency calls on the hotlines is what the organisation refers to as Emergency Legal Support or 
Rapid Response Services. 
 
By being the reception point for calls from distressed persons, the hotline also documents and 
creates a record of information which lawyers can then use to follow up complaints or which the 
NGO can use in its official publications the Human Rights Bulletin59, in Annual Reports, or in 
the Legal Monitor. Hotline managers who receive distress calls are required to take as many 
details as possible about the victim, the incident, the place, time, and source of the threat which 
 
59 The Zimbabwe Human Rights Bulletin reports on human rights-related legislation in Zimbabwe. Together with the 
Legal Monitor, they are also currently the only sources of documenting and archiving cases of human rights 
infringements in Zimbabwe.  
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they will then pass on to the field legal team. Although I was not able to interact with a hotline 
manager, comments by the communications officer were again suggestive. The organisation can 
only instruct a field lawyer to intervene in a distress situation once the hotline manager is 
satisfied with all this information, a lawyer with relevant competencies to handle the case has 
been identified and can be dispatched as quickly as possible to intervene. I concluded that this 
screening process made it vital that regional lawyers be equipped with efficient mobile 
communications, and be ready to travel to remote areas. The NGO’s annual reports for 2014-
2016, which detail contributions of regional offices, are also suggestive. 
 
7.3.2  Emergency response: protecting citizens and promoting the rule of law  
 
From conversations with the communications officer and activists, I concluded that the 
effectiveness of ZLHR’s Rapid or Emergency Response system depends on the lawyers’ quick 
responses, their readiness to commit time, energy, and sometimes personal resources to provide 
legal assistance. It also depends on the coincidence and convenience of the lawyers’ proximity to 
incidents. The communications officer’s exposition on January 21, 2014 distinguishes hotlines’ 
tactical and strategic advantages in contesting human rights abuses. 
…Making the number of the hotline available bridges the information dissemination gap. It 
makes communication quicker. It also makes us alert to violations…The mere ringing of the 
hotline alone alerts us to the fact that there is a need for a very quick reaction. 
 
…Because we have a wide network of lawyers, once our hotline is reached instead of saying ‘I 
am in Karoi...I'm being arrested for such and such …I feel my rights are being violated…’ our 
lawyer who manages the project Rapid Reaction Response will deploy a lawyer immediately to 
handle such a case. Or where it is a legitimate demonstration which is being blocked by the 
police, because of our wide network of lawyers we quickly deploy lawyers to immediately 
intervene. For example, if somebody is arrested in Machipisa and we know that one of our 
lawyers is at courts in Mbare we ask him if he is available to quickly cross to Machipisa60 to 
intervene. It is faster that way. What we sometimes have is a situation where even then… before 
these guys are at the police station, Alec who is our lawyer is already at this station waiting for 
the arrest team and the human rights defender, ready to represent the client.  
 
  
ZLHR’s speedy legal response not only challenges and frustrates police when they try to build 
cases against their victims based on flimsy evidence extracted through physical torture, threats, 
 
60 Mbare and Machipisa are high density townships about 10-15 minutes’ drive from each other and can therefore be 
accessed by ZLHR lawyers very quickly in case activists are arrested or detained. 
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and intimidation, but it places them at a psychological disadvantage. The communications officer 
says police are thus forced to reduce excesses and respect justice and the rule of law.  
…This (intervention) often unsettles authorities because the speed with which news is 
communicated to our provincial members, and they react to be at police stations or in courts to 
represent people, frustrates and scares them. That is how quickly we want our Rapid Response 
system to work. In the past, our fears were that during the time when somebody is in police 
detention he is being subjected to harassment... He is also being forced to give information…and 
the harassment may include torture. That is why we are saying the quicker and immediately we 
deploy a lawyer the quicker we limit the time somebody risks his rights being violated. (Interview 
Communications Officer, ZLHR, Jan. 21, 2014)  
 
The experiences of Election Resource Centre (ERC) activists arrested in early May 2013 and 
charged under the Electoral Act with conducting unlawful voter education, not only bolsters the 
communication officer’s observation, but suggests another dimension to the convenience of the 
hotline’s intervention. It is that the hotline’s intervention relieves NGOs and victims’ families of 
immediate financial stress obviated by the need to pay for immediate legal defence processes. 
ERC activists arrested over one weekend in May 2013 in three different cities posed serious 
logistical and financial challenges for the organization and the families of the victims. The ERC 
Director explained in a Skype interview on February 27, 2015 that the immediate involvement of 
ZLHR lawyers in response to the hotline, relieved ERC of the stress of organizing funds for the 
defense of the activists over a weekend when banks are closed. ZLHR lawyers were also able to 
force law enforcement to permit relatives of the victims to have access to them to offer emotional 
and other support. These are part of the rights of all detained persons. One danger though 
highlighted by the communications officer was that lawyers responding to hotline distresses 
could themselves be harassed, or the cases could take so long to resolve that the lawyers 
themselves could end up being exposed to physical, emotional, and judicial harassment by state 
actors.  
 
7.3.3 Promoting personal safety of HRDs: some incidents. 
 
 My discussions with the NGO staff and activists indicated that HRDs have become increasingly 
aware of the protection guaranteed by the intervention of the hotline. I will quote a few examples 
to illustrate the usefulness of the tool in mobilising interventions for activists. One involves a 
small but very active, youthful group called the Occupy Africa Unity Square (OAUS); others 
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involve a teenager, Gumisai Manduwa, human rights lawyer, Beatrice Mtetwa, ZPP director 
Jestina Mukoko and staff from the ERC. In Beatrice Mtetwa’s case the communications officer 
had been directly involved in efforts to seek her release from police detention in 2013. Mutetwa 
is also amongst the country’s most celebrated female HRDs and chairs the NGO’s board. 
Jestina’s abduction is discussed elsewhere in this study. OAUS was the only activist group 
ZLHR was willing to connect me with directly because, according to the communications 
officer, the activists were young and not deterred by police intimidation. I also use the OAUS 
case to explore risks associated with using the mobile phone, its role in protecting the HRDs and 
in informing the world about human rights abuses in the country. 
 
The OAUS group was formed at the end of 2014 by a former journalist Itai Dzamara. It had 
several brushes with the law when it began a campaign protesting the President’s failure to repair 
the economy and demanding his resignation. On March 9, 2015, Itai, like Jestina, was abducted 
by an unknown group of people in broad daylight, but, unlike the female HRD, and despite 
intense international civil society and diplomatic interventions for his release, has not been seen 
since. ZLHR consistently represented OAUS members whenever they were detained or arrested. 
In the two years between 2014 and 2016 OAUS built a formidable profile of activism. It became 
Zimbabwe’s first youthful protest group to ‘capture’ Africa Unity Square- a large open square in 
the capital so named to symbolise the unity of African states- and turn it into a peaceful protest 
zone. Every day between 5pm and 6pm the group would congregate in the square- also 
symbolically opposite Parliament, the President’s and main government buildings- to address 
Zimbabweans on grievances against the government. The evening mobilization, organised 
through WhatsApp, other social media platforms, word-of-mouth, and messages in the 
independent media, was intended to attract the attention of hundreds of workers leaving their 
offices for home and passing through the square. Itai’s brother, Partson, was also the first and 
only person to demonstrate, singly, against the government, on Independence Day, 18th April 
2016. The day celebrates the country’s independence in 1980. Symbolically draped in the 
country’s flag, Partson carried a placard demanding the return of his abducted brother and 
decrying the loss of freedom for Zimbabweans. Described by many as daring and provocative, 
the demonstration was in the country’s National Sports Stadium, in front of the President, the 
country’s security chiefs and more than 30 000 civilians and armed forces members. It was also 
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captured live on local TV and international media and, no doubt, by thousands of private mobile 
phones in the stadium. I was told by media friends that the demonstration went viral on 
WhatsApp. After my interaction with the members during research, I was ‘co-opted’ onto their 
WhatsApp group for a short while, during which time I received invitations to public meetings, 
demos, as well as alerts on arrests of their members. 
 
Between themselves and hotline managers, the two groups agreed tactics which, in addition to 
making direct calls, involved using “coded communication” over the hotlines to trigger lawyer 
intervention. Communication in the form of pre-agreed cryptic SMS or WhatsApp texts or calls 
to the hotline number would set the Emergency Response in motion. According to one activist 
the “coded” communication could also be used by ZLHR to identify the caller or text sender, and 
in some cases the import of the message. The activists also used similar communication tactics 
amongst themselves, for example to advise each other where they were being detained by police. 
“If I say on the phone ‘meet me in Mandela Avenue’ to my Chairman, they know I am in trouble 
with police on that street and need help immediately,’ one of them told me. On 26 November 
2014, four OAUS members were detained by Parliament Security after sneaking into Parliament 
to present legislators with a petition demanding the President’s resignation.  Fearing for their 
safety the activists said they called and beeped the ZLHR hotline in addition to sending text 
messages to their Chairman’s mobile number, seeking their intervention. The participant said 
ZLHR intervened shortly afterwards. On November 30, 2015, five members of the group were 
arrested in Harare after protesting a one-year hotel stay by one of the country’s Vice Presidents, 
at tax-payers expense, while millions of Zimbabweans were starving. A call to the hotline while 
they were detained at the dreaded Law Enforcement offices resulted in ZLHR’s intervention 
although the NGO’s pressure was not sufficient to spare the activists a 48- hour police detention 
under Section 46 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. Activists charged that 
most times they have been detained or arrested, police have invoked this piece of legislation. 
One activist was convinced that had it not been for the intervention of ZLHR they would have 
been brutalized physically while in police custody, or even disappeared. The demonstration 
against the Vice President, planned to coincide with the 2015 ‘UN Conference on HIV/Aids and 
STIs in Africa’ was viewed by the political leadership as an attempt to embarrass and undermine 
the government to the 5 000 international delegates attending the conference. Like other activist 
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groups OAUS regards arbitrary arrests, incarcerations and 48-hour detentions as part of police 
intimidation tactics against HRDs, and the ZLHR hotlines become the most immediate 
interventionist tools to assure their personal safety and justice.  
 
Gumisai Manduwa, an 18-year old teenager was arrested by police in Mutare on January 18, 
2014, for posting on his Facebook page a message that President Mugabe had died and was 
being preserved in a freezer in the Far East. The teenager was charged, under the Criminal Law 
(Codification and Reform) Act, with insulting the President and passing falsehoods. Friends 
phoned the Mutare hotline whose administrator then set up a rapid response process which 
intervened but only managed to get a bail release of the youth after two days in police custody.  
 
In the case of Beatrice Mtetwa the lawyer was herself detained by police on Sunday, March 17, 
2013 when she intervened to stop an illegal police search of the offices of the Movement for 
Democratic Change-T legal adviser. On being arrested Miss Mtetwa immediately phoned the 
communications officer who activated the Rapid Response system through the hotline. Despite 
this intervention and a High court injunction for her release by the police the same day, the HRD 
was only released after seven days of local civil society solidarity demonstrations and 
international political pressure on the government. There were media reports that to frustrate 
ZLHR lawyers over the weekend police moved the activist around police stations and only 
released her whereabouts on the Monday. The hotline’s intervention however revealed several 
key issues. It inspired a speedy release judgment from the High Court which, unfortunately, was 
subverted by the police’s refusal to release her: a classic case of the failure of horizontal 
accountability (O’Donnell, 1998). The intervention also threatened the police system against 
brutalizing or disappearing her. Finally, it inspired a ‘Free-Beatrice-Mtetwa’ campaign by civil 
society organisations which roped in foreign embassies, international media and human rights 
bodies. The campaign used alerts, Legal Monitor updates, emails and news items on CNN and 
Canadian Television to force the Zimbabwean authorities to release her. Despite these pressures, 
Miss Mtetwa still faced judicial harassment for more than seven months during which time she 





7.4  Phone evidence in litigations  
 
Much as this part of the study shows that hotline information can be used by ZLHR lawyers, the 
NGO also relies on the use of other mobile phones in other areas of its work. One such area is 
litigation where mobile-phone-generated evidence is crucial. Local media and CSOs highlighted 
several cases in which the state has used mobile phone evidence to put citizens on trial, cases 
which show state capabilities in intercepting citizens’ SMS and Facebook communications, but 
such use has not yet found traction amongst civils society organisations. However, in the 
paragraphs that follow I briefly discuss four cases which illustrate ZLHR’s use of mobile phone 
images in litigating against state institutions for violating people’s rights to shelter, personal 
safety, security, and free expression.  
 
The first case involved demolitions of residents’ houses in the shanty suburb of Epworth, 
approximately 16 kilometres to the east of Harare City. The suburb is home to some of the 
country’s poorest workers who settled here after migrating from the rural areas. In 2014, the 
Epworth Local Board sought to evict some it called illegal residents (although many of them had 
lived in the settlement for a decade or more. As in the case of Murambatsvina in 2005, 
Chingwizi in 2014 and several other cases, ZLHR intervened on behalf of the families, charging 
that the government and Epworth Town Board had an obligation to find alternative settlement for 
the victims before evicting them. Arguing that every citizen had a right to shelter, ZLHR lawyers 
used mobile phone pictures of the demolished houses in a court application seeking to interdict 
the board and the police from demolishing their houses. A temporary interdict was awarded.  
 
The second case involved the violent evictions in January 2015 of almost 200 families61 from 
Arnold or Manzou Farm in Mazowe area, one of Zimbabwe’s rich agricultural regions. The farm 
was home to a mix of former farm workers, farm invaders and a few original settlers from the 
area. Independent media charged that the evictions were being instigated by Zimbabwe’s First 
Lady who was seeking to move wild game onto the farm. The state denied the allegations, 
arguing that most of the families were illegal settlers. Arguing that all citizens had a right to 
 
61 The 200 families were part of an initial 1000 families, over 900 of whom had already been relocated to another 
farm. Even up to early 2017 some of these families were still on the farm, having won another court order to stay on 
the farm, after representation by ZLHR.  
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shelter and the state had an obligation to provide it, ZLHR interdicted the evictions in the courts 
in early January 2015. It used images of the evicted families’ demolished huts and property, as 
well as those of the ‘big five’62 game scheduled for relocation, as part of evidence to argue 
human rights violations. The court ordered temporary suspension of the evictions, and, even 
later, awarded compensation to five of the families for the loss of land and property. The incident 
attracted wide publicity in both local and international media, as well as among human rights 
watchdogs like Amnesty International. However, as the images in Figure 7.4 show, ZLHR 
continued to be involved in more interdictions up to 2017. 
 
The third case involved litigations against the police for the brutal handling of citizen protests 
against economic hardships and government corruption. In August and September 2016, the 
NGO presented the court in Mbare, one of the capital’s suburbs, with (mobile phone sourced) 
video evidence of police brutality against civilians during the protests staged between July 4-6, 
2016. The protests marked Zimbabwe’s first massive social-media-instigated civil unrest which 
was, at the same time, marked by equally massively brutal police response. In one of the 
September court appearances of the protesters, ZLHR lawyer, Harrison Nkomo, forced the court 
to take images of brutalized victims on trial that day, and accept them as evidence of police 
brutality. 
 
The fourth case involved use of the image below, and others which ZLHR says were circulated 
on social media, to litigate against police for brutally assaulting a 63-year old lady, Lilian 
Chinyerere in August 2016. Mrs Chinyerere was, ironically, assaulted while sitting in front of the 
magistrate’s court. The case was heard at the end of May 2017 when ZLHR also sent out an alert 
to inform HRDs and other NGOs of the court appearances. The images were taken by a citizen 
journalist who passed them on to the NGO. This image has also appeared on the NGO’s 
Facebook and Twitter pages, a multi-media use approach which appears to be designed to 
capture the attention of a wide audience. The alert headline possibly intimated ZLHR’s approach 




62  Zimbabwe’s ‘big five’ game are the lion, elephant, rhino, leopard and buffalo. 
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HRDs Alert-from ZLHR          30 May 2017 
JUSTICE BECKONS FOR GOGO CHINYERERE-A VICTIM OF POLICE BRUTALITY 
 
Figure 7.2  Armed riot police assault 63-year old Mrs Lilian Chinyerere of Chitungwiza 
  
7.5  Using other mobiles: documenting for other communication channels  
 
NGO staff and HRDs use their personal handsets to document events, with the images afterwards 
used with the organisation’s multiple communication platforms. Staff for instance, take images 
and videos of street demonstrations, HRD court appearances or the organisation’s outreach 
activities which they then use with the other platforms: the Legal Monitor, the NGO website and 
the social networking sites. In the case of activists, one of the OUAS activists said they use their 
phones to document their activities, including taking images of violence against their members or 
other HRDs. This mobile ‘evidence’ is then transmitted to regional and international contacts as 
part of the group’s campaign to inform and educate these contacts about Zimbabwe’s human 
rights situation as well as to lobby their support. In addition to the online editions uploaded onto 
the website, the organisation prints between 600 000 and 1 100 000 copies of the Legal Monitor 
annually (ZLHR annual reports 2014-2016) to distribute to law students, journalists, urban 
activists, embassy staff, the public, and rural populations during outreach activities. In 2014 for 
example, 1 080 000 copies were produced and distributed (ZLHR annual report 2014:40). 
During my field work I came across numerous copies of the magazine in university libraries, 
NGO offices and news rooms. The publication is considered a highly reliable source of news and 
information on HRD cases, legal and human rights issues in the country. I was told by my 
respondents from Newsday and Daily News that they often use it as a source of diary items. Its 
articles are often more detailed than alerts because the communication staff enrich the alerts 
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through further research, court appearances and direct conversations with victims. By early 
October 2016 the newsletter, distributed free, was in its 356th edition. I also established that the 
same images appearing on the ZLHR’s Facebook, Twitter and website archives also appear on 
the communications officer’s social media platforms. The images below and several others were 
sent to me by the communications officer through WhatsApp and illustrate the range of human 
rights issues the NGO attempts to highlight. 
 
The image in Figure 7.3, showing villagers from different political parties in the volatile Mutoko 
district attending a ZLHR free legal clinic to discuss citizen’s rights in April 2017, is from the 
NGO’s and communications officer’s social media platforms. The clinics are thus also meant to 
bridge political differences amongst grassroots communities. 
Figure 7.3  ZLHR discusses citizens’ rights with Mutoko villagers under a tree  
 
 
The image in Figure 7.4 from the Legal Monitor, relates to Manzou (Mazowe) farm evictees, 
whose case ZLHR had been litigating since 2015. The images represent the NGO’s work in 
promoting or protecting citizens’ rights to shelter, property and dignity. The four top images on 
the page again appear on the Facebook and Twitter pages of both ZLHR and the communications 




Figure 7.4 Manzou farm evictees whose houses were demolished, living in the open in 2016.
 
I noted that the NGO also uploads some of its key documents- which include legal instruments, 
court outcomes, training and security manuals, brochures, and fact sheets- on its website. The 
presence of the massive documentation online makes the website a key platform for interactions 
with stakeholders. Communications staff said Google analytics showed that there was significant 
interest in pre- and post-election reports, HRD cases as well as other human rights challenges in 
the country. For example, they said there was massive traffic to the website during Beatrice 
Mtetwa’s detention in March 2014 when the NGO kept updating the world about her case. Of 
ZLHR’s social media platforms the Twitter following comprised mainly individual 
Zimbabweans and institutions while the Facebook following, according to the communications 
officer, was initially opened selectively because of fears of being hacked, surveilled or attracting 
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offensive posts. Although such posts could be mediated, he said ZLHR was concerned that the 
page could be captured and manipulated by state agents. Between 2012 and December 2015, the 
NGO grew a following of 11 300, was itself following 227 people, had recorded 116 likes, and 
had made 1039 tweets. Most of the tweets were about trending political, human rights and 
economic issues: for example, HRD court rulings and Constitutional Court rulings which the 
NGO had championed. Some of the issues were simultaneously featured in the Legal Monitor. 
Table 7.1 shows the levels of Twitter uptake amongst a few select NGOs and their activists. The 
Table, which I also referred to in the Methodology chapter, can therefore be read with the other 
case studies. The table could be used to show that social media platforms have potential to 
complement the mobile phone, as well as highlighting that they are also accessible through 
mobile internet. Activists can post while ‘on the go’ as long as there is internet connectivity. 
 





Followers Following Likes Content Year 
Joined 
ZPP Information 148 261 456 5 Political violence & 
aid discrimination 
2012 
MISA Zim 7651 6557 524 237 Media freedom, info 
access, media laws 
2012 
MISA-Community  
media officer (kn) 




media officer (tn) 
2564 1855 501 209 Media freedom 
community media 
2010 
ERC 8589 4096 1210 406 Electoral issues 2010 
 ERC director (tc) 13.8K 3838 2588 9385 Electoral democracy,  2010 
ZLHR 963 11,3K 227 67 Human rights 2012 
ZLHR communications 
Officer (km) 









Council of Zimbabwe 
2410 5133 301 122 Media freedom 2011 
Media Monitoring 
Project of Zimbabwe 
1170 4656 4103 33 Media freedom 203 
**Prof J. Moyo 13.9K 56.4K 395 8475 Education, politics 2015 
Tech Zim 13.3K 38.6K 1761 1165 ICT  
*263 Chat 124K 96.8K 32K 1126 Social, political 
issues 
2012 
Digital Society of Zim 
(DSZ) 
931 356 381 106 Digital security, 
Cybersecurity laws 
2015 
CM (DSZ) 4475 964 976 679 Digital security, 
Cybersecurity laws 
2011 
ZimRights 6090 11,3K 3334 54 Human rights 2012 
Heal Zimbabwe 458 1089 2301 13 Human rights, 
counselling 
2012 
Veritas Zim 2129 2451 162 152 Legislature 2014 
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7.6 Threats to mobile communication: the OAUS experiences 
 
OAUS activists indicated there were other threats linked to the use of the phone. Outside the 
communication with the hotline the three activists I interviewed were concerned that their 
phones were being intercepted: “It’s not a suspicion. It’s a certainty. Echoes on the line means 
they are listening (in),” one explained in a WhatsApp exchange on 24 June 2016. Another said 
in an interview on January 26, 2016, at one time he had complained to his network provider 
because “there were funny sounds on my line that had never been there.” At other times attempts 
are made to disrupt communication between the activists, especially if they are planning protests. 
‘Sometimes, during action days they will actively jam the calls with strange noises so we can-not 
communicate,’ was a response I received from the June 24 2016 WhatsApp text conversation, 
confirming what his colleague had told me in the January 26, 2016 interview: “People cannot 
hear them(selves) properly...We expect that there are bugs or those things...buffers on our lines 
so that they can hear our conversations...what we are planning, what we are thinking and 
interfere with our conversation.” The activists again view these threats as part of state 
intimidatory tactics rooted in its surveillance and interception strategy. 
 
Q. You talked about being tracked or hacked. How serious do you feel surveillance is against 
HRDs? 
A. Looking at this Robert Mugabe regime, they try by all means to surveille, especially HRDs, 
those activists, because they know that activists dig and they say it as it is…without fear or 
favour. Especially some of us who do not belong to any political party. So, they try by all means 
to track you, hack you, surveille on you to try by all means to suppress you so that you cannot 
say anything. If they find something on you, they turn it to be criminal (HRD 1 on.20/1/16) 
 
To get around these risks and threats, particularly where voice calls are concerned, OAUS 
members communicate mainly through WhatsApp, in which they have more confidence because 
of the application’s end-to-end encryption. They cited two potential risks in using WhatsApp 
though: first, if one’s phone was confiscated and somehow accessed, and second, if the group 
was infiltrated and their WhatsApp conversations leaked to a third party. In fact, some of their 
phones had been confiscated before. One of the participants was also concerned that some 
members who had been participating in WhatsApp group conversations, afterwards wanted to 
engage her in separate conversations through her Inbox. She interpreted this move as 




7.7  Networks, partnerships, and collaborations  
 
An NGO’s networking with both local and international partners can be a test of its potential in 
protecting human rights. Among other things networks facilitate access to partners’ links, 
broadening theirs in the process. Their messages subsequently benefit by being amplified from 
multiplier effect. Partnerships with local NGOs like NANGO, the NGO Forum and MISA 
facilitate ‘bonding’ on human rights. There are hardly any local human rights organisations, any 
HRD group, or as late as 2015/6, hashtag groups, that have not relied on the ZLHR for legal 
interventions. The 1000-1700 activists that the annual reports for 2013-2016 indicate the 
organisation defends every year are testimony to its importance in the human-rights-promotion 
agenda. As with the other three cases my observation was that ZLHR also benefits from 
collaborations created by personal relationships amongst activists and cross-memberships at 
Board or special committee levels within the sector. International partners include UK based 
Sigrid Rausing Trust63 and the well linked human rights lobby groups Human Rights Watch, 
Trocaire, OSISA and Frontline Defenders. Human Rights Watch and Frontline Defenders are 
amongst international human rights groups that the NGO also follows on its Twitter account, the 
others being The Open Society Justice Initiative, the Ford, Gates and Knight Foundations, the 
African HRDs Network, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Oxfam, Amnesty 
International, CNN, BBC, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and even UK politicians 
like David Cameron.  
7.8  Information, education and protection tools 
 
Because of the increasing number of HRD abductions and enforced disappearances as well as 
constant harassment- particularly arbitrary arrests and detentions, ZLHR has developed two key 
guides to educate activists about their rights as well as possible tactics to avoid persecutions. 
Two handbooks, ABCs Following Arrest and Trial Procedures (ABCs) and Guide for Enforced 
Disappearances (GED) have been incorporated into the NGO’s training and education 
programme, and are accessible as hard copy or electronic versions. With 5 894 abductions 
 
63 Sigrid Rausing Trust (SRT) is spending £480 000 between 2014 and 2017 to support the NGO’s research, 
advocacy and litigation programmes. The organisation also supports the NGO Forum (£1,150,000 since 2008, and 




documented between 2000 and 2016 according to figures released by Eddie Cross, the Guides 
are also seen as useful information and advocacy tools for getting justice for HRDs. The ABCs is 
a short, simple, concise, but at the same time invaluable guide for HRDs, many of whom do not 
know their rights and what to do to protect themselves from police harassment, illegal arrests or 
detentions. These rights include the right to be informed about the charges, to be allowed access 
to relatives and a lawyer; the right to have access to medicines, exercise, decent food and to be 
released within 48 hours if they have not been brought before a court. At the same time, the 
guide can also be viewed as an advice to HRDs about which of their activities could, equally, be 
considered unlawful and therefore make them targets of police action.  
 
The Guide for Enforced Disappearances, introduced at the beginning of 2016, expounds 
strategies and tips for activists to keep themselves safe from potential enforced disappearances, 
as well as what civil society organisations themselves should do to minimise risks for their staff. 
Enforced disappearances infringe on such rights as rights to liberty, life, security, recognition as 
a person before the law, not to be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment and to fair trial. 
Being disappeared also deprives the victim of their right to access by friends and relatives who 
could assist. These are fundamental rights under the UN Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as under the ACHPR. Zimbabwe’s own Constitution (2013) holds up these rights 
in Chapter 2, Part 2 Sections, 48 to 53. But clearly disappearances continue. 
7.9  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored a distinctly different use of the mobile phone compared to its  
deployment by the other case studies. Under normal service circumstances a hotline is a tool  
for employees, service, and product users to raise concerns over services or products. In this  
case, the instrument facilitates interventions in the much more serious issues of human rights 
 violations. The phone, in this case, is specifically deployed by legal professionals as  
distinct from its deployment, in the other case studies, by volunteers who in most cases, lack 
 the skills, the education and sophistication of the legal professional. In the act of intervening 
 the phone also appears to prompt behavioural traits of resistance as well as confidence  
building. The chapter suggests that the NGO uses the mobile hotline to protect victims from 





8. History and Vision 
 MISA, Zimbabwe is the Zimbabwe Chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa, the 
Windhoek-headquartered body set up by Southern Africa’s media organisations to champion 
access to information and media freedom, diversity and pluralism. The chapter was championed 
and steered, from 1995, by veteran Zimbabwean journalists Geoff Nyarota, Tonic Sakaike, 
Vincent Chikwari and Sarah Chiumbu. The NGO’s early years, according to Annie Musemburi-
Musodza, one of the three founding staff, were devoted to creating synergies amongst 
Zimbabwe’s media houses, facilitating a harmonious working environment between the Ministry 
of Information and the media and championing the professional interests of journalists. Relations 
between the media and the state, as well as amongst media institutions themselves, were fairly 
harmonious until the late ‘90s when the entry of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) forced a cooling of relations as the state accused 
the independent media of supporting critical civil society and opposition, both of whom were 
demanding improved governance and human rights. The government’s reaction was reflected in 
the introduction of the restrictive media laws, the bombings and closures of Daily News and 
Capital Radio in 2003 (D. Moyo,2005) the closure of the Mirror stables, and the general 
harassment of independent journalists.  
 
These developments precipitated a re-appraisal of the previously close relationship with 
government, such that between 2000 and 2002, MISA’s work centered around lobbying 
parliament and policy makers for the reform of the media environment64. MISA Director, 
Nhlahla Ngwenya said in a February 2014 interview that the situation was not helped by the fact 
that civil society viewed issues of media freedom and the right to information as “mere media 
issues and they did not engage the repressive laws Access to Information, Privacy and Protection 
Act, the Broadcasting Services Act and the Public Order and Security Act in an effective 
manner.” The developments also forced a re-assessment of the expertise that the NGO required 
 
64 In a document on its website MISA says government’s stance towards it increasingly became more 
antagonistic as the media NGO criticised it for its treatment of independent newspapers.  
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to remain relevant to the country’s media industry. The organisation reviewed its structure to 
include the National Director and specialists in community media, media law, research, and 
administration. The organogram reflects the re-appraisal. Of critical relevance in this study, 
however, are the officers and volunteers (media activists) involved in community media projects. 
Figure 8.1  MISA organising structure 
 
 
The organisation’s objectives include promoting access to diverse media and information 
channels, promotion of a free, independent, diverse and pluralistic media and the implementation 
of legislation and policy reforms that support this ethos. A self-reliant and non-partisan media 
that informs, entertains and educates, working in an environment free of fear, harassment and 
victimization is thus at the centre of the organisation’s lobby and advocacy campaigns. It 
researches legal frameworks, produces model media laws and champions alternative (and 
existing) media platforms for marginalised groups such as the community media that are the 





Snr Prog. Officer-Res & Info
Prog. Officers:- Community Media; 
Lawyers
Assitant Prog. Officers-
Interns Community Volunteers (Media activists & Advocacy 
Chairpersons) Fairly independent, involved in community media 
initiatives, worksshops organisation, surveys, distribution, peace 
projects




8.1  Media environment post-2013 elections 
 
Apart from media reforms, MISA’s criticism of government over the years has also centred 
around the state’s bias in propping up partisan media institutions that nonetheless still 
marginalize rural communities, by constraining information access and monopolizing 
broadcasting and print spaces. Although Sections 61 and 62 of the new (2013) Constitution 
vastly improved the potential for promoting and protecting media freedoms, actualization of the 
necessary changes was slow. By the end of 2016 the only indicator of ‘media reform’ was 
government’s granting of commercial radio licenses to three out of eight provincial stations. But 
even then, all three had links to the ruling party. Despite government’s obstinacy in repealing 
laws, civil society leaders like the then MISA Director Nhlahla Ngwenya, cautioned against a 
radical or confrontational approach, advocating a multipronged approach involving launching a 
legal challenge, complemented by increased adoption of digital media platforms which were 
beyond state control.   
… What civil society’s best bet would be, is to try and push for legal processes that will open up 
the space. Of course, I am not going to discount other activities that civil society and other 
Zimbabweans are undertaking now… to say okay, in the meantime, while we still haggle over the 
realignment of laws, can we then be enjoying our right to freedom of expression? Which is why 
we have seen the emergence of citizen journalism in this country, where (we have) community 
radio initiatives. Before they have been licensed, they are producing material for their own 
communities. We have community newsletters, civil societies producing dozens of newsletters to 
express themselves, to cater for their constituencies and their beneficiaries (Interview Nhlahla 
Ngwenya, February 18, 2014). 
 
Community media activism or citizen journalism thus became one of the alternatives, while the 
outcome of the legal-processes approach resulted in the Constitutional Court (ConCourt) setting 
aside Sections 61 and 62 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act in June 2014, the 
biggest MISA and civil society win for media freedom since independence. 
8.2  Expanding the search for media freedoms: Media Lawyers’ Network and others 
 
MISA’s efforts to expand media freedom gave birth to digital media NGOs. The Media 
Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ), the Media Centre (MC), the Media Alliance of 
Zimbabwe (MAZ), the Voluntary Media Council (VMC), the Media Lawyers’ Network (MLN) 
and the Zimbabwe Association of Community Radio Stations (ZACRAS) were all MISA 
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creations, and, despite following different mandates, still do so under the same MISA objectives. 
The Media Lawyers’ Network (MLN) is the more relevant in this study because of its role in 
advising the NGO, MISA Southern Africa, and protecting community journalists. MISA’s two 
lawyers at head office collaborate with independent and ZLHR provincial lawyers when 
interventions become necessary. The Network “…whose purpose is to ensure that there is a pool 
of lawyers who are there to protect freedom of expression and of the media wherever it is 
threatened,” according to the NGO’s website, has helped reduce media fears of arbitrary arrests 
or detentions. It is a rapid response system like, and indeed supported by ZLHR’s Rapid 
Response facility.  
 
The ‘network’ is supported by a Media Defense Fund established by MISA in 2002 to source 
funds for the defence of journalists at the height of media persecutions. In-fact the fund protected 
several journalists, the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) and Association of 
Independent Journalists, Zimbabwe (IJAZ) against Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act and Public Order and Security Act in lower and Supreme Court challenges 
(Dumisani Moyo, 2005:108). Appendix 8.1 shows a few select cases in which MISA and its 
lawyers were involved in some capacity to assist persecuted media activists. Regular interaction 
with HQ colleagues and other lawyers in respect of media laws and best practice keeps the duo 
alive to challenges in the media environment.  
8.3  Community initiatives and volunteer roles  
 
MISA runs three key information initiatives for marginalized communities, direct products of the 
NGO’s community empowerment programme. The initiatives are Information Kiosks, 
Community Radios and Community Newsletters, but the last two depend heavily on the 
involvement of volunteers from the communities themselves. The community radio initiative is 
organised together with Zimbabwe Association of Community Radio Stations (ZACRAS), the 
umbrella body for the grassroots radio stations. Except for the group that MISA calls Advocacy 
Committees, the other volunteers are young, high school graduates but with no training in 
broadcasting or newspaper production. They are therefore prime targets of the repressive media 
laws if they are caught producing or disseminating any form of regulated information. Advocacy 
Committee members are also young but mostly trained, registered journalists working in 
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provinces but are volunteering to mediate for the NGO in its outreach programmes. In terms of 
visibility, this latter group operates overtly in the communities while the other two are meant to 
operate discreetly, only revealing themselves where they feel the communities are 
accommodating. 
 
 In terms of access to information, marginalised communities are not only those in remote rural 
areas but even those in peri-urban and urban areas but with limited access to news and 
information. For many, newspapers and television are beyond their reach, leaving radio as the 
predominant source of news and information (Mano, 2009; Mhiripiri, 2011). The three projects 
are therefore attempts to democratise media space and empower the marginalized communities 
by opening up new, independent platforms through which their voices can be heard. 
 
MISA officers told me that volunteers are recruited during outreach activities like community 
workshops, press club presentations and media law surveys. Outreach programmes present 
opportunities for staff and advocacy committee members to collect participants’ contact details 
(names, telephone numbers, gender, community) which eventually go into the organisation’s 
mobile data base.  From my discussions with the community journalists and the NGO, the 
volunteers become involved because they feel challenges in their communities are not being 
sufficiently communicated. In this respect MISA’s recruitment is strategic in that these are 
people, as in the case of ZPP monitors, with vested interest in development, social justice, and 
general human rights issues in their communities.  
 
In terms of co-ordination for all three initiatives, as with ZPP and ERC, the media NGO’s 
organizational structure drives communication: within its internal structure of professionals as 
well as with the ‘informal’ dispersed structures comprising the two groups of volunteers. There 
is a more distinct top-down influence from HQ than in the case with ERC and ZPP. The 
‘informal’ volunteer structure appears to show a slightly more structured model than that 
exhibited by the other cases. I make this suggestion because the structures are in the form of 5-
member ‘committees’ with group leaders or co-ordinators, an arrangement that introduces issues 
of deference to group ‘working rules’ and possibly less individual independence. The manner in 
which newsletter journalists plan and execute news production also suggests a more structured 
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arrangement. The next section briefly discusses the roles of information kiosk and community 
radio initiatives in promoting marginalized community involvement and information 
accessibility, before turning to community newsletters, the focus of this case.  
 
8.3.1   Information kiosks and community radio stations 
 
Situated in the cities and towns of Gweru, Mutare, Masvingo, Kariba, Gwanda and rural 
Umzingwane in Matebelealnd South Province, Information Kiosks are managed by MISA 
employees and form part of the decentralized structure of the organization, working with 
Advocacy committees to promote MISA’s outreach activities. Their main objective is to 
empower citizens by making information accessible65. The structures tend to be single-roomed 
offices located within town or council office complexes to target citizens walking in to pay bills 
or conduct any other council business. At growth points in rural areas they are located close to 
shops, clubs, district or provincial magistrate’s courts, the focal points of civil service and 
village/community traffic. They have become both meeting places and resource centres for 
activists and researchers in the provinces, providing broadcasting manuals, media law critiques, 
community training programmes and mainstream newspapers. Although predominantly for use 
by officials who man the kiosks, the kiosk mobile phones facilitate interaction with head office, 
the public and volunteers. Kiosk officials can use the phones to communicate with HQ should 
users ask for further information that is not readily available. Or community members can 
contact officials on the kiosk mobile number. 
 
In terms of the community radio stations initiative between 2001 and 2015, despite the 
constrictive media laws, MISA and ZACRAS had championed the establishment of 22 
clandestine stations- shown in Appendix 9- around the country. However, in 2015 only six were 
broadcasting through Zim Channel, a satellite broadcasting platform managed by ZACRAS, 
while others were podcasting 66. Radio Chiedza, the 23rd station on the list, was a Roman 
 
65  In a statement on 28 July 2015, the NGO said the launch marked the beginning of a programme to make 
information accessible to marginalised communities through-out the country. 
66 The Zimbabwe2012 Human Rights Report says that in May 2011 Minister Shamu announced government’s 
procurement of equipment ‘to establish eight community radio stations, with technical assistance from the ZBC.’ 
However, by the end of 2016, no community radio stations had been licensed, only commercial radio stations. In 
2013 government invited tenders for 14 commercial radio stations. Only two, Star FM and ZiFM were given 
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Catholic Church initiative. The broadcasts through ZIM Channel were for a few hours a day. 
Five-member committees of the journalists ran each community radio project. The most active 
committees were in Bulawayo, Gweru, Mutare, Masvingo, Gwanda, Victoria Falls, Kwekwe and 
Kariba. In an interview on March 3, 2014 MISA’s officer managing the radio project said this 
was because of their proximity and access to telecommunications and energy infrastructure. The 
committees, with MISA or ZACRAS’ guidance built public awareness around media, political 
and social issues following a communication strategy that employed traditional platforms like 
community workshops, theatre and drama, song, pamphlets and flyers.  
 
Media NGOs agreed in the interviews, that the mobile phone, through voice calls and WhatsApp, 
was the predominant tool for interacting with community members, and, for established stations 
like Radio Dialogue and CORAH, encouraging community involvement in content production. 
Although these two radio stations are operating illegally, according to the country’s laws, they 
have been operating for so many years, and with such strong community support, that the state 
turns a blind eye for political expediency. Radio Dialogue in Bulawayo, for example is viewed 
by Bulawayo citizens as the City’s Voice, and they raise ‘regionalism’ and ‘tribalism’ flags 
whenever the station staff are harassed. In his research of the station Mhiripiri (2011) established 
that the phone was a key ICT in facilitating audience participation in content production.  
 
ZACRAS officials claimed in an interview on September 3, 2014 that WhatsApp became 
instrumental in supporting broadcast teams mobilise communities to set up WhatsApp forums 
whose members used their various skills, positions and networks to tackle community 
challenges. They said for example, public hearings on reforming Zimbabwe’s media, conducted 
in 2014 by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, were successful in large part 
due to the role played by WhatsApp. The WhatsApp groups set up by the community radio 
committees mobilised the public to participate in the hearings. 
8.4  Community newspapers, a brief history.  
 
Before turning to the third initiative, Newsletters, I briefly discuss the history of community  
 
licences and began operating the same year. Infact they were operating by the time of the July 2013 elections and 
provided alternative space for the voices of CSOs/NGOs. 
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newspapers in Zimbabwe. The concept of Community Newspapers can trace its history back to 
1983 when the fortnightly Murehwa News,67 the first of 51 district newspapers proposed by the 
Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) was launched to serve black communities which had 
been sidelined by urban-based papers serving mainly the interests of the white community 
(Saunders, 1991, cited in Mandava, 2006). ZMMT hoped to use community newspapers “… to 
set up a rural public sphere and democratise the domestic information order hence initiate and 
support development,” (Ibid, 34). They were also to act as conduits for passing information 
between rural communities and government. Although touted by government as independent and 
profit-oriented, Community newspapers became another mouth piece for the ruling ZANU PF 
government in the provinces, complementing Zimbabwe Newspapers. By August 2015 only two 
provincial papers remained, according to The Zimbabwean of August 28, 2015. Although 
primarily concerned with media law and policy advocacy, MISA felt that marginalised 
communities, especially rural based, deserved alternative, more independent media platforms 
through which they could share information and tell their own story. The colonial newspaper 
distribution pattern had also favoured highways, while communities that are peripheral to or 
distant from the highway routes were marginalized, including in their participation in national 
discourses.  
8.5  The community newsletter initiative 
 
The state’s control of remaining community papers, the chasms and conflicts created by media 
laws, all forced MISA, in 2006, to explore the launch of what it wanted to be an independent 
community newspaper project. Poor resourcing however forced consolidation of the project in 
2007. As the 2008 elections approached MISA also believed that the initiative, outside 
government control and influence, would be a source of information and empowerment for the 
marginalised communities so that they could actively participate in the coming elections and 
after. The organisation’s trial runs in ‘no go’ political hotspots in Mashonaland East, the 
Midlands, and Mashonaland West Provinces68 were successful enough to prompt a launch of an 
 
67  Murehwa News then was a community paper for Murehwa District, in Mashonaland East Province. The District 
was fairly well developed infrastructurally because it was well serviced by Rhodesian forces to better conduct the 
war against ZANLA and ZAPU fighters. 
68  These are amongst the provinces where ZPP and the report in the Zimbabwean of March 17, 2016, indicate the 
largest numbers of violations and abducted citizens were recorded. 
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initial 20 newsletters in 20 districts in 2007. By the end of 2015 the NGO had championed 32 
community newsletters countrywide, some produced monthly, others bi-monthly, still others 
quarterly. Table 8.1 shows the titles of the newsletters and their spread as at the end of 2015. The 
last column in the table shows the presence of state controlled newspapers in the areas, as one 
way of illustrating what challenge or competition the newsletters might have in the areas. I have 
ranked the presence of state controlled papers as H for high, A for average and M for minimal 
presence in those areas, based on comments from the newsletter and conventional media 
participants. My participants were also from the first twelve newsletters from seven of the 
country’s 10 Provinces. 
 
Table 8.1   List of community newsletters and national newspaper presence in the districts 
 Newsletter Location (District/Province) Languages  National 
Papers 
1 # Chitungwiza News Chitungwiza Town (Harare satellite) Shona H 
2# Mhondoro Pachena Mubaira, Chegutu, Mashonaland West  Shona A 
3# Buhera News Buhera District, Manicaland  Shona A 
4# Hurungwe News/Star Hurungwe District, Mashonaland West  Shona M 
5# Wedza News Wedza District, Manicaland  Shona M 
6# Gokwe Moto Gokwe District, Midlands  Shona M 
7# The Chipinge Voice 
Vekanye Voreketa 
Chipinge District, Manicaland  Shona 
English 
M 
8# Zvishavane News Zvishavane, Midlands Shona A 
9# Kariba News Kariba, Mashonaland West Shona A 
10# The Spy Glass Kwekwe, Midlands  English, Shona H 
11# Lalapansi Yotaura Lalapansi, Matebeleland South Ndebele, Shona M 
12# Tjedza Tjebukalanga Plumtree District Matebeleland South  Kalanga M 
13 Hatcliffe News Hatcliffe High Density Suburb, Harare Shona, English. H 
14 Goromonzi News Goromonzi District, Mash East  Shona A 
15 Chinhoyi News Chinhoyi District, Mashonaland West Shona A 
188 
 
16 Mutoko News Mutoko District, Mashonaland East  Shona M 
17 The Eastern Parrot Makoni District, Manicaland  Shona M 
18 Bikita Metro Bikita District, Masvingo  Shona M 
19 5 Stars Bulletin Buhera District, Manicaland  Shona M 
20 Sakubva News Sakubva Suburb, Mutare, Manicaland Shona H 
21 GlenView News Glen View Suburb, Harare Shona, English H 
22 Domboshawa News Domboshawa District,  Shona H 
23 Murehwa. Com Murehwa District, Mashonaland East  Shona M 
24 Kariba Satelite Kariba District, Mashonaland West  Shona M 
25 Zaka News Zaka District, Masvingo Shona M 
26 Chivi News Chivi District, Masvingo Shona M 
27 Kwekwe News Kwekwe, Midlands  Shona Y 
28 Gweru Eye Gweru, Midlands  Shona/Eng. YH 
29 Zhombe News Zhombe District, Midlands Shona Y-M 
30 Iqiniso Zvishavane/Mberengwa; Midlands Ndebele M 
31 Bubi News Bubi. Matebeleland South  Ndebele M 
32 Mabvazuwa News Mutare, Manicaland Shona Y 
# Newsletters 1-12 whose journalists participated in the interviews    
*H= High presence   *A=Average Presence, *M = Minimal presence    
 
MISA interns, who help co-ordinate the production process said in interviews on February 2, 
2014, that each newsletter has a print-run of 5000, is shared by between 3-6 people in a family, 
giving a potential readership of at least 15 000 people in a constituency. This is the average size 
of constituencies in the country. In an email response on September 30, 2014, the MISA officer 
managing the project argued the critical nature of the community media initiatives in facilitating 
citizens’ demands for information and democratic processes: 
The overall goal of the initiatives is to contribute towards the promotion of an active citizenry 
that participates and engages on national processes through exercising their right to freedom of 
expression and access to information and is empowered to demand the protection of their basic 
freedoms within their communities through their own communication platforms. MISA-
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Zimbabwe believes that key to building accountable and transparent governance as well as 
engendering democracy is by empowering communities with platforms through which they can 
participate in the country’s democratic processes and hold their leaders to account. Thus, by 
facilitating the production and distribution of community-based media products through which 
communities would access information that would enable them to participate from an informed 
position  
 
8.5.1  Promoting information access and a community voice 
 
The Newsletter’s success hinges on various factors including journalists’ commitment, their 
familiarity with community politics and keeping the news production and distribution processes 
secret. The last two factors are significant for two reasons: first because of the prohibitive media 
laws, and second, because of the potential for retributive action by community members 
offended by some of the articles. Polarization in the communities forces journalists to write 
anonymously to avoid unwelcome outcomes. It is because of these challenges, according to the 
officer running the newsletter project, that MISA wanted the production and distribution process 
to be a clandestine, ‘guerrilla-type’ operation, which at the same time gave the communities 
media platforms to express their concerns and aspirations.  
 
The need to protect the activists is so strong that, as discussed in the Methodology chapter, there 
were challenges with getting introduced to them and hearing from the participants directly, until 
in early 2016. Several attempts in 2014 and 2015 for interactions with the journalists were not 
very successful, except for phone interviews with journalists from Mhondoro Pachena News and 
Vekanye Voreketa and physical interaction with two journalists from Chitungwiza News. Further 
attempts in early 2016, after the intervention of the officer managing the initiative were more 
successful. The findings which follow are based on various types of interactions with the 
journalists and MISA officers: a combination of email, face-to-face, telephone and WhatsApp 
text interviews. I also spent some time with interns and MISA’s Newsletter design and layout 
officer. 
 
One of the questions I posed to the participants, given the impediments placed by Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Broadcasting Services Act, was how they saw 
their Newsletters promoting media freedoms and access to information. The themes of 
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“ownership” of the story, localization of distribution and the capacity to give news for free 
repeatedly featured in the responses. This appeared to bolster MISA’s aim of eventually making 
the Newsletter production less clandestine and allowing communities to be more involved in the 
production. A journalist from the Hurungwe Star a remote area publication saw the newsletter as 
the main source of news and information, free and relevant to the people, devoid of the biases in 
national papers.   
Our newsletter is mainly distributed in remote areas and seems to be the main source of news in 
hurungwe and pple prefer our paper as it is relevant to them. All publications in our paper is full 
of stories of people and places they know making it the best for all. No monetary value to get the 
paper as cash is also an issue to them. National paper at times they say is biased or one sided 
when addressing political issues so we enjoy our own stories than their story.  
 
The journalist with Lalapansi Yotaura expressed similar views, again emphasizing the aspects of 
‘ownership’ and free nature of the publication: “...What sets the newsletter apart from 
mainstream papers is that it is free of charge and reports directly on issues of their communities, 
their projects, developments and many more. Its unique because they Own the paper.”  
 
On retirement, most Zimbabwean males withdraw to live in their rural homes, but the culture of 
news reading and information sharing stays with many of them. This is not to imply that 
newsletter readership is confined to males, but the point is relevant. The participant from Tjedza 
Tjebukalanga, which caters for communities in the southern border town of Plumtree and the 
vast rural areas around it, said these pensioners are still avid news readers and want to follow 
both community and national developments. The newsletter attempts to satisfy that need as it 
contains “current affairs and current happenings, nationally and locally.” In the main, stories 
challenge corruption, political victimisation, poor governance, violence, female and child abuse, 
rape, gender discrimination in education, poor health facilities, politicised food aid distribution 
and several other issues affecting village and district communities. In short these are issues of 
civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights.  
8.6  Role in co-ordination, production, and distribution and related challenges 
 
I have referred to a ‘committee’ structure which defines how the journalists’ co-ordinate their 
work. The best writer amongst the journalists is often given the co-ordinator or team leader’s role 
which involves arranging meetings for the group, collecting copy from each writer, sometimes 
verifying and re-writing stories and liaising with interns at MISA HQ, all through WhatsApp, 
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voice calls or, occasionally, SMS. The co-ordinator often calls for face-to-face meetings at each 
other’s homes or some other safe place to discuss drafts, before taking or texting them to Head 
Office. Most co-ordinators however take copy to HQ. MISA interns also identify safe venues and 
arrange training and other types of workshops for the journalists through the phone. For 
remotely-based (rural) journalists, physical meetings are more far-between because of 
prohibitive distances between the activists, related travel costs, political and interception risks. 
Many of them deem it prudent to carefully co-ordinate travel and personal safety arrangements 
before travelling to meetings.  
 
When I visited the MISA offices on 24 and 25 February 2014 I found three interns editing stories 
from the journalists. They told me that they assist the advocacy officer to co-ordinate with the 
journalists, receiving, editing, cross-checking the stories before they are laid out and printed. 
Cross-checking is a verification process designed to ensure that the stories are accurate, reliable 
and cannot invite litigations or create community disharmony. They confirmed that verification 
usually involves asking the lead journalist to cross check issues which might appear 
uncorroborated. Because of the added functionalities on smartphones, compared to the simplicity 
of 2G handsets, journalists who use them- to discreetly record speeches, village court 
proceedings, interviews or take pictures and videos to support their stories- said they find it 
easier to compile and transmit their stories to HQ soon after, saving time and travel costs. This is 
in addition to the fact that these formats may later provide evidence. The journalist with 
Hurungwe Star said in the WhatsApp conversation on April 20, 2016: Sending news through 
smartphone save time. You use little money. You don’t have to travel long distance to distribute 
news. U just send thus all. ‘Distribute’ in this case meant transmitting copy to the interns at 
MISA head office. 
 
The distribution process has its challenges, which the journalists attempt to circumvent by 
deploying the phone. Once issues have been printed team leaders are contacted to collect their 
copies either from head office or satellite or agency offices in the smaller towns. Interviews with 
respondents showed that distribution tactics are broadly the same: secretive, clandestine and, in 
many areas, a night affair. In rural areas team members leave copies at strategic places where 
they are visible and accessible to community members: at council beer halls, on shop stoeps, at 
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school gates, clinics and at homesteads. The following conversation with Mhondoro Pachena 
News participant highlights the risks involved in distribution and the role the phone plays in 
coordinating the process and navigating the risks. The respondent describes the process from 
collecting printed copies from MISA offices up to distribution in their constituency: 
 
When I carry the newspapers from MISA I make sure that they are in a big bag that is zipped and I have 
them close to me on the bus. I never let them out of my sight. When I leave town I also phone my friends 
and tell them which bus or kombi (mini bus used as passenger transport) I am travelling on so that they 
can meet me at bus stops where I drop off their copies for distribution in their wards. 
Q. Do you drop off all the copies (with colleagues) in one trip? 
A. Not very often No. Some (colleagues) I meet at bus stops at their homes, and hand them their copies 
and don’t even get off the bus. But sometimes we make arrangements to meet later, at a growth point. You 
make sure the papers are wrapped carefully in bags...they just look like parcels I am taking to friends. 
They should not raise suspicion 
Q, Then, how do you distribute your papers?  
A.  During the night, say around 7 or 8 pm. You pack your newsletters in a bag; put on a heavy coat to 
hide yourself from easy identification. You take the bag to places like school gates, or clinics and dump 
the papers there. You then walk away and avoid people identifying you. You do not drop off near your 
area, but at school gates. In the morning school children will pick up the copies from the school gate and 
share them with others. They will also bring copies home to parents and friends. They will say to you 
‘Mummy have you seen this story? Have you seen this story about so and so...?’ But you pretend you do 
not know. You say No, let me see… That is how the newspaper spreads. So we consider school children 
very good distribution agents.  
8.7  Risks associated with story content 
 
Community media has the potential to create harmony as much as it can cause discord. From 
participant comments, and additionally, going over some stories in some editions, I noted some 
whose content appeared to have the potential to offend those who might not share the writers’ 
views. It is partly to obviate such a challenge, and partly to present objective, credible 
publications, that MISA’s officers and interns moderate the stories at editing stage. The 
following comments from some of the participants highlight the danger of some stories creating 
discordances which could lead to repression or threats of retribution.  
The Hurungwe Star journalist observed that “Sensitive issues published makes pple victimized as 
to why publish prominent pple (people) and they use their influence to silence publishers.” The 
writer for Wedza News said, “Risks and Challenges… (include) threats from those who fear their 
deeds,” while the Lalapansi Yotaura participant pointed out that “The newsletter in some areas 
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faces challenges in that the stories contained exposes corruption and others to an extent that 
those in the corridors of power do not like the newsletter hence they make the distribution almost 
impossible by threatening to find the source or the origins of the paper.” The Mhondoro 
Pachena News journalist voiced similar concerns: “Many of the stories we cover are considered 
private, sometimes family and very personal stories. We are always afraid that because some of 
these stories could affect members of the community too intimately, if they know who published 
them it could jeopardize community relations and our own personal safety.” 
 The journalist with Vekanye Voreketa recalled the ruling party MP for Chipinge South, 
Porusingazi, launching a campaign to identify the Newsletter’s writers and attacking the 
publication’s criticism of government for permitting Green Fuels to evict the villagers from their 
traditional lands to pave way for a fuel blending project. The newsletter’s interventions to protect 
the villagers’ rights is discussed in more detail in a later section. 
 
Lack of funds for communication and transport, apparent amongst ZPP monitors, is also 
common with the journalists, sometimes making it difficult for them to verify incidents. Average 
monthly allowance for a journalist at the time of the study was $25, an inadequate figure for 
travel and communication needs. This is particularly so for those in rural areas who travel longer 
distances and have more problems with connectivity and battery charging. Tjedza Tjebukalanga 
and Mhondoro Pachena journalists for instance, gave examples of costs at least 3-5 times this 
figure to produce stories per month. Just as with ZPP, cost factors impact the quality of 
investigation and final output, although in this case the larger number of volunteers in each unit 
allows for consultations and co-operation. The editing team at HQ may also ask for further 
investigations into a story, which increases costs and risks.  
 
8.8  Other challenges and risks  
 
There are more areas that pose challenges and risks. I have referred to stories challenging poor 
governance, political victimisation, corruption, partisan food distribution and denial of women’s 
and children’s rights, almost all of which areas have the potential to breed conflict with 
community leaders. The responses I received to the question ‘what the journalists considered 
the sources of risks to mobile phone use’ suggested that alongside the restrictive Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, there was concern over state capacity to track calls or 
intercept messages. None of the journalists however quoted actual personal experiences in the 
way that OAUS activists did. The perception of this threat is however so strong that I found it 
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intriguing, that Tjedza Tjebukalanga and Lalapansi Yotaura participants, who own smartphones 
which have the capability to transmit copy and images directly to head office through WhatsApp, 
preferred to travel 100 kilometres to Bulawayo to use email facilities. This was regardless of the 
risk posed by possible police searches at road blocks. The Lalapansi Yotaura respondent said she 
feared intercepted material could be “reproduced as prove (proof) or evidence against you if 
certain powerful political individuals want to fix you.”. The journalist passes through several 
police road blocks to and from Bulawayo and the risk of being intercepted with stories on her 
phone or with hard copies of the paper, is high.  
  
 The Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe requirement that lines 
be registered was quoted as another risk. For other journalists, the practice of phone sharing, 
particularly amongst rural families, presented another source of risk. Phone sharing means the 
journalist loses control of his work as family members might access his/her images or 
recordings, thereby inadvertently creating the risk of exposure. The journalist with Hurungwe 
Star pointed out: “Phones also are used by families, not individuals, in the rural areas and 
privacy is not maintained by the real owner as some of the issues are sensitive to some pple. 
Sharing sometimes extends beyond immediate family members, exacerbating the risk of 
exposure to ‘outsiders’.  
 
There also appeared some concern with openly using the phone to take pictures of sensitive 
incidents, or asking questions that made journalists appear incompatible with their place in the 
community. However, as this study has noted elsewhere, discreet recordings are possible. This 
concern was however not as serious as ZPP monitors expressed, because the journalists are 
younger and use phones more openly than older people. Some communities are also more 
accommodating towards journalists as mediators for their voice, notably urban councils, like 
Chitungwiza, administered by the opposition, or rural areas like Zhombe and Chipinge where 
communities have been victims of state violence or feel discriminated against because of support 
for the opposition. The Chitungwiza News reporter told me the council empathises with critical 





There was also concern over poor signal, acknowledged by almost every participant but more so 
by those travelling to remote areas. In these areas, as in the case with ZPP monitors, poor signal 
strength forces the journalists to hold their images and recordings on the phone until the signal 
has improved sufficiently for transmission to Head Office. But the journalists also know that this 
creates vulnerabilities. A project expert with the development NGO, People Action, Lawrence 
Gudza, puts this challenge into some sombre perspective in an interview on February 28, 2014. 
He described how low signal strength in remote areas sometimes led to fresh produce rotting or 
wasting in villages because transport companies in towns could not be contacted. The villagers 
had to either board buses to the nearest growth point, or climb up mountains to get sufficient 
signal strength to make calls, send WhatsApp or SMS to collectors.  




This section discusses briefly the role of the newsletter in national politics and development, 
with the mediation of mobile phone. Several examples emerged from interviews, of the 
newsletter fulfilling MISA’s cherished objective of giving disadvantaged communities 
communication platforms through which to participate in national processes. Several of the 
papers have broken important stories or initiated debates which have changed priorities in local 
and national politics. During elections for example, all the Newsletters prioritise voter education 
issues which include publishing lists of candidates and polling stations in their constituencies. 
This is critical information for communities in remote areas starved for such information by the 
poor reach of national media. As copies are shared by community members, their contents 
amplified by word of mouth or person-to-person interaction, this information spreads. Some 
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newsletters are reported to have energized proactive responses by legislators. For example, 
MISA said Wedza News had reported issues which opened contentious local debate, exposing 
shortfalls within elected leadership such that the sitting MP was forced to introduce his own 
Constituency Newsletter. Both MISA and the Wedza News journalist argued that the increased 
communication channels opened up space for democratic debate within the community. In 
Gokwe, Midlands Province, Gokwe News was instrumental in the mobilization of national and 
international funds for several development projects, including the rehabilitation of dip tanks 
which critically improved the health of livestock. Bloggers amplified the newsletter’s voice, one 
of them Takura Zhangazha, who had also been instrumental in the formation of the Community 
media project at MISA and whose blogs turned the problems in the community into national 
concerns. In 2007-2008, when Chitungwiza suburb suffered a major cholera outbreak after 
residents drank polluted water from city council tanks and wells dug around poorly drained 
wetlands, Chitungwiza News became the only publication in Harare and Chitungwiza to print a 
special flyer for residents detailing how to manage the contagion. The journalists told me on 
January 18, 2015 that they believe their newsletter’s intervention helped save the lives of 
thousands of residents.  
 
Yet another example involved the interventionist role played by the Vekanye Voreketa newsletter 
from 2012 onwards in a protracted conflict between the energy company Green Fuels and the 
villagers from Chisumbanje, a sugar-cane growing area in Chipinge District, Manicaland 
Province. Owned by millionaire Billy Rautenbach- who is reported to fund ZANU PF 69, Green 
Fuels was granted permission to implement a sugar-cane ethanol-blending project in the district. 
By 2016 the company was Zimbabwe’s biggest ethanol fuel producer and compulsory supplier to 
fuel retailers. The project displaced 2 000 families without compensating them for lost land and 
livelihoods. Only 30% of them were relocated. When there was silence from government to 
community complaints over the land grabs and displacements Vekanye Voreketa began a 
campaign, producing a series of articles exposing the violations to villagers’ rights. The articles, 
 
69 The Mail and Guardian of South Africa has written several articles suggesting Green Fuels is getting preferential 
treatment from the ZANU PF government because Billy Rautenbach, the owner, has financial links with the party. 
Green Fuels was planning to set up an additional four plants in the country, raising output of ethanol to 1.5-billion 
litres annually by 2018. The company would increase its sugar cane plantations nearly fourfold to 46 000 hectares 
from 9 500 hectares. This massive increase in hectarage would result in more displacements and possible ‘forced’ 
cheap labour for the project. 
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picked up by national and regional press (including South Africa’s Mail and Guardian,) sparked 
national debate to a point where government was forced to appoint an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee in July-August 2012, headed by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Arthur Mutambara, 
to investigate and make recommendations. The investigation proved numerous rights violations, 
including evictions from land and property (property rights), physical violence (personal safety, 
life), destruction of villagers’ crops and poisoning of villagers’ livestock through drinking 
contaminated stream and canal water. The committee recommended compensation to the 
villagers for the violations, including provision of funds for feedstock schemes, new schools and 
clinics, jobs, irrigation infrastructure and training for the villagers to become sugar cane out-
growers and cash crop producers.  
 
The Vekanye Voreketa journalists said the mobile phone has always been central to their 
campaign to open Green Fuels to public or national scrutiny about its responsibility towards the 
community in which the project operates. The phone records speeches, videos and images of 
incidents or violations against the community. For example, some of the images used by the Mail 
and Guardian and those in the March 2017 issue of the ZLHR publication, The Legal Monitor, 
were provided by the Vekanye Voreketa journalists and their community radio friends, as part of 
the campaign to expose the violations.70 The journalists said they also use the phone to keep 
contacts with sources inside the company. Sharing information with colleagues from the local 
community radio initiative the two groups managed to compile a mobile data base of community 
members which they then passed on to MISA to be placed on the NGO’s lists of recipients for 











70 One of the journalists said they were the source of information for the Mail and Guardian stories, including some 
of the images the newspaper was using. Notably the livestock images. I also observed that the same journalist was 
getting space in the Legal Monitor to write about the collusion between Green Fuels and police to ignore villagers’ 
complaints against the company. 
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Figure 8.2   Images of Chipinge villagers by Wekanye Voreketa journalists used by ZLHR. 
 
The group also appears to be using the mobile phone to link up with new social media platforms. 
A member of the group referred me to a Facebook page, ‘Chipinge News Online Facebook’, 
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which they had launched and on which community members, including Chipinge citizens living 
in other towns, shared views on violations and other local issues. A cursory analysis of a few 
posts up to mid- 2016 indicated an interesting development: that the Facebook page had also 
become a user site for the journalists’ pictures, and a source of news for both the newsletter and 
the national press. One example relates to a collision on 29 October 2013 between a Green Fuels 
fuel tanker and a truck, in which 23 people were burnt to death near Chipinge. Some pictures of 
the tragic incident were captured by phone by a journalist contributing to both Vekanye Voreketa 
and the radio station project. The image below was used by ‘Vekanye Voreketa’ and the 
Facebook page as well as by several local papers- including the daily Newsday- and international 
media. More than anything else what appears to have raised emotions and made the image 
iconic, was the involvement of Green Fuels, which the Vekanye Voreketa articles accused of 
wanton disregard for life and villagers’ rights. 
 




8.10  The 2013 elections: the place of SMS alerts and social media platforms 
Although SMS use had been increasing since 2000 there was vastly increased deployment in 
2008 (Moyo, 2009) and 2013 coinciding with electoral activity. This section briefly analyses 
some SMS alerts from 2013 which I downloaded from the NGO’s website in 2015 and in which 
the mobile phone played some role. It also briefly explores their links to MISA’s social media 
platforms. It is necessary to give some background to the alerts. In July 2013 MISA said they 
sought to assess the efficacy of the mobile phone and other digital media platforms in reporting 
the elections. It sought to achieve this by testing the capacity and skills of community (citizen) 
journalists in reporting the elections using SMS or WhatsApp. After receiving updates/alerts 
from the community journalists, the NGO would distribute them three (3) times a day and three 
times a week to its constituents through bulk SMS. The alerts were also uploaded onto the 
NGO’s page Zimcitizenbuzz, an interactive page meant to enhance the public’s knowledge of the 
election process as well as “expose the challenges and irregularities experienced by voters,” 
(MISA, ‘Zimcitizenbuzz’ Report, July 2013). MISA officers believed the recipients would share 
the alerts with friends. The officers told me they were able to confirm this diffusion process 
through feedback questions as well as at media workshops.  
 
The reports making up the 48 SMS texts from the community journalists covered election 
observations in 20 of the country’s 50 districts. The coverage however was more relevant than 
the figure suggests because the districts represented are in remote, outlying parts of the country. 
The fact that community journalists could send stories from some of these infrastructurally and 
politically challenged districts in the country, as voting progressed, reflects positively on the 
capabilities of both the medium and the journalists. Of the 48 only three texts could be 
considered to report stable voting environments. The rest referred to the voting process being 
undermined by political threats against voters; candidates attempting to cheat; deliberate 
subversion or violation of the process by the ruling party and lack of knowledge of voting 
requirements by some villagers. A community journalist from Gwanda for example sent two 
SMS texts to MISA: One read “The Councillors’ ballot papers at Spitzkopje Ward 5 in Gwanda 
have run out but voting is continuing.” The other read “With 2 (two) hours before polling ends, 
Gwanda voters are told that a helicopter has been dispatched from Harare with extra ballots.” 
Both reports suggest a fraudulent, corrupted and manipulated voting system incapable of 
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producing transparent, honest, and incontestable results. How does voting continue if there are 
no ballot papers? How can extra ballot papers be dispatched on a flight that will take more than 
three hours to get to polling stations that have only two hours left before voting closes? I could 
not find any report suggesting that voting had been officially extended in Gwanda on the voting 
day.  
 
A report from Gutu, a ruling party stronghold pointed to another flawed voting process: 
“Literate people in Gutu are being compelled to receive assistance to vote. 37 people have been 
assisted so far despite being competent (to do so themselves)”. There were similar messages 
from other districts-Zhombe and Chipinge notably- where the ruling party dominated. In both 
districts, the journalists reported that literate residents-including a High School teacher of 
English- were refusing to vote without the assistance of ZANU PF supporters, a clear indication 
that they were being coerced. Other reports gave the names of perpetrators violating the Electoral 
Act. A ZANU PF candidate for Red Cliff town council in the Midlands Province physically 
escorted voters to queues to vote for him, while in Chiredzi to the South East of the country “…. 
Rtd Brigadier Gwanetsa brought voters at Gwaseche, Ward 7, who did not stand in queue but 
went straight to the polling station claiming that they are special voters.”  
 
The NGO’s social media platform, VoteWatch263 complemented the communication. This 
crowd-sourcing platform, replicating Kenya’s Ushahidi platform and its deployment Uchaguzi, 
had developed Facebook, Twitter and You Tube pages initially meant to report and allow debate 
on electoral violations- several of which appeared on the Zimcitizenbuzz platform- but, 
subsequently, to debate social and other issues. MISA would receive public feedback from the 
Zimcitizenbuzz page on a dedicated telephone line as well as allow public debate of the content 
on the Votewatch263 Twitter and Facebook pages. Thus, it became a matter of putting the 
journalists’ reports on multiple platforms. The NGO informed me that the Vote Watch263 
Facebook page attracted Google’s attention because of its interactivity such that the technology 
giant nominated it Zimbabwe’s election information site.  
 
Comments from Zimbabwe Election Support Network suggested the claim was true. When I 
sought their views about Zimbabwean CSO experiences in deploying the Ushahidi platform 
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during the elections, ZESN confirmed that ERC, MISA and the Daily News had useful 
experiences with election monitoring platforms at that time. Lydia Polgreen, the International 
Deputy Editor of The New York Times and Geoffrey York, the Africa Correspondent for the 
Globe and Mail described Vote Watch263 site as a “Useful crowd-sourced site collecting reports 
of election problems in Zimbabwe,” while The Zimbabwean of July 24, 2013 said the platform 
would allow citizens to:  
… participate in watching and rating your election online and through your mobile on WhatsApp and text 
messaging (SMS) on the given number under the following categories; Access to information; Freedom of 
expression; Journalist/Media attacks; Voting; Post voting issues; reporting other issues such as civil 
society attacks and citizen attacks. Vote Watch 263 is also your central election news site which allows 
you to access official, mainstream and citizen news from around the country.    
 
8.11  Collaborations and developing multi sectoral skills 
 
Collaborations allow human rights NGOs to promote human rights issues as effectively as 
possible. MISA’s major contribution in collaborations with local NGOs like Heal Zimbabwe 
Trust, Her Zimbabwe, Mobile Community Zimbabwe, Magamba Network and Digital Society 
Zimbabwe (DSZ) involves training HRDs in story writing and the use of mobile phones in 
news/content production, personal protection and the protection of the phone contents. 
Collaboration with ERC is discussed under that Case Study. The partnership with DSZ in digital 
security for HRDs and other activists from other NGOs, covers security for a variety of digital 
media but particularly the computer and mobile phone, recognizing that they are the most 
prevalently used technologies amongst Zimbabwean activists. DSZ conducts regular evaluation 
of the project’s training programme to assess its suitability in some regions of the country, for 
particular skill groups or group needs. The DSZ trainer told me that the delivery for younger 
HRDs, for example, would be more comprehensive and perhaps more technical than that for 
older community or rural-based HRDs whose phones are also more basic and used in places 
where signals may be weak and inconsistent. Among the issues digital security training covers 
are tactics to avoid or minimise mobile-phone-related risks. These include PIN or pass-code 
locking, deleting sensitive data before taking the phone to unknown repairers to ensure security, 
or using known repairers to ensure integrity, switching off phones and battery during meetings or 
when visiting sensitive areas, avoiding using phones during sensitive events, being sensitive to 
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unfamiliar noises during phone conversations which could point to eaves-dropping by agents and 
installing phone tracking software in case it is lost 
 
But there are other benefits for media activists. For example, a request by ERC for MISA to 
assist in identifying volunteers in constituencies where its community media projects have been 
successful, received two suggestions. MISA asked its journalists to recommend trusted friends to 
ERC, or its own broadcast journalists willing to volunteer for both organisations could do so. 
The second option nullified the need for training except in understanding how the new NGO 
expected to operate. MISA said this type of collaboration encourages joint community 
programmes, minimum duplication of activities, costs and resource outlay and multi-sectoral 
skilling and knowledge sharing for the activists. For broadcast journalists for example, the 
opportunity to ‘represent’ more than MISA or ZACRAS gives them more material to work with, 
although they are aware of the risk of exposure.  
8.12  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored how MISA’s struggle for media reform in the country has involved the 
NGO challenging repressive media laws, among other things, by launching and supporting 
community media projects. As with the other case studies, the advent of digital media has given 
impetus to the projects. Although the community radio project is undoubtedly the most unique 
because of its more pronounced community involvement, the community newsletter initiative is 
also giving remote and marginalized communities a platform for their voices to be heard, and 
their views to become part of the national agenda. Because of legal barriers the initiative gets 
protection from volunteer embeddedness. The mobile phone’s role in the initiative must be as 
discreet as that of the community journalists themselves. Phone use involves deploying a range 
of tactics designed to ensure the safety of the journalists and the clandestine but still safe and 
successful production and distribution of the newsletters. In these roles, the mobile phone is also 




Election Resource Centre 
9. ERC and the electoral environment in Zimbabwe 
 
The Election Resource Centre (ERC) describes itself as a “think tank and advocacy institution on 
elections and democracy in Zimbabwe.”71 Established in 2010 the NGO seeks to strengthen the 
capacity of voters, national institutions that govern elections and other civil society institutions to 
“meaningfully engage in electoral processes,” and it does this through generating and 
disseminating knowledge and information, promoting open debate and lobbying for 
improvements in electoral laws.  
  
The quality and credibility of the electoral process is heavily contested in Zimbabwe for various 
reasons.  Such forces and instruments of co-ercion as security forces, War veterans, Party 
Youths, politicised village, and aid distribution structures have swayed heavily the outcome of 
elections in favour of the ruling ZANU PF party (McGregor, 2002; Sachikonye, 2002, 2007; 
Kriger, 2003, 2005; Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; D. Moyo, 2009; Mapuva, 2010; 
Raftopoulos, 2013). In June 2011 ERC lobbied Southern African governments to pressure 
ZANU PF leadership to address security, judicial, media and election management issues which 
also negatively impacted elections. Police and army chiefs have shown partisanship by 
repeatedly making political and election pronouncements showing intolerance for the opposition 
and civil society; judicial structures and police have applied justice and the law selectively to 
benefit ZANU PF; government-owned media has consistently completely blacked out the 
opposition and human rights NGOs and the Election Management body the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission (ZEC), has been militarised like many other public institutions (Mapuva, 2010) and 
it lacked resources and capacity to manage electoral process objectively (Kubatana.net). 
Amongst contested issues under the purview of ZEC are accessibility of the voter register, 
impartial or partisan management and custodianship of the voter registration process, vote 
 
71  The July 2014 issue of the Election Eye, the NGO’s monthly publication, has four articles which features issues 
which are at the heart of the organisation’s drive for democratic electoral processes. The issues discussed are: 1) 
Government being urged to speed up electoral reforms (p 2) 2. Citizens anger at the lack of delivery by legislators (p 
3) 3. Rural communities are haunted by political polarization (p 4) 4. Reforming political party financing would help 
smaller poorer parties and even the political playing field a little more (p 5). 
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counting, impartial information dissemination, political party representation at polling stations, 
civil society involvement in the voter education and election monitoring processes and proposing 
recommendations for the alignment of electoral laws to the Constitution (ERC 2013 Referendum 
Report). Voter literacy has not been prioritised and the national voter register has always been a 
subject of suspicion, particularly so when opposition candidates have been denied access to it up 
to voting day.72 The selection and invitation of international election observer missions has also 
been contested. Civic society and the Opposition have argued that adhering to regional and 
international election standards would ensure transparency and legitimacy. 
 
Together with the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) and several other civil society 
organisations (CSOs) involved in voting and elections ERC has tried to execute its watch dog 
role over these processes (Matyszak, 2009:140). The NGO’s contest for electoral democracy is 
also reflected in a petition that it and 16 other CSOs presented to Parliament on September 22, 
2015 demanding full reforms before the next general election in 2018. Since independence the 
results of elections (1985, 1990, 1995,2000/2002, 2008 and 2013) have been contested. Civil 
society as a result demanded a more comprehensive review of the Electoral Act so that, among 
other things, ZEC could be given more independence as the election management body 
(including having sole authority to manage Observer Missions invitations); every registered 
Zimbabwean- whether they are in the diaspora, in prison or hospital- could be allowed to vote; 
voter registration and the voters’ roll could be more transparent and accessible-which would 
have the effect of showing credible elections.73 ERC also criticises ZEC for pursuing a voter 
education strategy that teaches Zimbabweans only how to vote, rather than understand the rights 
which grant them fair political participation and leadership choice.  
 
 
72 In the July 31, 2013 elections one of the reasons for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change rejecting 
the outcome of the elections was the absence of the voter register right up to voting day, which led to suspicions and 
accusations of register manipulation by ZANU PF.  
73 In their 2015 petition ERC and CSOs argue that the results of the elections in 1990, 1995/6, 2000 and 2002, 2008 
and 2013 have been highly contested because of ZANU PF’s refusal to reform the Electoral Act, and, even when the 
2013 Constitution required its review, the ruling party still dragged its feet. In mid-2016, Justice Rita Makarau, the 
ZEC Chairperson, committed the body to involving CSOs in voter education, completing biometric registration, 
completing a new Voters’ Register, transparent and full involvement of all political parties in electoral changes that 
ZEC controlled and recommending alignment of Electoral laws to the Constitution. 
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ZEC has also been criticised for using expensive antiquated election management methods, with 
ERC demanding that the electoral body consider new methods of election management, which 
are cost effective and reflective of international best practice. ICT-based voter education, 
biometric voter registration (BVR) and electronic voting have become the norm in electoral 
democracies and this has been one of the recommendations by civil society. BVR effectively 
means the creation of a new register which would remove concerns over electoral fraud. Civil 
society and the opposition repeatedly accused the ruling party of controlling and manipulating 
the voter register and undermining the electoral body. 
 
ERC has attempted to correct some of these shortfalls by making itself the source of credible 
quality electoral information so that it can enable citizen and other stake-holder participation in 
the processes. The NGO’s campaigns to encourage citizen participation could be described as, 
ultimately, aiming to promote reliability, credibility, and electoral justice. The organisation 
contends that its major mandate is to see Zimbabweans empowered to participate in a 
“transparent and accountable electoral democracy.” This is important, given that of Zimbabwe’s 
13 million people, less than 50% are registered to vote. Of this figure, less than 42% usually 
come out to vote in elections, leaving out an uninterested 60%, according to the ERC Director, 
Tawanda Chimhini. The situation becomes more interesting when we consider that over 75% of 
the country’s population are people under 35 years. The country’s youths make up 41% of 
eligible voters, but only 14% are registered voters (RAU, 2017:1).  
9.1 ERC structure, co-ordination and communicating key campaigns 
 
ERC is one of the country’s youthful organisations with a clear appreciation of the opportunities 
offered by digital media platforms, particularly in targeting youths either as users or 
beneficiaries. Much of my analysis of this case relied on discussions with the Director and a 
programme officer managing the IT portfolio, as well as analysis of the NGO website content, 
social media platforms, a private radio station, news clippings and activists with other NGOs. 
The challenges I faced here in getting access to internal operations were almost a replica of those 
I faced at the lawyers’ NGO. Even having access to the organisation’s library became a 
challenge. The analysis further relied on material from my interviews with NGOs like Crisis in 
Zimbabwe Coalition, ZESN and MISA, who have strong networking relations with ERC.  
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At the time of the study staff indicated that mobile phone use between the organisation and its 
targets accounted for over 60% of its communication and, with an ‘SMS’ and ‘WhatsApp’ 
subscriber base of 500 00074, ERC has probably the largest constituent base amongst 
Zimbabwean NGOs. The large constituent base naturally had implications for the reach of its 
messages, although most subscribers are in urban or peri-urban areas. Other channels and media 
for mass communication include radio, mobile entertainment, person-to-person and the 
traditional fliers and posters. 
 
The NGO runs three key projects, the X1G campaign, Voters’ Clubs, and Citizen Election 
Reporters, which have been at the centre of the NGO’s efforts to both educate and encourage 
youths to participate in electoral processes. The first involves ERC staff interacting with 
communities through mobile outreach activities and a radio broadcast programme. The other two 
projects involve co-opting volunteers from the provinces. All three rely on the mobile phone, 
with WhatsApp and SMS key mediums of interaction with constituents. The next sections 
explore the role of the technology and applications in the projects, but starting with their internal 
deployment. 
  
9.1.1   The X1G Youth Campaign 
 
One of ERC’s long running campaigns, the X1G (X1 Young Generation) campaign features a 
weekly radio programme focusing on voting and electoral issues. The radio programme is run on 
one of the two independent radio stations and features pre-programmed discussions or live 
phone-ins from the public to ERC staff. Although targeting youths, described by the Director as 
‘political game changers’, the programme is also popular with other age groups. The X1G 
campaign also features an outreach programme involving mobile outdoor activities which aim to 
educate youths about civic and electoral issues. These activities are a key aspect of the 
campaign’s attempt to use new and traditional media platforms to create and disseminate content 
which the NGO believes will empower the youths to make decisions that impact their future. 
Two key features of the radio programme and mobile outreach activities are the use of music and 
 
74  The figure of 500 000 ascribed to SMS subscribers is really the organisation’s mobile data base. Because of the 
high SMS tarrifs, many of the constituents prefer to use WhatsApp. Operators like Econet have also marketed 
special ‘WhatsApp enabled’ phones. 
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celebrities, with whom young people identify. The NGO’s website for instance, carries images of 
young celebrity musicians and actors performing at ERC’s outreach mobile shows, promoting 
voter education and youth issues.  
 
The NGO has a limited budget and moderate staff complement, and given the almost ‘free’ 
nature of WhatsApp, ERC decided to turn the application into a powerful communication 
medium. Both interviews and website information indicated that the X1G radio campaign, 
between 2012 and 2013, made use of a dedicated ERC WhatsApp number to solicit feedback on 
electoral issues from youths. The project was meant both as a lead up to the 2013 elections and 
as longterm education on voting issues. The broadcasts would take WhatsApp feedback from 
listeners and turn the content into the subjects of discussions in subsequent radio programmes. In 
the process of collating the feedback coming through the WhatsApp number, ERC would also 
grow their mobile phone data base. They would however first seek permission from the 
WhatsApp sender to use their feedback on the radio programme as well as add their number to 
ERC’s mobile phone data base. Some of the content would also be incorporated in bulk SMS 
messages transmitted back to the numbers in the data base. After the 2013 elections, the ERC 
WhatsApp number continued to serve as a conduit for suggestions, observations, and questions 
from citizens on electoral democracy and human rights issues.  
 
At the time of this study, the campaign had developed its own Facebook site with a 
Youthdecidezw page “aimed at motivating and encouraging youths to effectively participate in 
the electoral processes in Zimbabwe,” (X1G Facebook). The page pitched a campaign message, 
Shape Tomorrow, Register to Vote designed to invite and challenge young people to learn about 
the importance of voting in shaping their future. The down side of-course was that most of the 
campaign’s participants, urban youths, were not the only targets the organisation wanted to 
reach. The challenges which confronted ERC in the campaign were characteristic of challenges 
that NGOs faced in trying to reach out to a young Zimbabwean population that was clearly taken 
by the mobile phone and social media but politically disinterested and uninvolved. XIG and 




9.1.2    The Voters’ Clubs model: enhancing citizen engagement through WhatsApp 
 
As much as the X1G campaign used the mobile phone to solicit feedback and encourage youth 
engagement, ERC also targeted the participation and engagement of more citizens through what 
it described as ‘Voters’ Clubs.’ The clubs were a model responding to civil society’s practice of 
conducting voter education in a top-down approach. Partly because of limited human and 
financial resources, but equally to take advantage of increasing mobile phone penetration into 
rural areas, ERC was letting the communities drive the process of educating themselves about 
voting. It was a volunteer, community-driven approach which involved peer group mobilisation. 
Ten (10)-member groups each of women, men, and youths, equipped with their own phones, 
were identified at ward75 or provincial levels, and encouraged to mobilise community peers into 
WhatsApp groups or clubs (rural groups could also use SMS because of the prevalence of 2G 
technology). Each member of the 30 transmitted messages from ERC (on voting or election 
issues, updates, alerts, questions similar to those in Table 9.1) to 10 other WhatsApp contacts in 
his own group, thus effectively multiplying the reach potential of the messages. It was therefore 
a bottom-up approach which made it easier, cheaper, quicker, and altogether more convenient to 
encourage the participation and engagement of communities in pertinent debates. The model also 
encouraged volunteer independence. Members were at liberty to expand debate on the topics 
transmitted by the NGO. The Director said collecting constituents’ mobile numbers, soliciting 
feedback, amplifying messages, organising meetings and mobilising for voter registration and 
voting, thus effectively relied on these community structures, their phones and person-to-person 
communication. The Director explained in a Skype interview on February 27, 2015, the 
multiplier and group-engagement potential of the voters’ clubs model: 
When they are engaged they share their mobile numbers, they send questions, they receive 
updates and are able to participate given the internal communal sharing of information and 
communal mobilisation, where people would say ‘Ah, so in terms of voting, on voting day, let’s 
make sure that we all go…let’s also make sure that whoever has registered is supported to come 
out and vote.’ So, those volunteers, now that we deploy our mobile applications, are people who 
then, at ward level...you probably have a coordinator who is responsible for co-ordinating the 
activities of the group of 30. The group of 30 then work with their own numbers so that they 
interact. But as they engage with each other at that level they share their contacts with the ERC 
and you ensure that the same updates that you give them relating to elections and electoral 
 
75 Wards in Zimbabwe are small administrative communities, making up districts, which in turn make up provinces. 
As noted in chapter 4, Zimbabwe has ten provinces. 
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democracy you also forward to these people and if these people have questions they can directly 
communicate with you, or through their peers 
 
Feedback from these structures was transmitted and amplified by the NGO to relevant 
government structures: councillors, MPs, Ministers or Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, 
ensuring that a communication loop was maintained between the communities and political 
leadership. Some of the issues raised by the groups were taken up on the NGO’s radio 
programmes. There was minimal influence from the NGO at levels beyond the provincial 
volunteers. Additionally, because the volunteers were using their own resources, it was only 
interest, commitment and mutual trust on their part that guaranteed the process of information 
sharing, as, without mutual trust, sharing information in such a structure could pose risks. 
 
9.1.3  Citizen election reporters 
 
But these community structures also act as multi-purpose vehicles, the most accurate sounding 
blocks on community problems. Taking care not to encroach on or duplicate the election 
observation activities of Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the NGO encouraged community 
volunteers, especially youths, in the country’s constituencies to collect and report information on 
election-related problems using their mobile phones. The NGO described the reports, of near-real 
time election updates, as citizen reports and the young people themselves as Citizen Reporters. 
ERC also targeted some of these participants to assist with surveys on election issues. Instead of 
deploying election observers, who would expect to be paid, these volunteers would respond to 
survey instruments (questionnaires) through their phones in addition to sending the organisation 
election updates. The same telephone number used by the X1G and voters’ clubs’ campaigns 
was used by the ‘citizen reporters’ to SMS or WhatsApp their reports or simply make telephone 
inquiries. Using the mobile details of the inquirer, the organisation would communicate back to 
them directly or use bulk SMS/WhatsApp to inform more constituents. The ERC Director 
explained in the Skype interview of February 27, 2015 how using the mobile phone can help 
rationalize costs and solicit instantaneous feedback from citizen observers. 
Rather than deploying electoral observers, whom you pay, you simply send a question to a group 
through the phone, a group that is on location, where a by election, for instance, is 
happening…and you will get responses…You know communities voluntarily give you 
information…’these are the things that are happening during the pre-election period. This is 
what was happening as I was voting...this is how the people have taken the results…”  
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During 2013’s Constitutional Referendum, and the elections themselves, the NGO mobilised all 
three campaigns, deploying accredited observers, Voters’ Clubs members and citizen monitors in 
the constituencies, all using mobile phones to co-ordinate, transmit their reports and receive 
feedback. Figure 9.3 is a screenshot of communication from citizen reporters to ERC during the 
July 2013 elections. I have blocked the mobile numbers of the citizen reporters to protect their 
identities, but the role of the phone in crowd sourcing the information is evident. The reports, 
sourced through SMS are either in the local Shona language or in English. Election monitoring is 
not typically ERC’s mandate but both itself and Zimbabwe Election Support Network agreed 
that because of the opaque nature of ZESN volunteer operations, citizen reporters were better 
positioned to present the ‘realities’ on the ground, especially in the more politicized areas.  
9.2  Analysis of bulk SMS to constituents and feedback texts 
 
I was unable to interact with ERC volunteers but I managed to obtain copies of bulk SMS 
distributed to constituents (Table 9.1) between June and September 2014 as well as 
SMS/WhatsApp feedback from the constituents (Table 9.2) received by ERC between 8th and 
14th July 2014. The communication ‘loop’ was important because it proved that mobile 
communication existed between the organisation and its constituents. Bulk SMS companies 
could either transmit the SMSes to NGO constituents on their behalf, or create log-ins for the 
NGOs to transmit the texts themselves. My view of the NGO’s adoption of bulk SMS was that 
not only was it a cheap means of involving their constituents (at 65cents to bulk send to over 
1000 recipients), but it achieved high distribution and message amplification and provided a 
number for feedback, both of which would encourage even greater participation. Amongst the 
receivers would be the volunteers from the other campaigns. A brief analysis of the outgoing and 
incoming texts may be useful in identifying issues promoting electoral democracy. Table 9.1 
shows messages from an original list of 22 SMS texts transmitted to constituents. Bulk SMS 
comprised a number of SMS texts containing shortened versions of information or news 
considered important for constituents. I analysed the messages using criteria which identified 
themes resonating with the NGO’s human rights and electoral democracy objectives: themes 
which included citizen’s’ rights to a vote; elected leaders’ responsibilities; the media’s role in 
electoral processes; youths and elections. The texts showed that the messages were relevant to 
the issue of electoral democracy: event reminders, citizens’ rights to demand fulfilment of 
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electoral pledges by political leaders; interrogating ZEC’s capacity to manage elections and the 
opposition’s capacity to force electoral and political changes and the importance of citizen 
participation in voting and elections. 
 
Table  9.1  SMS texts transmitted to all in ERC’s data base between June-September 2014. 
Message Date Recipients 
1. Considering that the voter turnout continues to dwindle, do you think it is important to 
continue having by-elections in Zimbabwe? 
6/6/14 All  
2. Did you know that ZTV is now AIRING LIVE Parly debates? For more info on the sitting 




3. Opposition movement's quest for democracy in Zimbabwe genuine? Just a weapon being 




4. Yesterday young people gathered at Harare gardens in Harare and demanded that 
government fulfil its election promise of 2 million jobs. 
17/6/14  
5. Parliament sittings resume today. Watch ZTV to monitor what your elected MPs say in 
parliament. 
1/7/14  
6. Do existing political parties remain viable alternatives for dismantling one party 
dominance in Zimbabwe? SMS to 0771826641 
8/7/14  
7. Workers and young people have now been reduced to a life of misery with no hope of ever 
getting decent employment, factories and industries are closing. Any solutions? 
14/7/14  
8. Is it necessary to hold elections in Zimbabwe? What is your take about the electoral 
process in Zimbabwe? 
16/7/14  
9. Is it possible to encourage people with a genuine concern for the welfare of Zim in Zanu 
PF, MDC & other parties to find each other to save Zim from a total collapse? 
17/7/14  
10. Maizviziva here kuti ikodzero yenyu kutaura zvichemo uye maonero enyu ehutungamiri 
mukugadzirisa zvikuitika munzvimbo dzenyu. (Did you know that it is your right as 
constituents to question your leadership about the needs of your constituency?) 
6/8/14  
11. President Robert Mugabe last week signed the Electoral Amendment Bill into law. 25/8/14  
12. Vamiriri veparamende vanokanganwa vimbiso dzavanoita pakutsvaga vatsigiri 
munofanirwa kuvayeuchidza zvavakataura zvisinei nekuti munotsigira bato ripi. (MPs often 
forget their electoral pledges. It is your right to remind leaders of their electoral promises 
2/9/14  
13. Sangano rionoona nezvekufambiswa kwesarudzo reZimbabwe Electoral Commission 
(Zec) ratenda kuti rakaita zvesarudzo dzegore rapera risina kugadzirira. (ZEC has admitted 
unpreparedness for last year’s elections) 
4/9/14  
 





Table 9.2  Feedback WhatsApp/SMS texts from citizens. (8-14/7/14) 
1 Our lives are in real danger with no hope we the young pple we are reaching the ages 
of 30 with no descent future we are waiting 4 God 2 intervene 
2 solution only possible with gvt revisting its policies that scare off investers 
3 My take on our country's future is an uprise and kick all the thieves out of 
parliament! This is very unfair and we are frustrated to the bone. 
4 y ind.succesfl partiz hv destroyd smaler partiz.mo formations mo confusion. 
5 Existing polical parties' relevance in reducing one part domnance has been 
scraped.the mo parties we'v the les imp they become hence their manipulation b 
6 Tudday political parties are now focusing on exposing each other’s weakness and 
mistakes instead of uniting for a cause !! 
7 No way they can remove bullying party 
8 Problem is with oposition parties which opos each other, and nw its persønal btwn 
oposition political  leaders.grand coalition is imposble and there is n 
9 I thnk existing part can form one solid opposition. 
10  Apart from that, offering balance and checks to the sitting government. Enlightment 
on political situation and other civil issues enhancing their partic 
11 Yes they are still viable altenative to dismantle one party dominance in zimbabwe 
hence the need for them to be effective with people centred idealogies. 
12 zimbabwe need a free and fare election people are behind Tsvangirai 
13 HELLO ADMN I AM (name deleted) WHO RESIDES IN REDCLIFF I 
ATTENDED ONE OF WORKSHOP IN KWEKWE YOU PROMISED US YOU 
WILL COME TO REDCLIFF SO HOW FAR HAVE GONE 
 WhatsApp code 802-026 
14 I THINK THE EXISITING POLITICAL PARTIES DO NOT HAVE THE 
STRENGHT TO DISMANTLE ONE PARTY DOMINANCE,UNLESS THEY 
FORM A COALITION 
15 Yes, Tsvangirai Can Do It. 
16 y domination (It is domination) 
17 Judging from past experience its still a walk in the dark. Opposition politicians are 
cashing on this crisis and they are not serious abt ending one part 
18 NO I THINK IF THERE WAS PROVISION FOR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT OF 
NATIONAL UNITY MAYBE WE CAN SURVIVE 
 
The responses or feedback do not all relate to the original texts from ERC shown here but the 
following are illustrative of the links between the questions and the constituents’ feedback, and 
thus the place of the phone in the process. Answers 1, 5 and 12 in Table 9.2 appear to be 
responses to comments or questions 7,5 and 6 in Table 9.1. Further analysis of feedback shows a 
mix of views relating to citizens’ understanding of the political system: ranging from a general 
mistrust of political leadership to deliver true electoral democracy, through youths considering 
themselves victims of the absence of political participation; disappointment with the opposition’s 
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failure to push change; demands for free and fair elections, to a suggestion for an uprising to 
push political change. Overall, the public’s responses show an understanding of issues affecting 
their participation in politics. 
 
The screenshot in Figure 9.1 shows comments from citizens who were monitoring the voting 
process for constitutional change between March 16 and 17, 2013. Most observations are short, 
simple and reporting events in real time. Because the reporters’ numbers would have appeared 
on ERC’s dedicated feedback line, and because the reports appear specific to polling stations, the 
NGO would have been able to map incidents of irregularities easily. I had to block off the users’ 
telephone numbers to protect them from being identified. 
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Figure 9.1  Screenshot of citizen observer comments on March 16/17, 2013.
 
9.3  Risks and challenges 
 
In the discussions with the Director and advocacy officer several areas of risk and challenges 
emerged. The most significant is the constant antagonism between government on one hand and 
216 
 
ERC and its partner Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) on the other. The NGOs 
criticise government for failing to reform the electoral landscape. Government on its part accuses 
the two of carrying an agenda to destabilise the political environment, in ZESN’s case, of 
interfering with election results while ERC staff have been harassed for undermining the voter 
education process. The constant antagonism has created an environment where the NGOs are 
constantly in fear of arrests, and sometimes of using media that could land them in trouble. The 
discussion which follows looks specifically at areas or sources associated with using mobile 
communication. 
 
The first relates to reports from citizen reporters. The Director said there were challenges with 
citizen reports. Because the reporters had no information sourcing or reporting skills they ran the 
risk of transmitting inaccurate or uncorroborated reports. Such reports would give the state 
ammunition to accuse civil society of deliberate lies or exaggerations. To obviate this weakness 
ERC was, from the end of 2015, collaborating with other NGOs, but specifically MISA, to have 
their volunteer citizen reporters trained in basic reporting and mobile communication skills. The 
structure of the training programme for citizen reporting is discussed in the next section, as an 
example of collaborative efforts amongst the human rights NGOs.  
 
The second source of risks relates to vulnerabilities with the mobile phone and other digital 
platforms. On February 2, 2015, the Director gave me a detailed account of NGO fears 
associated with deploying mobile phones and other digital platforms, and what he was 
encouraging his staff to do to obviate the dangers. ZPP and other NGOs expressed similar 
concerns. 
There are vulnerabilities about using the mobile phone. There is no way an organisation or an 
individual can use these new mobile technologies without worrying about the insecurities that 
have come with the mobile phone. For instance, at the office level, in terms of providing 
adequate security, people should not access their e-mail, work e-mails, on their phone. It’s not 
safe. People must be able to have passwords; that’s a must in terms of all mobile phones. Three, 
the use of the vault, in terms of storing critical and important information. Four, we have worked 
with Kenyan experts around how you can actually delete information if you feel that you are in a 
situation where you feel the information can be vulnerable on your mobile phone. We have 
actually had to include security, training data security, whenever we do engage: one, with our 




Deep-seated concern over possible e-mail hacking by state agents has also persuaded not just 
ERC but other NGOs to migrate their email from Yahoo and Hotmail domains to Google, which 
they believe to be more robust. There was also concern that local domains for webmail, such as 
M-Web and Ecoweb, lacked robustness and could be hacked or accessed easily. Or the 
businesses they worked with to transmit their bulk SMS could be intimidated and compromised 
by state agents, an issue that I discuss in some detail below as another area of risk. 
 
The owner of the bulk SMS company that I interviewed on July 11, 2014, indicated that because 
of its small size the company feels vulnerable and seeks to protect its business by avoiding 
confrontation with government. That can happen if it is seen to have distributed SMS that may 
be considered undesirable by government. To protect its business, the company may censor 
NGO SMS content. He said this could be done by building a ‘firewall’ which filters specific 
SMS content, instead of following the standard practice of allocating NGOs self- log-in codes (in 
which case the bulk SMS company loses control of the content going out). Alternatively, it can 
be selective about which NGOs to accept business from. Some human rights NGOs are viewed 
to be “Political” and therefore risky and to be avoided, no matter the attractiveness of their 
business. Deleting client data bases, or avoiding keeping the data altogether, is another strategy 
to avoid confrontation with the state, in case the company is forced to give up such information. 
The owner explained in the interview: 
We choose our clients with caution. I love the money (but) at times when I look at a client, there 
are clients I don’t go out looking for business from...like your Politics guys and all that. 
Certainly they have got the numbers…..they can easily get the funding to do a campaign and 
things like that but I don’t wannna be found in the wrong side of things, so I always try not to get 
them on board…..I am still very young and I have young kids...Would I want to die for $10 
thousand…?Its money that I wouldn’t pick up but you know… I walk away. At the same time you 
also asked me about how we get people’s names...how do we get their numbers?...how we get 
data bases of the SMS recipients…? We have a lot of people who come asking ‘We would like 
your data base of recipients...’ We deliberately don’t have one because we may not be able to 
stand up and defend that data base. 
  
Ultimately, I interpreted this form of control to be a form of co-ercion from the state, but could 
not determine if collusion with the state was also involved. Implicit in the comments is also fear 
of attracting physical harm. I also concluded that the bulk SMS ban by the Posts and 
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Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe on July 25, 2013,76 following NGOs’ 
alleged abuse of the medium by sending or receiving alleged subversive messages, was a 
significant factor in the company’s decision to censor the transmission process. 
 
The fourth area of risk arose from ERC’s attempts to use the Ushahidi platform in 2013. 
Towards the July elections, the NGO implemented a project which encouraged citizen reporters 
to text or phone in observations about the voting process using the Ushahidi and Frontline SMS 
platforms which the organisation had set up. The reporters were given codes, each of which 
translated to an observation of the election or voting process. The reporters would send SMS or 
WhatsApp texts to ERC mobile numbers advertised on its website and linked with the Ushahidi 
and Frontline platforms at the NGO’s offices. After identifying the polling station from which 
they were texting, the citizen reporters would text the observation codes which ERC would then 
feed into its system and project the results on a live map, itself in turn uploaded in real time on 
the ERC website. Unless the system was hacked, only ERC could trace the phone numbers from 
which the observations/codes originated, thus protecting the participants’ identities. Trials 
conducted a day before the elections were successful, supporting the deployment of the platform 
on July 31, 2013, election day.  
 
The Director believes the trials may however have been monitored by state agents. Late on the 
eve of elections the website crashed and the Director and two staff were arrested. This was the 
second arrest of ERC staff and volunteers, following one in mid-May when three volunteers, 
Moses Chikora, Farai Saungweme and Wadzanai Nyakudya had been arrested and charged with 
contravening section 40(c)(1)(g) of the Electoral Act. The section prohibits voter education by 
any institution or individual without the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s permission. ERC 
believes that the system crash may have been an attempt by state agents to either completely 
disable the NGO’s election monitoring, or an attempt to hack into the institution’s data base. 
While the organisation managed to salvage most of the data/information, it is not 100% certain 
that some of the information was not compromised. It also appeared that the system crash and 
the arrest of staff were not coincidence and may have been designed to intimidate not just ERC 
 
76  Kubatana.net announced on 25 and 26 July that POTRAZ had instructed Mobile network operators to stop using 
international gateways from delivering bulk SMS. Kubatana, which introduced SMS in 2007, had successfully used 
the platform to deliver election news in the 2008 elections. 
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but other NGOs during the elections. An incident quoted in the Herald of July 31, 2013 
publicizing details of bank accounts and bank transfers of funds from European organisations to 
ZESN and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, might have appeared un-related, but the Director 
suggested the three incidents could have been linked and designed to intimidate NGOs. 
9.4  Networks and collaborations as protection tools 
 
Discussions in the other case studies have identified collaborations as a key element in enhancing 
NGO efforts to protect human rights. Getting communities to understand governance weaknesses 
in their localities is one way of mobilising citizens to defend or demand their civic rights. This 
was one of the reasons why ERC solicited MISA support in running a citizen reporters’ training 
programme, an outline of whose contents is shown in Table 9.3 ‘MISA Citizen Journalism 
Training Workshop’. The request, made in an email on November 25, 2015 is quite detailed 
about the objective of the programme. The community reporters were meant to develop 
competences in using digital media to investigate and write about community programmes ideal 
for promoting transparency, good governance and democracy as well as to ensure their own 
security. They would also discus cybersecurity laws. The email indicated that the community 
news products and information sources would not only “… increase their (communities) access 
to alternative media and information on local governance issues.,” but would empower 
community members to engage with their local leaders as well as speak with their own voice. I 
noted that the journalists were being drawn from 14 of the country’s volatile districts: Chipinge, 
Mutasa, Mutare, Silobela, Gweru, Umzingwane, Hurungwe, Chikomba, Hwedza, Sanyati, 
















Who is a citizen journalist, citizen journalism best practices, ethical 
issues in dealing with citizen journalists and their content and the latest 
digital media tools for citizen and professional journalists to achieve 
more exciting and interactive media content. (MISA) 
Use of traditional 
media 
How to gather, analyse, report and disseminate relevant news and 
information. (MISA) 
Crowd sourcing How to safely gather, analyse, report and disseminate relevant news and 
information using digital media (MISA) 
Social Media activism How to spur conversation on local governance issues and use social 
media as an advocacy tool for enhanced transparency and accountability 
in local governance. (MISA) 
Practicals (Including 
story development) 
Exhibiting skills in Blogging, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp (MISA) 
Communication skills Getting acquainted on the various ways of communication (ERC) 
Cyber Security and 
Safety 
Ensuring safety of citizen journalists in gathering stories and reporting 
(ERC) 
 
Networking with other NGOs like ZLHR and Zimbabwe Women Lawyers results in enhanced 
protection for the organisation’s staff and volunteers. This study has quoted the example of 
ZLHR lawyers representing the NGO’s staff on several occasions. ERC staff and citizen election 
reporters, like many other HRDs, also have access to MISA and Digital Society of Zimbabwe’s Digital 
Security Guide and the ZLHR’s two handbooks, ABCs’ and Guide for Enforced Disappearances. In 
addition, two more of the country’s top legal watchdogs, Veritas Zimbabwe, and the Centre for 
Applied Legal Research (CALR), have developed mobile applications, freely downloadable from 
Google Play Store, and containing details of Zimbabwe’s Constitution and human rights. 
CALR’s Human rights Guide is a synopsised version of the country’s human rights while 
Veritas’ application synthesises Zimbabwe’s Constitution (incorporating the human rights). 
Running them as mobile applications makes them ideal and handy tools for HRDs as they 
navigate security traps and barriers daily. But the guides are also ideal for lawyers, academics, 
students, and even ordinary citizens, who may want to make references online while outside their 
normal operating environments. 
9.5  Conclusion 
 
Amongst important issues this Chapter has canvassed are ERC’s strategy to harness the power of 
the link between digital media and youths to push voting and electoral democracy issues. The 
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NGO’s three key campaigns seek to involve young people in activities that expose them to issues 
of citizen political rights, of voter education and electoral transparency. The mobile phone is 
used in three ways: to engage with electoral issues through radio broadcasts and mobile 
community activities, to facilitate voter education and to monitor elections. The phone has thus 
become ERC’s most actively deployed communication tool and WhatsApp and SMS its most 
trusted applications for citizen engagement. The NGO recognizes that radio, though a traditional 
mass medium, has tremendous power to complement mobile communications. In an environment 
where direct, open engagement with the populace is curtailed, and yet citizens need to 
understand their electoral rights, ERC is using digital media to find ways of opening up 


























10.  Introduction 
 
By exploring the experiences of some human rights NGOs, the aim of this study was to explore 
the potential of mobile phones in facilitating the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe’s 
restrictive environment. The country’s human rights NGOs have been among the most vocal 
institutions in criticising the country’s poor human rights and democracy record and this study 
aimed to explore how they were using mobile phones to challenge the state’s role in the abuses. 
To respond to the research questions, the study sought respondents’ perspectives on several 
issues. For example, why were the NGOs adopting mobile phones as opposed to other digital 
media? What affordances did mobile phones offer? What was the orientation and commitment of 
volunteers towards human rights issues? How were the NGOs using mobile phones to empower 
the volunteers to contest the abuses? Were there unique uses of mobile phones amongst the case 
studies, and if so what were the points of uniqueness? What was their relevance? How prevalent 
was the use of WhatsApp, SMS, and other applications?  
 
The study also aimed to explore the perspectives of the NGOs and activists on the impact of 
critical legislative, political, and administrative impediments on mobile phone use. What risks 
and challenges did the state pose that inhibited the use of the devices? What coping mechanisms 
were the NGOs and HRDs employing against a strategy deploying violence, surveillance, 
interception, and censorship tactics? One of the strategies to protect human rights is to mobilise 
networks, alliances, and collaborative arrangements, and in this respect the study sought to 
establish how mobile phones were fostering these relationships to protect human rights. How 
were reports, the outcomes of mobile phone deployment, supporting or enhancing NGO lobby 
and advocacy campaigns?  
 
One of the notions against which the questions and objectives were framed is that of ‘liberation 
technologies’ and their capacity to promote democracy, empower citizens, promote free 
expression, and deepen citizens’ participation in political and social interactions (Diamond, 
2010; Zicardi, 2013; Manacorda and Tesei, 2016). They were also framed against the (counter) 
argument that these technologies can also become tools for repression in the hands of 
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authoritarian states (MacKinnon, 2010,2012; Howard, 2011). This argument becomes more 
relevant when it is viewed against observations that even leading democracies like the United 
States and United Kingdom, were also trying to control cyberspace even as they, through leaders 
like Hilary Clinton, (2010) championed internet freedom.  
10.1 Factors influencing mobile phone deployment 
 
Responding to the question why NGOs were deploying mobile phones as opposed to other 
digital media, this study has identified several factors which influence the deployment. 
Zimbabwe’s human rights NGOs have been proscribed from public media spaces by the state, 
leaving them little option but to adopt digital media and outreach activities to interact with their 
constituents and remain relevant. ERC was using private radio stations, which have limited 
national reach, because national radio ostracises them. Respondents expressed fear about the 
constrictive nature of media laws, which could only be circumvented by adopting alternative 
communication platforms. But deployment is also influenced by connectivity (internet and 
mobile phone), gender, age and literacy levels of activists, financial capacity of both NGOs and 
activists and the affordances accorded by the mobile phones’ technical functionalities.  
 
Zimbabwe’s experiences with telecommunications growth are similar to those of other 
developing countries where state financial incapacity has led to landline infrastructural 
obsolescence and mobile phone infrastructure has taken over (Raine and Wellman, 2012:88; 
Aker and Mbiti, 2010:208). Chapter 4 suggests disparities in access to ICTs between urban and 
rural populations and gender and age groups despite the seemingly high mobile penetration77. 
The findings suggest that urban populations, youths and males have greater access to mobile 
phones, compared to rural populations and women. These inequalities are more acute in remote 
areas which, incidentally, also reported some of the highest incidences of violations notably 
during the 2008 elections: districts in Midlands, Mashonaland and Manicaland provinces. ZPP 
and MISA volunteer reports confirm these observations. It is also instructive that with respect to 
violence there also appears to be some link between voting patterns and election violence in 
these provinces. The highest votes for the ruling party in 2013 came from provinces which had 
 
77 Posts and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe reported in 2016 that Zimbabwe had over 90% 
mobile penetration while 84% of rural households had access to a mobile device. 
224 
 
experienced the highest levels of violence in 2008, suggesting that the post-2008 election 
violence was the catalyst for the high 2013 votes.  
 
Distinct patterns emerged in relation to gender, age, education, and levels of mobile activism 
amongst the volunteers and other human rights defenders (HRDs), but overall, they do not 
appear to detract from the increasing adoption of the mobile phone by groups across all the case 
studies. The gender and ages of ZPP volunteers vary widely but middle-aged women dominate 
the mix in rural areas. This is in slight contrast to ERC and MISA volunteers and OAUS 
activists, who, although of both genders, are on the whole young. This research may not have 
interacted with ERC’s volunteers or constituents directly, but analysis of its three key campaigns 
points to the use of digital media, complemented by the traditional medium of radio as a strategy 
designed to involve the youth in reaching out to other youths and the wider adult constituency. 
The pattern of young, high-school-educated, and mixed-gender activists evident in the MISA and 
ERC cases suggests a strategy of ‘recruiting’ people who are more responsive to new 
technologies, something that Tufte et al (2012:7) also discovered in their studies of East African 
youths. Young people’s capability for mobile activism is enhanced because their age and 
education levels give them greater ability to learn and innovate with new technologies (Tufte et 
al.,2012; Basson, 2009:137 and Dralega, 2009 in Mudhai et al, 2009:125-140). Given this 
pattern, it can be argued that these NGOs’ philosophy is being built around using digital media 
technologies to empower youths to push for the democratisation of electoral, media, information, 
and political processes.  
 
The distinctive involvement of female volunteers, particularly middle-aged women, in rural 
communities in the case of ZPP appears to be consistent with gender ratios amongst rural 
populations in that even though they are less skilled in the use of mobile phones, the female 
population is higher and their gender is more involved in community and household activities.  
There are more women heading households in rural areas than men, carrying out most of the 
physical chores while males are in towns. Additionally, historically, rural populations have 
fortified liberation movements and have remained the haunts of ZANU PF for power retention 
(Kriger, 2003; Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). In the process women became more violated 
(RAU, 2009, 2013; HR NGO Forum, 2011; Mashiri, 2013:95). However, it is important to point 
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out that ZPP violations reports for 2015/2016 indicate that more male citizens were targeted than 
females, but at the same time they were also worse offenders than their female counterparts (ZPP 
Reports, 2015/16). 
 
Another argument from participants is that mobile phones are cheaper and more efficient to 
adopt. Network coverage maps from the three operators presented in Chapter 4 support this 
point. Particularly important though is the fact that mobile phones have reduced travel and 
communication costs, enhancing the potential of the organisations to reach out to their 
constituents. Programmes that in the past required the physical presence of co-ordinators in rural 
communities to plan, could now be planned and co-ordinated by phone, resulting in greater 
potential for the organisations to address human rights issues. One MISA officer stressed these 
points, while the increasing deployment of WhatsApp and bulk SMS by all the institutions to 
disseminate information also reinforces the point. These developments however do not detract 
from the fact that volunteers themselves still find costs prohibitive because of insufficient 
personal financial resources. 
 
Yet another argument related to some of the technology’s affordances, a point which also links to 
that about affordability: MISA and ZPP volunteers refer to the compactness of the new phone 
models, especially given the need to keep them discreetly hidden on the person when making 
recordings. Participants also found the devices’ capacity to accommodate multiple converging 
media significant for managing diverse situations. For example, when the phone’s radio becomes 
a useful news source when the activist is in the field, or, in extreme cases, when the phone’s 
flashlight is a convenience at night. Community journalists used personal phones, in similar 
range of capabilities, although several indicated they could not afford the latest models. Phones 
with cameras and WhatsApp capabilities are necessary, even if using some of the functions was 
inhibited by poor connectivity in remote areas. These phone capabilities make the volunteers’ 
work easier, and the quality of reports and stories considerably better.  
 
For activists, the most increasingly significant affordance is thus the device’s accommodation or 
hosting of the WhatsApp application. Since its introduction in the country in 2010, WhatsApp 
has become the dominant service for the case studies as indeed for other NGOs in the country. 
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Because of its affordability, user friendliness- as embodied in instantaneous two-way 
communication, multi-contact messaging- and accommodation of multi-media functionalities 
WhatsApp has outstripped SMS and email to become the application of choice for activists and 
ordinary citizens. Functionalities which involve WhatsApp using the Internet to make calls and 
send text messages, images, videos, user location and audio messages in real-time at no cost 
(Chiridza et al, 2016:46; Church and de Oliveira,2013:352) have become ideal for capturing 
evidence of human rights violations, and ZPP smartphones evidenced this. ERC also highlights 
the use of WhatsApp in voter education, OAUS activists in calling for lawyer intervention and 
MISA journalists in managing the newsletter production and distribution processes. 
10.2  Volunteerism, empowerment and human rights protection 
 
Another significant observation relates to volunteerism and how it empowers activists, in the end 
impacting human rights protection. NGO reliance on volunteers is fully evident across the four 
cases, suggesting their centrality and importance in the human rights contest. ZPP relies on 
community monitors; MISA on young community or ‘citizen’ journalists; ERC on young citizen 
election reporters and voters’ club members held together by peer relationships and ZLHR on its 
own Secretariat lawyers and others volunteering from around the country. Reasons for the 
NGOs’ heavy reliance on volunteers include constraints imposed by laws which restrict the 
movement of NGO staff and activists, lack of knowledge of local cultural and political contexts, 
limited resources because of the small sizes and limited budgets of the NGOs vis-a-vis the large 
numbers of target constituents and, finally, political polarisation in the communities. Some of 
these issues have the potential to pose risks for NGO staff, who, as outsiders, are unfamiliar with 
navigating local politics. 
 
From interactions with interviewees, I concluded that volunteerism is pillared on creativity, 
courage, conviction, dedication, and commitment. Including committing personal time and 
resources in pursuit of justice and peace for the communities. These are some of the qualities that 
Nah et al (2013:407) and the Office of High Commissioner for Human rights (OCHR,2004) see 
as defining strong human rights defenders. Barry (2011, cited in Nah et al, 2013:407) contends 
that for many HRDs, human rights work is deeply personal and therefore requires commitment. 
The examples of the ZPP monitor who sells off her livestock to raise transport money, or MISA 
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journalists who undertake long journeys on very low allowances, epitomise the traits of 
Zimbabwean volunteers and exactly what OHCHR acknowledges. The problem however, is that 
perpetrators are aware of these depths of commitment and tend to exploit them by launching 
physical and psychological attacks on the activists or their families.  
 
The final observation about volunteerism relates to volunteer autonomy and bonding and their 
impact on phone use. Volunteers have independence and autonomy, which implies the need for 
mutual trust between themselves and the organisations, as well as amongst themselves. Although 
the evidence from my investigations can-not claim to be conclusive, (especially in respect of 
ERC where volunteers were not interviewed), volunteerism may be responsible for facilitating 
bonds amongst the HRDs which make the work of the mobile phone that much more effective. 
Despite the separation from head office, the communication afforded by the phone still inspires 
some feelings of camaraderie, confidence and bonding that resemble those engendered by 
interactions in close proximity, office set-ups. Such bonding enhances feelings of security and 
safety and results in better output. In the case of MISA journalists, bonds of mutual trust form 
among the team members, in some cases overlapping into relationships with community 
broadcast journalists in the same constituencies, leading to the sharing of news and information. 
The Chipinge teams provide a relevant example. The journalist who took the image of the 
burning Green Fuels truck is from the community radio project and shared the picture with 
newsletter colleagues, who in turn shared it with daily papers. In the case of ERC voters’ club 
members, the way WhatsApp group co-ordinators cascade information to their peers, and 
negotiate issues to debate further amongst themselves, suggest that this is only possible where 
bonds of mutual trust exist amongst group members. In this case, peer relations engender such 
trust because the activists know each other closely. I argue that these examples point to the 
mobile phone being a tool that promotes the empowerment of volunteers, helping them surmount 
constraints imposed by embeddedness, facilitating bonding amongst them, creating options that 
allow them to work independently and yet within the organisational frameworks. 
10.3 Disseminating messages 
 
In terms of disseminating their messages the case studies appear to be following a two-pronged 
approach to maximise their reach. One strand is to adopt multiple digital platforms which allows 
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for the same mobile images, audio and videos to be shared on NGOs’ websites and social media 
platforms. It is an approach common in all the cases, and undoubtedly amongst most NGOs in 
the country. The other approach is to adopt a mix of new ICT platforms and traditional media, as 
in the case of ERC which uses WhatsApp, website, other social media platforms and the 
traditional mass medium of radio. A second example is ZLHR’s use of the digital media 
platforms and the Legal Monitor, a traditional mass medium, but clearly also one of the 
institution’s strongest human rights advocacy tools. The Legal Monitor’s million plus print-run 
per year translates to a potential readership of 5 million. The use of the mobile phone images in 
that publication is likely to have a significant impact amongst rural communities, where some 
may relate to the pictures, or they can read and develop a greater appreciation of citizen’s rights 
and the tribulations of human rights defenders. Although it is not one of the case studies, 
Kubatana has shown other Zimbabwean NGOs that its success in human rights activism has 
hinged on continual experimentation with digital media as much as in adopting a media mix of 
email, bulk SMS, blogs, internet, ‘Freedom’ radio broadcast (Atwood and Clark, 2010) and 
lately, WhatsApp. Bulk SMS is a particularly important platform, because, as its name implies, it 
is used when targeting large numbers of news recipients because of the low costs of 
transmission. Due to the limited characters in the medium’s format, bulk SMS contents are 
synthesised versions of what the NGOs believe is important news for their constituents, and it 
appears ideal for transmitting alerts. It is therefore an important activism tool for NGOs. 
Mabweazara’s (2011), study of mobile phone dynamics in Zimbabwean journalism practices also 
highlights the reliance human rights NGOs had on SMS to transmit alerts to journalists.  
 
Studies by Mattoni and Trere (2014) about the relationship between social movements and media 
practices help put this phenomenon into perspective further. The authors contend that one 
weakness with our understanding of social movement media uses is that literature rarely explores 
how mainstream media and alternative or digital media can talk to each other when they are used 
at the same time and for one actor (ibid,254). Our fixation is with a one-medium or one-
technology analysis, which discounts the fact that in movements uses are influenced by actors’ 
backgrounds, contexts as well as connections between the technologies. Drawing on the concepts 
of mediation and mediatization- the first expressing activist media practices which include media 
productions, media circulation, media interpretation and media recirculation (Mattoni and Trere, 
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2014:260 citing Couldry,2008), the second explaining broadly the role of multiple media 
technologies in shaping the practices of the movements- the authors argue that modern and old 
media can be used to complement or support each other to serve the interests of both the activist 
and the message recipients. That does not necessarily hold for social movements only. The 
choice of which platforms to place their images or videos on by the case studies is deliberate as 
the platforms have different readerships, different shelf lives and invoke different modes of 
interactivity with targets, who themselves emerge from different experiences. The social 
networking sites are accessed by activists and those with internet while radio and print media 
like the Legal Monitor can, additionally, claim rural audiences/readership. 
 
Kelvin Maenzanise of Zimbabwe Election Support Network emphasised the media-mix approach 
when he proposed in an interview on September 30, 2014 “…a synchronization of new ICTs and 
traditional media so that you reach all the possible constituents.” Tabani Moyo of MISA argued 
similarly, that a ‘communication mix’ strategy would motivate linkages within various media 
whose effect ultimately is to democratise information. Democratisation of information is the 
ultimate goal of this NGO and its activists, thus its media practices target to achieve it. The ‘mix’ 
strategy is of-course not unique, having been tested elsewhere on the continent. Herman 
Wasserman (2005; 2007) and Sarah Chiumbu (2012) made similar recommendations after 
separately researching the use of multiple communication platforms by South African social 
movements in HIV and eviction campaigns. Both concluded that a mix of platforms, more so 
when applied within local and international contexts, yields better results than if single platforms 
were employed. 
10.4  A tool for co-ordinating, documenting and reporting 
 
This section critiques findings on use of the mobile phone in co-ordination, documentation, 
moderation and reporting, drawing relevant comparisons and contrasts where necessary. Across 
all cases, internal staff tend to use smartphones, which, because of their improved functionalities 
and affordances, are more ideal for co-ordinating, documenting and reporting compared to other 
types of mobile phones. ZPP volunteers too rely on the latest mobile phones because of the 
instruments’ compatibility with the circumvention platform used by the NGO to monitor 
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violations78. Across the cases co-ordination also appears to rely on WhatsApp, voice calls and 
emails because of their dominant use. Even over weekends when NGO staff engage in social 
networking, that too overlaps and moves into formal communication, where staff co-ordinate the 
coming week’s programmes. 
 
State accountability is fundamentally easier to demand when it is challenged with evidence thus 
documenting is a key objective of institutions monitoring violence or other forms of repression 
(Welch, 1995). This study shows that for ZPP the mobile phone is ideal for documenting 
evidence of violence and then representing that evidence in alerts, monthly reports, maps and 
statistics, pictures, videos, and audio testimonies. The wide array of evidence formats, which 
sometimes supplement, complement, or corroborate each other, present strong, compelling 
justification for interventions. Presenting the evidence on the NGO’s website and social media 
platforms multiplies its reach and, in the process, strengthens its potential for influencing 
domestic and international opinion on the human rights situation. The UN High Commission for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR, 2001) contends that documentation provides evidence which can be 
left as a record for posterity. ZPP reports from 2002 can still be used to identify perpetrators of 
violence sixteen years later. Orentlicher (1991,2007:11) argues that one way for transitional 
societies to protect human rights is to make certain that those from past regimes who were 
responsible for the worst violations answer for their transgressions. This is obviously possible if 
records of those violations have been kept. Orentlicher’s argument is echoed by the ZPP director 
when she says her organisation believes all perpetrators should be made accountable for their 
transgressions, as her own case proves in Section 6.7.1. 
 
For MISA evidence recorded by journalists during interviews or at various events, is represented 
in newsletter stories, alerts, and occasional special publications. MISA insists on documented 
evidence from community journalists because this gives credibility to the information and news 
appearing in newsletters. As with the outcomes in ZPP and ZLHR’s cases, the evidence can be 
used to challenge injustice from elites or to promote development. It can also be used to 
influence national policy review, as the Green Fuels example illustrates. Newsletters could 
 
78  It has been noted that ZPP has replaced the 2013 Huawei Y100 model with the Huawei Y336, which by 2016/ 
2017 was amongst top phone brands in the country. 
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further provide evidence which compels responses from the local elite in the form of the 
introduction of alternative media. In the process media space is opened for wider community 
involvement. Local and regional papers following up leads or evidence from community 
journalists, as in the examples of the Mail and Guardian and Newsday, also act as endorsements 
of the potential of the community journalists and their media tools. 
 
Plans by ERC to have citizen reporters trained in story writing, digital security and social media 
use suggest that the NGO also considers mobile phone-based evidence as a vital component of 
election-related and governance reports. In the case of ZLHR, information collected from hotline 
calls may be critical in immediate interventions, in follow-up litigations, in evidencing stories for 
the Legal Monitor or Annual Reports as well as in HRD education and training. Essentially in 
producing a body of information which can be used to challenge the inadequacies and injustices 
of the governing system. It can be concluded that at the heart of the various documenting and 
reporting efforts by the four NGOs is the need to produce reports, human rights guides, 
community stories and various other documents which accurately reflect the human rights 
situation in the country.  
 
Related to documentation, or indeed as an element of that process, is the role of the phone in 
verifying or moderating reports whose contents are not fully trusted. Verification guarantees 
authenticity and reliability of the information gathering process, and ultimately of the reports and 
the organisations themselves. Moderation is evident in ZPP and MISA documentation and 
reporting processes and inferred in ERC processes which involve using reports from citizen 
election reporters. Moderation thus appears common among NGOs involved in various forms of 
monitoring and highlights a common objective amongst the organisations: that they want to be 
viewed as sources of objective and reliable information. NGO drives to produce impeccable, 
unquestionable reports reflect the spirit guiding the UN High Commission for Human Rights, 
that effective human rights monitoring must be built on accuracy, precision, impartiality, 
objectivity, sensitivity, integrity, and professionalism (UNHCHR Training Manual, 2001). There 
are of course problems with achieving this high goal. These include inadequate technical and 
financial resources by volunteers and the NGOs to verify, threats from the political system and in 
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some cases lack of impartiality where monitors may have been direct victims of violations 
themselves.   
10.5   Enhancing constituents and HRD security through alerts and warnings. 
 
The study also shows that the mobile phone’s role in monitoring violations enhances 
constituents’ safety through the issuing of alerts and various forms of warnings. For volunteers 
and other types of HRDs, the phone may be a tool for daily social interaction (a lifestyle 
instrument) but, as Best (cited in Poblet,2011:24) suggests it can also act as a lifeline in times of 
danger. For elderly female volunteers particularly, the device functions as inconspicuously, as 
discreetly and as invisibly as the monitors themselves attempt to be covert in their communities. 
The adaptability of the device compels volunteers to develop an intimate understanding of its 
functional capabilities, how it can be manipulated to give the users the best possible results 
without exposing themselves to risks. It also means that when it is used in monitoring violence in 
the communities, the device becomes a vehicle through which both constituents and volunteers 
can be assured of their safety and security. Michael Best’s example of the phone’s use as a 
lifeline may refer to conflict situations, but it does not detract a comparison with the device’s 
similar use in Zimbabwe’s repressed environment. With respect to elderly female volunteers, and 
how Zimbabwean culture defers to age and gender, the findings appear to suggest that the 
deference may in-fact create better opportunities for monitoring at the same time that the practice 
also assures the volunteers of personal security. 
 
The element of facilitating safety and security through alerts and warnings is evident in at least 
three of the cases:  ZPP volunteers use the phone to flag the movement of violators, or to make 
distress calls relating to their own safety; MISA journalists’ use the device to flag hot spots to 
avoid and activists from other NGOs send distress calls to ZLHR hotlines or other NGOs. There 
is evidence of even more direct use of the phone in initiating network intervention that saves the 
life of ZPP’s Matebeleland monitor. The device’s use in these contexts finds support from 
Howard (2011:117), Mashingaidze (2016) and Mann’s (2003;2004) studies, which suggest this 
type of technology can be a powerful tool for surveillance. When it is used in observing and 
reporting the movement of perpetrators, the phone’s function loosely approximates that of 
Mann’s (2003, 2004) “sousveillance” technology, a device used by the underdog to surveille the 
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elite. Fernback (2013:14) suggests that the power of sousveillance lies in the fact that instead of 
casting the weak as victims, it casts them as challengers to those who have concentrated the 
power to surveille. In other words, under sousveillance, the phone can be viewed as a tool that 
helps empower the weak to resist the abuse of power by the strong.  
 
The phone’s use in facilitating NGOs to issue early warnings, often relating to food shortages-
sent as bulk SMS- or violator movements, finds support in Joseph Brock’s (2012) exposition of 
how early response and early warning systems work. Brock contends that involving locals- 
including community leadership and organisations-helps reduce the impact of violent 
perpetrations. Local involvement makes the systems people-centred and potentially more 
successful in violence prevention than if non-local actors were involved. He suggests further that 
the system should also use timely communication and appropriate channels or platforms. Like a 
few other authors he too gives the example of Kenya where SMS texts (Goldstein and 
Rotich,2008, Heacock, 2009; Meier, 2013) cumulated by the Ushahidi platform became the 
source of national warnings and appeals for peace in 2007-8. 
 
For ZPP the issue of monitor safety is also so critical that the NGO even uses measures of 
consistency in phone interaction between head office and the volunteers to assess the latter’s 
personal safety. Inconsistent results become warnings. The study suggests that the measures have 
resulted in new phone uses or the emergence of what I may describe as new meanings or 
‘communication codes’ peculiar only to the organisation. The meanings are different from the 
pre-negotiated beeps and missed calls referred to by the Director, and are reminiscent of 
Donner’s instrumental language (2007:6-7). Because monitor silence, or inconsistencies in report 
submissions are interpreted by the organisation in terms of threats to the monitor’s life, 
disruptions within the community or financial or technical (mobile phone) challenges for the 
monitor, they become warnings, with grave implications for human rights. Silence thus translates 
into a particular ‘language’, with specific meaning only for ZPP and not any other NGO. Even 
the NGO’s response to ‘phone silence’ or non-submission of reports- of deploying a supervisor 
to investigate- is much more involved than its response to ‘call-me-backs’ or ‘beeps.’ The ZLHR 
study shows a similar language-use phenomenon, although in this case it is about pre-negotiated 
instrumental language involving ‘phone rings’ and ‘texts’, although again used and understood 
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only by hotline managers and OAUS activists. This form of mobile communication is different 
to that of ‘phone silence’. Whatever interpretation may be given to the phenomena, it appears 
violations monitoring has led to NGOs developing unique phone uses and coping mechanisms 
designed to ensure greater safety for their staff, volunteers and constituents.  
10.6  The hotline as a tool for protection, seeking justice and accountability. 
 
Foregoing sections have acknowledged the use of the hotline along with other mobile phones, 
but in this section, I argue that findings suggest a unique role in protecting, seeking justice and 
accountability. Several Zimbabwean CSOs use hotlines, but none appears to command the 
attention that the ZLHR facility does amongst HRDs. It is one of the activists’ last lines of 
defense against state harassment and intimidation. OAUS activist submissions suggest the 
hotline acts as a barrier against abuse of the law and injustice. Its deployment and that of other 
media to intervene in cases of illegal detentions, arrests or abductions force law enforcement and 
judicial systems to respect the rule of law, follow fair judicial processes and, ultimately, 
democracy. To the extent that the facility almost always responds to distress, it also attempts to 
guarantee HRDs and other citizens their rights to free movement, free assembly, free association, 
and free speech. In this respect, the resource is therefore an indicator to victims that they have 
access and recourse to a tool which links them to a free legal system which can assist them 
demand their (citizens’) rights. At the same time lawyer interventions act as warnings to the 
offending system that it is also being monitored and will be held accountable.  
 
This thesis has intimated strongly about the state’s ‘legislation’ of violence against its own 
citizens, deference to executive power and sometimes outright partisanship or incompetence of 
the judiciary. This study suggests that through mobile-generated evidence ZLHR has been able 
to challenge and subject some of the institutions to the demands of the law, the constitution and 
natural justice. The litigations involving evictions are cases in point. Equally the NGO’s reports 
and lobbies with regional and international bodies were aimed at forcing the state to respect both 
domestic and international human rights laws, in the same manner that ZPP reports also lobby 
international support for the same purpose. These observations point to the hotline, together with 




The hotline also appears to have become part of the HRDs’ protest and resistance arsenal, 
characteristics also evident in the MISA journalists’ use of the phone to resist government’s 
dominance of media space. Emergency legal interventions following HRD detentions appear to 
have emboldened activists to mound more protests and resistance against authorities. The study 
may not offer direct, conclusive evidence to this claim, but there was concurrence from OAUS 
activists, that they felt bolder the more they knew ZLHR, through the intervention of the hotline, 
was ready to defend their cause. They became more active as interventions from ZLHR also 
increased. For instance, the movement’s protests in the Africa Unity Square increased, a 
seemingly direct challenge against a directive from state authorities that the movement should 
cease their daily evening protest vigils in the square. My proposition is that movements like 
OAUS, #This Flag and #Tajamuka were using the mobile phone and social media not only to 
organise themselves but, in conjunction with ZLHR hotlines, to resist and challenge the police or 
even provoke them out of a conviction that the lawyer NGO would intervene. The comment by 
one of the OAUS activists, that no HRD should go out into the field without the ZLHR hotline 
number is testimony to the facility’s critical nature in emboldening the activists and facilitating 
interventions resulting in their protection.  
10.7  Challenging repressive media laws, empowering the marginalised with information 
 
Just as the hotline shows uniqueness in challenging the disregard for the rule of law, justice and 
accountability by some state institutions, the community journalist’s phone, too, shows 
uniqueness in challenging state control of information flow. Used in conditions of harsh media 
control and politically polluted community environments, the phone is like a guerrilla’s tool. The 
manner in which it is used in the clandestine production and distribution of the newsletters shows 
its capacity to facilitate the circumvention and undermining of the country’s restrictive media 
laws. Its use is also in such manner that it protects both news sources and content from legal and 
political threats. Using the device to email, text or hold copy is also as much a means of the 
journalists ensuring personal and content protection as it is of minimising costs and enhancing 
the news production process. The game of roulette that the distribution process exposes the 
journalists to, makes the mobile phone a powerful tool for safeguarding them as well as 
challenging and undermining compliance with media laws which are being used to control the 
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flow of news and information. To this extent then I view the mobile phone as, additionally, a tool 
for resisting information control by the state.  
 
Rodriguez (2001)’s observes that citizen journalists rely on using whatever technology resources 
are available in their environments to produce community media that speaks to their needs. This 
appears to be what MISA journalists are doing: using the phone to champion the production of 
alternative media and information that allows rural and other marginalised communities to 
engage with local and national issues. Ultimately, because it is being used to facilitate access to 
and production of information relevant for the community’s development, the technology could 
be regarded as a tool that facilitates community empowerment. The use of WhatsApp by some of 
the journalists in producing news also compares with what writers like Said-Moorhouse, (2016) 
Albaih,(2015) and Dempsey (2015) suggest citizen reporters and activists in repressive or 
conflict environments use the technology for. Zimbabwe is clearly not a conflict environment but 
it is restrictive enough to approximate one. 
 
A point I found intriguing about MISA’s involvement in the newsletter project, though, was to 
what extent the NGO’s moderation was allowing creativity, individuality, independence, radical 
critiquing and realistic expression of personal experiences, amongst the journalists. These factors 
are among those which define the hallmarks of citizen journalism (Banda, 2010; Allan et al, 
2007). MISA explains its involvement in what should be reported and how, by suggesting that it 
seeks to protect the journalists as well as producing a credible community news medium. There 
are similarities in the way that MISA and the Nigerian communications rights group, On Our 
Radar, (Dempsey, 2015) both support the production of alternative news by citizen journalists 
but could the similarities be said to represent a growing norm for citizen journalism in conflict or 
repressed environments in Africa?   Although scans through some MISA newsletter articles 
show that there is a fair amount of individuality and independence could the fact that MISA 
decides what is published imply the absence of true citizen or non-institutionalised journalism? 
Could this form of citizen journalism be described as a ‘quasi institutionalised citizen 
journalism’ (Banda, 2010:28-29) because it is guided by a human rights institution- as opposed 
to a news organisation- whose mandate is to challenge media laws and policies that deprive 
citizens of their right to information and variable media? The journalism is activist and 
237 
 
alternative to state or even independent professional media, but MISA’s influence in the 
organisational and production processes cannot be ignored. 
10.8  A tool for supporting voter education and electoral democracy 
 
In attempting to avoid direct confrontation with the state because of the Electoral Act’s 
restrictions on the involvement of NGOs in voter education, civil society has turned to the 
mobile phone to help them cross this barrier. Amongst the four cases it is ERC which stands out 
in believing that linking digital media and young people, provides solutions that respond to the 
shortfalls in the Electoral Act as well as to develop sustained means of educating the public 
about electoral processes and political rights. Young people, with their ability to adopt new 
technologies faster and more efficiently than older people (Katz, 2006; de Bruijn, 2009; Porter et 
al, 2012) are key actors in this process. Besides, youths represent the future. For the NGO, the 
mobile phone represents a tool that can be used to reach more people because of its proliferation 
and WhatsApp has become the most viable communication medium while ‘voters’ clubs’ have 
become the most appropriate vehicle for accelerated but controlled diffusion of information on 
electoral issues.  
 
The ‘club’ structure and WhatsApp application can also both be viewed as tools for co-
ordination as much as they are for facilitating voter education. The ‘cascading and expanding’ 
character of the voters’ club model and the digital versatility of the WhatsApp application are 
uniquely suited to achieving wide reach of the NGO’s huge constituent base and encouraging 
debate and other interactions amongst the recipients. The model also supports member or peer 
bonding as well as feedback to ERC. The NGO also refers to the WhatsApp groups providing 
ready support for surveys on electoral issues, another pointer to the co-ordination function. To 
me these linkages also suggest, or are even proof, of the power of the device and WhatsApp to 
circumvent the proscriptions of the Electoral Act to facilitate voter education, whose ultimate 
aim is to promote electoral democracy. 
 
But the voters’ ‘clubs’ structure, may be instrumental in introducing a ‘selectivity’ factor: 
selectivity in the issues circulated within the rest of the WhatsApp group members. This in a 
way, implies the use of a form of ‘censorship’ mechanism by group administrators. Because the 
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groups are structured on the basis of peer relationships, what can be shared amongst the members 
is also then influenced by the relationships amongst the peers. Under these circumstances, 
WhatsApp group administrators can potentially select or filter the information to transmit to the 
rest of the group members. ERC therefore must rely on the integrity of the first level of recipients 
of its messages, on their ability to positively influence their own group and that level influencing 
subsequent groups. 
 
However, because the NGO uses the phone in diverse ways in its three electoral education 
campaigns, it is important to distinguish that within the framework of the X1G campaign the 
mobile phone, as in the case of MISA’s newsletters, contributes to content production, allowing, 
through the phone-in facility, the opinion of citizens to be heard on electoral issues. In the voters’ 
clubs campaign, the WhatsApp group model has multiplier and amplification effects on 
recipients and messages. Within the citizen election reporters’ framework, the phone promotes 
electoral democracy by documenting election irregularities and using them to challenge the 
political system.  
10.9  Collaborations to educate and enhance the protection capabilities of activists. 
 
The study shows another aspect to the role of the phone in the education of human rights 
defenders to more effectively protect human rights. Collaborations between the case studies and 
other NGOs point to converging efforts by the sector to equip HRDs with tools and skills to 
contest human rights challenges more vigorously. I recognise two broad strands of collaborative 
efforts which have emerged from sector-based relationships. The first appears to be attempts to 
introduce formalised journalism skills to enhance digital media use for human rights and 
democracy. The collaborations are aimed at improving activists’ skills in using digital media, 
specifically the phone, to investigate, record and report human rights challenges objectively and 
accurately. The structure or format of the ZPP forms, supports my proposition. ZPP digital forms 
highlight the 4Ws, which in journalism terms emphasize the four basic elements in story 
construction, and this format appears to be the focus of the training. MISA’s journalists would be 
familiar with these elements. The outline of the MISA’s training programme for ERC citizen 
election reporters mirrors the same key elements. The conclusion I draw from these observations 
is that there is a convergence of thinking amongst the NGOs about what these programmes 
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should achieve for citizen reporters, HRDs and monitors in relation to understanding digital 
media use to contest human rights abuses.  
 
The second ‘collaborative effort’ is an extension of the foregoing, and illustrates attempts by the 
case studies and other NGOs in the sector, to share a collection of what I would like to define as 
‘human rights education, information and protection tools.’ Some of the tools are mobile based- 
and therefore easily accessible on the phones themselves- while others are paper-based but can 
still be accessed easily because they are light and portable. The last column in Table 10.1 
identifies some of them.  ZPP’s software is the most unique because of its capacity to circumvent 
interception. However, it does not appear to be a tool that is shared amongst the cases, although, 
because it is open source and free software, it is possible other NGOs outside the ones 
interviewed, are using it or something similar. The software unfortunately represents the type of 
technology that, because of its robustness against interception, frustrates and provokes 
authorities. ZLHR’s two Guides are circulated in hard or file copy to HRDs across the country; 
MISA and DSZ’s mobile Digital Security Guide is used with targeted HRD groups because of 
the complexity of the subject it engages; the Zimbabwe Constitution and Zimbabwe Human 
rights and Mobile Story Maker applications, by Veritas, Centre for Applied Law Research and 
Mobile Community Zimbabwe respectively, are also completely mobile phone-based and focus 
on human rights and human-rights-video content productions. The crucial point is that the NGOs 
and their partners are, collectively or individually, mobilising an increasing collection of tools 
and encouraging their adoption by HRDs to educate and inform themselves about human rights 
protection and promotion. The focus of this study may be on mobile phone mediation, but I 
argue that these tools make a powerful assemblage that can only strengthen the potential of the 
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10.10  Reports as tools for accountability and healing  
 
The study has referred to the fact that NGO violations reports have provided the basis for actions 
which include whistleblowing (Mashingaidze, 2016:26), predicting future acts of violence, 
naming and shaming, litigations and organising healing and peace building campaigns. One 
important aspect of the concept of protection from physical and emotional violence is that 
victims must ultimately be healed either emotionally or physically. In this respect, it can be 
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posited, from the examples involving ERC, ZPP and even the OAUS movement about 
interventions from the hotlines, other mobile phones and reports themselves, that these tools 
facilitate relief for both victims of violations and their relatives. And amongst the case studies, it 
is ZPP which, using the example of the 2008 election violence involving the Masvingo victims, 
holds up the most informative illustration of effective use of reports to champion counselling and 
healing.  
 
Closely related to the issue of healing is how reports that name and shame have shaped state 
response. Most reports on state-instigated violations which have aroused global reactions against 
the regime emanated from ZPP, the NGO’s founding organisations, the NGO Forum and other 
CSOs. As this study reveals, the Commonwealth Office report for 2014 was almost entirely 
based on information from ZPP’s reports, while international freedom watchdogs, but notably 
Freedom House, also borrow heavily from MISA, ZPP, Reporters Without Borders and NGO 
Forum reports. Government’s participation at the UN Universal Periodic Review provided 
testimony that these reports were forcing that participation although other people argued that 
given that the regime continuously falls back on its default position of invoking violence during 
crisis moments, the participation was a smokescreen to lull international opinion. This study 
cannot claim that this pattern of response, identified by Hafner Burton (2008) as one of the 
classic responses by autocratic regimes, can be inferred in Zimbabwe’s case, but it would, 
equally, be unwise to dismiss it outright. 
 
In compelling state reaction, it can be argued that citizens can use both reports and mobile 
phones to demand justice and accountability from the elite. The study provides evidence of 
reports being instrumental in civil society lobbies for regional and international interventions to 
compel the government to adhere to domestic (its own) and international human rights standards. 
Jestina Mukoko and Beatrice Mtetwa’s cases, for example, provide evidence of both the phone 
and reports being instrumental in mobilising international interventions and demands for state 
accountability. In an environment where the use of violence has been compounded by a culture 
of impunity (Coltart, 2006), ZPP, ZLHR and MISA are convinced that evidence, presented to 
local, regional, and international platforms, may compel government to become more 
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accountable and democratic. An email response by CiZC activist, Memory Kadau on April 29, 
2015 sums up what NGOs and the public expect the reports and lobbies to achieve.  
“… statements in condemnation (of human rights abuses) are meant to put reputational 
pressure on the violations and the documentation provides evidence on the abuses. The 
evidence attained can be later used for the prosecution of the perpetrators.”. 
 
10.11  Reports, networks and collaborations  
 
Findings suggest that reports are also instrumental in mobilising collaborations within networks 
and alliances against violators. ZPP, ZLHR and MISA e-reports, statements, violations maps and 
other forms of perpetrator footprints (Mashingaidze, 2016:6) - in large part products of digital 
media deployment - have become powerful tools in mobilising solidarity actions amongst local 
and international networks against institutional and individual human rights abusers. Because 
HRDs are at the centre of protection efforts, shows of solidarity increase their visibility as well 
as that of others at risk (Nah et al.,2013:412).  Reports, supplemented by international speaking 
engagements and media appearances (in other words engaging with local and global network 
partners), has allowed local NGOs and activists to globalise the situation of HRDs and others at 
risk. Again, the examples of Mukoko and Mtetwa come to mind. Local NGO Kubatana, alone, 
for example through its hosting capacity, is a conduit of ZPP, ZLHR, ERC and MISA reports to 
the 250 NGOs in its directory. These in turn amplify the reports through their domestic, regional, 
and international links. The study has shown that ZPP’s international links have opened up space 
in international media like CNN and BBC, with these institutions’ potential to reach even wider 
global audiences. Meernik et al (2012) suggest that these are the outcomes that network linkages 
should aim to achieve for human rights protection: multiplier and amplification effects in naming 
and shaming campaigns. Links between organisations at a domestic level tapping into their 
international partners’ links or networks. And the bigger the domestic human rights community, 
the stronger its networks and the more readily its reports will inspire solidarity actions from 
larger and more powerful organisations.  
 
The foregoing exemplifies collaborations or collective actions arising mainly from reports and 
supplementary actions, but there are others fostered through interpersonal relations amongst staff 
from different NGOs. From conversations with some participants, as well as the referral 
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introductions, I adduced that there were collaborations that were being fostered through 
interpersonal networks which cut across different NGOs and were evidenced as sectoral, special 
interest groups. Much of the communication within the network members was through 
WhatsApp in special WhatsApp groups. The networks would collaborate on issues of common 
interest. For example, they might use the WhatsApp platform to mobilise solidarity appearances 
at the trials of activists, arrange interventions during detentions or arrests of HRD colleagues or 
discuss and plan responses to government policies that infringed on human rights of a collective 
interest. The ZLHR communication officer showed adeptness at attracting the support of 
communication and advocacy colleagues from other NGOs during activist demonstrations or 
court appearances. During the trials of such HRDs as Mtetwa of ZLHR, Mukoko of ZPP and 
Okay Machisa of Zimrights, it was both their organisations and interpersonal networks that 
mobilised civil society solidarity actions.  
 
MacDonald Lewanika of Crisis in Coalition summarised why collaborative relations are 
important  in this comment:“…When people come together to coalitions or networks, they come 
to do things that they cannot do by themselves, so there is an advantage to that arrangement,” 
Collaborations, coalitions, networks, partnerships give strength to unitary organisations whose 
limitations as individual institutions might include weaknesses in their approach to issues, as 
well as lack of access to resources and ideas that are otherwise endorsed by the strengths of 
larger, collective groups. I believe this is what the Human rights NGOs are hoping these 
relationships will achieve for the advancement of human rights and democracy in the country. 
10.12  Censorship, surveillance and interception: challenges to mobile phone use. 
 
One of the contentions on which this study has been premised is that the country has a toxic 
political environment which in large part is bolstered by the state’s use of restrictive legislative 
pieces, physical force and surveillance, interception, and censorship capabilities. McGreggor 
(2013), Tendi (2010) and Bratton and Masunungure (2008) contend that these capabilities are 
meant to intimidate citizens so that they fear challenging the system. Fuchs et al (2013) have 
described the use of surveillance as attempts to create cultures of fear amongst people. Hope 
(2011), MacKinnon (2010,2012) and Crowe (2013) have made similar observations which this 
study confirms. In the case studies, there are indications that the state, apart from physically 
244 
 
brutalising citizens or mounting legal and political barriers, may be using some technical 
capabilities which present threats and risks to human rights activists. The requirement by the 
Posts and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority for SIM card registration, the involuntary 
co-optation of bulk SMS companies to filter NGO texts as discussed in the ERC case ; the 
possible cyber-attack on the same NGO’s website; the possible GPS tracking of HRD 
smartphones as suggested by several activists, including the OAUS activists; the confiscation of 
ZPP laptops and mobile phones; the physical trailing of the activists; the confiscation of mobile 
devices and possible interception of OAUS activists’ mobile communications; the threats of 
confiscation or interception of mobile phones and newsletters at police and ZANU PF youths 
roadblocks which community journalists allude to, all suggest use of strategy and tactics aimed 
at intimidating NGOs and activists and generally creating a culture of fear as posited by Fuchs et 
al (2013). 
 
The examples of seizure of mobile phones and several others outlined above, further, point to 
threats of invasion to activists’ privacy (Gwagwa, 2013). The report for the 2016 Universal 
Periodic Review of Human Rights prepared by CSOs suggests police raids on NGO offices and 
confiscation of their equipment intruded on activists’ privacy and intimidated them. Other 
tactics, such as the recruitment of ICT specialists by government departments to spy on citizens’ 
communications, were also described by OAUS participants as further attempts to bolster 
surveillance and intimidation. The Chinese and local intelligence services may also be involved 
in monitoring communications. These state actions may be the basis for claims by writers like 
Gwagwa (2013:11) that the state has capabilities to “…launch cyber-attacks against government 
critics including subjection to distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, and use of sponsored 
government agents to manipulate online discussions that are critical to the government.”  
 
When they have been launched Zimbabwe’s digital network shutdowns have clearly been meant 
to intimidate and silence civil society on critical electoral and democracy issues, a reaction 
similar to that from authoritarian regimes wary of social media, according to Howard, Agarwal 
and Hussain (2011:6). Shutdowns in July 2013 and July 2016 of bulk SMS and WhatsApp 
services by the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (POTRAZ) were 
respectively meant to disable NGOs from using mobile phones to monitor the elections, and 
245 
 
social media from mobilising public protests against corruption and poor economic conditions. 
On August 3, 2016, POTRAZ also prohibited the sale of mobile data bundles to inhibit users 
from sharing videos, audio, and texts on WhatsApp. These shut downs again echo the three 
authors’ proposition, that authoritarian regimes tend to shut down digital networks when they 
face political crisis arising from civil society’s use of social or digital media (2011:6-7). 
Shutdowns are thus aimed at eliminating what the state claims to be threats to state security and, 
in general, social-media- propagated anti-state propaganda.  
 
But it is clearly Fuchs and his colleagues’ thesis (2013) about how authoritarian states use 
surveillance and interception to create cultures of fear, that I find to have more relevance vis-à-
vis the country’s human rights situation. Going by their postulation (Fuchs et al, 2013:43) what 
ZANU PF is doing, is precisely what authoritarian states want surveillance, interception, 
censorship and other forms of repression to achieve: dominate and intimidate groups and 
individuals, control their behaviour, warn them that they are being watched and that deviant 
behaviour will be punished. Ultimately, they want to create a culture of fear. The tactics are also 
a smokescreen to conceal the state’s excesses. Monahan (2006), Heeks and Seo-Zindy (2013) 
and Howard and Hussain (2013) present similar views. ZANU PF has been using powers of 
censorship and surveillance as means of quashing freedom of choice, expression and assembly, 
with journalists and human rights defenders the more frequently targeted by the state. The state 
seeks to prevent circulation of reports, comments, stories, or any other form of information 
critical of it (Gwagwa, 2013:12). The strategy is intimidatory and, I argue, intended to give 
sharper teeth to the already repressive legislative pieces that this study has canvassed. 
Ultimately, all these tactics are meant to weaken civil society contestation of human rights 
abuses. It could therefore be argued that these tactics explain why, despite the increasing use of 
digital media, despite increasing activism by civil society, ZANU PF remains in power and 
violations have not declined to any significant level.  
 
 Almost every response to the question Which laws activists felt constrained the mobile phone 
and other digital media most placed the Interception of Communication Act (ICA) and CODE at 
the top of the list. The instruments have created a deep well of fear and dread amongst activists 
because, as the analyses of these laws has shown, they give authorities excessive powers that 
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curtail many rights. The questions I used to probe what problems activists experienced in using 
the mobile phone in the communities evoked fears of abuse of power by politicised and partisan 
community structures, fears expressed particularly by ZPP monitors and MISA journalists. Open 
use of the mobile phone to document violence in such close communities was interpreted as a 
threat by violators and would invite reprisals. The proposed introduction of three Cybersecurity 
Bills, from 2017, represented the newest and even more serious threats to digital activism in the 
country. The Bills were feared to threaten social media use and as a result, the privacy and 
personal security of activists (MISA, 2016). Again, civil society interprets these as a classical 
ploy by government to curtail criticism against it. 
10.13 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted several potentials of the mobile phone in the contest against human 
rights violations in Zimbabwe. These include the device’s potential to facilitate co-ordination, a 
potential that stretches across all case studies, and, no doubt across all NGOs. They also include 
the potential to monitor, document and record violations, to offer protection to HRDs, to mediate 
in electoral and information access processes such that citizens are empowered to make 
uninhibited political choices or participate in national development and debates. They also show 
potential in challenging state institutions that subvert the rule of law, justice, and good 
governance. The chapter has explored issues that define the relationship between Human rights 
NGOs, the phone, the state, and human rights in such manner that links between youths and 
digital media and between volunteers, NGOs, and digital media, stand out as one of the critical 
drivers of human rights protection. The use of circumvention technologies, the increasing 
dominance of WhatsApp and other social media since 2010 and the mobilisation of local and 
international networks to challenge the regime’s authoritarianism have also been canvassed.  











11. Insights into the phone’s challenges against human rights violations 
 
Exploring the experiences of Zimbabwean Human rights NGOs in using the mobile phone to 
challenge human rights abuses has generated an interesting and complex picture. The device is 
being deployed in an environment fraught with threats and risks to both activists and other 
citizens because of the conflict between the state and some sectors of civil society over human 
rights violations. For the purposes of this study, these are violations to media freedom, access to 
information and citizens’ rights to free association, assembly, expression, human dignity, to life 
and to political choice. The threats and risks stem from the state’s deployment of a strategy that 
manipulates legislative instruments and physical and technologically- mediated capabilities to 
stifle criticism while human rights NGOs have been countering with a mobile-phone mediated 
strategy. It is a strategy that has been riding on improved mobile penetration, increased uptake of 
new mobile phone models and, more significantly, on the direct involvement of grassroots 
activists. Although the study in large part could be said to draw inspiration from the ‘liberation 
technology’ thesis (Diamond, 2010:70), other notions also presented points of reflection, for 
example, notions about the power of networks as well as the critical role played by alternative or 
citizen media in empowering communities. Significantly too, contentions by authors like Fuchs’ 
(2013,2015) and Monahan’s (2006), about the corrosive effect of surveillance, interception and 
censorship, that the elite use surveillance and censorship to dominate, control, silence dissent and 
create a culture of fear, a culture that has impact on human rights defense. 
 
The adoption of a multi-case study approach allowed the study to compare the device’s use 
across a diverse range of human rights areas. In that respect, the device’s use by the four case 
studies can be generalised in as far as the phone’s use for social interaction, co-ordination and 
protection are concerned. There is also a general indication, in the case of ZPP, ERC and MISA, 
of covert or clandestine use of volunteers and their mobile devices, to circumvent or avoid open 
conflict with the state or state-aligned actors. These observations could be generalised to other 
human rights NGOs involved in similar activities: Heal Zimbabwe Trust and the NGO Forum, 
for example undertake similar activities as ZPP: ERC, CIVNET and ZESN’s activities often 
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overlap; MISA, Zimbabwe Association of Community Radio Stations and seve ral other 
media NGOs run parallel but sometimes converging programmes, while Zimbabwe Women 
Lawyers’ Association and Abamelli Lawyers Network are also involved in important 
programmes to defend activists. 
 
Broadly, the experiences of the four case studies highlight the mobile phone’s potential in most 
of the areas identified by Diamond (2010) to be examples that testify to the usefulness of the 
technology in ‘liberating’ citizens. From MISA’s examples, the phone can clearly be used in 
processes that allow the production and sharing of news and information. To this extent, it helps 
in empowering marginalised communities in that by having access to information about 
themselves and the nation, these communities are not only able to tell their own story but to 
become participants in national debate and development. Much as legislation has marginalised 
these groups, the phone, in the hands of activist institutions like MISA and volunteers, is finding 
ways of democratising information. I observe in the first and third chapters, that the use of digital 
media in citizen and community broadcasting journalism, as well as in election monitoring, has 
attracted more research and authorship as far as Zimbabwe is concerned, than other media fields. 
The role that the phone plays in navigating the minefield of polarised community politics, legal 
barriers, surveillance threats and financial resource deficiencies, to help produce and deliver 
community media products that can complement, substitute or even challenge state media 
perspectives, is something that I submit broadens our understanding of the links between digital 
media, human rights, empowerment, and democracy.  
 
Although there is evidence in the form of texts by ERC’s citizen election reporters that the 
mobile phone also facilitates the monitoring of elections I found the phone’s role in voter 
education to be quite significant. The country’s election processes have been consistently 
criticised not only because of the use of violent coercion, but because of deficiencies in voter 
education. The phone empowers ERC constituents to share, debate and diffuse information about 
civic, political, voting and election issues so that in the long term, citizens understand their 




Monitors’ experiences show the mobile phone as the instrument with which they expose 
violations and violators. The introductory Chapter refers to contributions by Mashingaidze 
(2016) to ZPP’s use of ICTs to surveille, expose and in some cases name, shame, and even 
sanction violators. This study contributes further by particularising the type of ICT-the mobile 
phone- and exploring in greater depth its potential as a tool to monitor, protect and invite global 
censure. The depth of inquiry is made more illustrative by exploring the potential of the phone as 
part of the circumvention platform. ZPP’s use of circumvention software to expose politically-
motivated violence and perpetrators, protect monitors, staff, and constituents/victims, represents 
some distinctive contribution for the sector in Zimbabwe and for human rights under similar 
restrictive environments. 
 
Literature about the use of emergency lines tends to be discussed in relation to customer 
complaints, medically-related situations or, more radically, armed conflicts or violent 
confrontations (Shaver, 2016; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013). That emergency lines can be used 
in non-armed conflict or non-violent situations to challenge constrictive, repressive state 
structures, policies, and legislative frameworks, as this study suggests, is an issue that academia 
and activists could find beneficial, be it from a Western or developing world perspective. The 
experiences of Zimbabwean activists quoted in this thesis show that mobile hotlines can be used 
to challenge state systems and institutions that undermine the rule of law and deprive citizens of 
justice and freedoms. It could be suggested that Zimbabwe’s human rights activism views the 
hotline in the same manner that actors in armed or violent conflicts regard their emergency lines: 
as tools to be deployed in cases of last resort, because they are designed to respond to situations 
of critical distress. Through lawyers, the hotlines invoke interventions which act as deterrents 
against state excesses, findings that would undoubtedly be useful to both research and human 
rights practice, whether it is in the context of Zimbabwe or other environments. 
 
Another significant finding of this study is the critical role community or grassroots volunteers 
play in challenging state repression directly themselves, as opposed to being mere victims. 
Except in ZLHR’s case, it is community volunteers who themselves are central in the ICT-
mediated campaigns to contest violations. Globally NGOs function to assist communities 
empower themselves, but the extent to which actors in constrained environments then involve 
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themselves and their devices, as the major participants in confronting the challenges, vary. 
Experiences analysed in this study suggest that without the committed involvement and direct 
participation of grassroots volunteers, NGOs would perhaps be unable to contest human rights 
abuses as robustly as they are doing. Human rights NGO experiences in using ICTs to empower 
communities are by no means unique, but they still provide useful insights for CSOs in similar 
situations globally.  
 
Yet another critical finding is the increasing role that WhatsApp is playing in human rights 
activism. Every case study was using WhatsApp because of the application’s affordability and 
affordances (Church and de Oliveira, 2013:352). In addition, statistics about its prevalence serve 
to support the human rights NGO sector’s reliance on the application as an educational and 
activism tool, especially so amongst youths. Of the 11.9 million active mobile subscribers in the 
country in 2015, 5,6 million were mobile internet subscribers on which WhatsApp rode 
(POTRAZ, 2015). In early 2016, WhatsApp accounted for 34% of all broadband traffic in the 
country while a study claimed that the application has created a unique ‘virtual society’ amongst 
university students (Chiridza et al, 2016). The statistics may not relate directly to NGO use of 
WhatsApp but they reflect on the application’s link with young people and the potential it could 
offer to human rights activism.  
11.1  Recommendations: researching in restrictive environments and future studies. 
 
This study proposes several areas which could benefit from further research, including that of 
adopting a specific study approach in restrictive environments like Zimbabwe. Ruhanya 
(2014:248) observes that one of the reasons for the failure of academics to capture the 
experiences of Zimbabwean journalists working under repression was that state actions made 
research difficult. Other Zimbabwean researchers (Mandiyanike, 2005; Tshabangu, 2009) make 
similar observations, although in the case of the two authors, the challenges they faced related to 
researching as ‘returnee’ academics. Under Methodology I suggest the direction taken by 
researchers like Rich-Dorman (2001) and Mabweazara (2010): that one way of solving the 
problem associated with researching as an outsider, was to adopt an ethnographic approach, 
where the researchers immersed themselves in the environments of their subject cases, taking 
time to observe, ‘understand’ and be accepted and trusted by their subjects. My experiences to a 
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large extent, validated this approach, even though my methodology also produced what I would 
argue to be credible results. I believe the difficult experiences faced by Zimbabwe’s human 
rights activists at the hands of state actors inhibit co-operation with individuals with whom they 
are unfamiliar. Prolonged face- to- face interactions with NGO staff - and where circumstances 
allow, with grassroots volunteers- as opposed to short term interactions between subjects and the 
researcher, are thus recommended to engender trust and a more conducive atmosphere, in such 
conflicted environments. 
 
This study suggests that there was concern among ZPP monitors that they were unable to match 
the capability of main stream journalists in terms of reporting events in their own constituencies. 
The observation led me to pose the question if some form of competitive journalism was 
developing between the monitors and traditional journalists? Or can the monitors be viewed as 
citizen journalists? The collaborations amongst NGOs in training HRDs in basic journalism also 
point to a growing recognition that these activists require writing and analytical skills to produce 
credible reports on human rights issues. What is the potential of these activists becoming citizen 
journalists or bloggers who will contribute to online activism? The ERC case study did not 
involve constituents themselves. Further research could explore the potential of the mobile phone 
in voter education from the perspective of the volunteers, eliciting personal experiences for 
example. The research could further explore the efficacy of WhatsApp and the Voter Club 
model, again from the volunteers’ perspectives. 
 
 Despite not being in a war-conflict situation, despite being a signatory to various human rights 
treaties, despite being sanctioned by the international community and despite increasing human 
rights and political activism in the country, why is there no significant abatement of human rights 
violations? Why does the same party with a history of election-related violence continue to 
dominate the political landscape? I believe these are important questions to explore further, and 
linking them to digital media deployment. Reasons that have been proffered for continued state 
violence against citizens include state capture, conflation of state and party, ‘militarisation’ of 
the state and politics and partocracy (Chingono,2010; Tendi,2010; Moyo, 1999). In terms of 
human rights protection, it could be informative to establish if for example, Hafner-Burton’s 
theory (2008), that when sanctioned for violations some states use smokescreens such as 
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adherence to international norms, but in fact revert to default positions when international 
oversight is reduced, could apply in the Zimbabwean situation? If it does, what are the future 
implications for human rights protection and what (other) role could digital media play? Finally, 
this study did not seek a rigorous assessment of the efficacy of the mobile phone in the human 
rights contest, but followed a purely qualitative exploration of the personal, felt experiences of a 
limited number of grassroots activists and NGO professionals in deploying it. A quantitative 
study, capturing the views of more participants could perhaps yield more representative results or 
empirical evidence, which could be reflective of similar political environments elsewhere.   
 
By exploring the experiences of NGO staff and activists in how they were deploying mobile 
phone technology to promote and protect human rights, this study was effectively seeking 
empirical evidence. The study has presented evidence showing that activists are indeed using the 
technology to subvert or circumvent state-supported legal barriers, to protect their constituents 
and themselves, to surveille violent elites, to build violations records for redress, to empower 
communities to create their own media and speak for themselves, to challenge infractions of the 
law and justice by protector agencies and to help citizens claim rights for democratic electoral 
processes. Research in digital media use in human rights in Zimbabwe has already established a 
base but it is the researcher’s hope that the evidence presented in the case studies here is not only 
significant but sufficiently so to be added to that base so that future research in human rights 
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Appendix 2   Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
Article 1 Right to Equality 
Article 2  Freedom from Discrimination 
Article 3  Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security 
Article 4  Freedom from Slavery 
Article 5 Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment 
Article 6  Right to Recognition as a Person before the Law 
Article 7 Right to Equality before the Law 
Article 8  Right to Remedy by Competent Tribunal 
Article 9  Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Exile 
Article 10  Right to Fair Public Hearing 
Article 11  Right to be Considered Innocent until Proven Guilty 
Article 12  Freedom from Interference with Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence 
Article 13  Right to Free Movement in and out of the Country 
Article 14  Right to Asylum in other Countries from Persecution 
Article 15  Right to a Nationality and the Freedom to Change It  
Article 16 Right to Marriage and Family 
Article 17  Right to Own Property 
Article 18  Freedom of Belief and Religion 
Article 19 Freedom of Opinion and Information 
Article 20 Right of Peaceful Assembly and Association 
Article 21 Right to Participate in Government and in Free Elections 
Article 22  Right to Social Security 
Article 23  Right to Desirable Work and to Join Trade Unions 
Article 24 Right to Rest and Leisure 
Article 25  Right to Adequate Living Standard 
Article 26  Right to Education 
Article 27 Right to Participate in the Cultural Life of Community 
Article 28 Right to a Social Order that Articulates this Document  
Article 29  Community Duties Essential to Free and Full Development 












Appendix 3  List of Human Rights outlined in Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution 
1 Right to Life 
2 Right to Personal Liberty 
3 Rights of arrested and detained persons 
4 Right to human dignity 
5 Right to personal security---right to freedom from violence from public or private sources 
6 Freedom from torture or cruelty, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
7 Freedom from Slavery or servitude 
8 Freedom from forced or compulsory labour 
9 Equality and non-discrimination 
10 Right to privacy- no entry to or search of one’s home, premises or property without 
permission; the privacy of their communication infringed on 
11 Freedom of assembly and association- right to freedom of assembly or association  
12 Freedom to demonstrate and petition 
13 Freedom of conscience 
14 Freedom of expression and freedom of the media 
15 Access to information 
16 Language and Culture 
17 Freedom of profession, trade or occupation 
18 Labour rights 
19 Freedom of movement and residence 
20 Right to free, fair and regular elections 
21 Right to administrative justice 
22 Right to a fair hearing 
23 Rights of accused persons 
24 Property rights 
25 Rights to agricultural land 
26 Environmental rights 
27 Freedom from arbitrary eviction 
28 Right to education 
29 Right to health care 
30 Right to food and water 
31 Marriage rights 










Appendix 4  Key International Conventions ratified by Zimbabwe (source Makwerere et al, 2012) 
 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against women 
(CEDAW) 
United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
 Protocol to The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on The Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
 Protocol to The African Charter on Human and People's Rights on The Rights of Women in Africa  
African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.  
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child  
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in 
Africa, 
Non-treaty based standards relevant to policing  
These guidelines and principles do not have binding powers as the treaties have but they have been 
proposed by the UN and regional bodies to help implement the rights enshrined in the treaties 
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 
December 1979  
The UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any form of Detention or 
Imprisonment  
The UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials  
The UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners  
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa  
The Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa  
Harare resolution on the SARPCCO Code of Conduct for Police Officials  























Appendix 5  Roadmap of ICT growth in Zimbabwe 1990-2016 
 
1990-1995 –Internet access established through Mango, a basic e-mail system set up by a Canadian 
aid organisation (First NGO involvement in internet development in Zimbabwe) 
Apr 1995- Data Control & Systems, Zimbabwe’s first internet service provider (ISP) launched in 
1994, goes live in Harare and attracts 500 users before the end of the year 
Sept 1996 – NetOne, is launched as the country’s first GSM mobile network. It signs up 2,000 
subscribers, with service initially restricted to the capital city, Harare. Subscribers given access to 
standard voice call and text message services. NGOs amongst clients. 
1996—MISA is established. Uses email predominantly 
1997- The PTC Internet backbone makes internet accessible and affordable to users outside Harare 
July 1998 – Telecel and Econet Wireless become 2nd and 3rd GSM mobile networks respectively 
2000 – POTRAZ is created through the PTC Act and begins operations in March 2001  
2000-  Opposition MDC making heavy use of email and internet to disseminate campaign messages 
in election. 
2001/2- ZPP is established by faith-based NGOs. Limited use of mobile phones in reporting 
violations  
Aug 2007– ICA passed. ISPs to monitor all email traffic passing through their systems for "anti-
national activities"  
2008- Civil society, NGOs, Media and Opposition make heavy use of SMS and mobile pictures to 
report Zimbabwe’s election irregularities 
2008- ZPP’s records largest number of violations reports. July records highest violations. 
2009 – Zimbabwe suspends its own Z$ and adopts a multi-currency system, effectively “dollarizing” 
the economy. This has an impact on the availability of technology products and services. 
Aug. 2009 – Econet Wireless introduces 3G internet services. Improves communication for NGOs 
and business. 
Dec. 2009 – Facebook, Gmail and Yahoo dominate Zimbabwean internet searches 
December 2009 – Mobile network lines (SIM Card) costs drop to US $5 per SIM.  
Mar. 2010 – the country has 1.4 million internet users and a mobile penetration of 36% 
May 2010 – Liquid telecom and Econet construct a 4,500km optic fibre backbone. 
June 2010 –Zimbabwe’s Internet penetration rate stands at 12.2% (ITU) 
Oct. 2010 – WhatsApp, a mobile based instant messaging service is launched 
Dec. 2010 – Telecel launches mobile money service. Improves access to money, and therefore phone 
services, for rural and urban populations. 
Jan. 2011 – NetOne launches OneWallet, its own mobile money service 
Feb. 2011 –Over 7.1 million mobile subscribers and a mobile teledensity of 57% 
2011 – All three MNOs are offering 2G, GPRS, EDGE and 3G internet services 
Sept. 2011 - Econet launches EcoCash mobile money service 
Dec. 2011 – Econet Wireless has 1.7 million mobile broadband subscribers 
Jan. 2012 - Mobile penetration now 72%  
Jan. 2012, Econet, has 5.7 million subscribers 
Feb. 2012 –30,000 Zimbabweans registered as social network Google Plus users  
Feb. 2012 –Prepaid mobile SIM card falls to 50 cents 
Apr. 2012 – Zimpapers, the country’s largest newspaper stable introduces an SMS based news 
service. Elite can now access news on mobile phone. 
June 2012 – Zimbabwe’s mobile penetration stands at 78.5% 
June 2012 – ipaidabribe.org.zw a Zimbabwean website designed to uncover corruption through 
anonymous whistleblowing is launched 
September 2012 – National media survey records a steady decline in the consumption of print 
newspapers against the rise of online news consumption 
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Nov. 2012 –Increased use of WhatsApp as a customer relationship tool. Opportunity for NGOs to 
use the application also increases. 
Feb. 2013 – Country now has 4.5 million internet subscribers 
July 25, 2013--POTRAZ bans SMS use to prevent election monitoring by civil society (NGOs)  
July 2013 – At least 1.1 million Zimbabweans now using Facebook. 
July 2013 – US$300,000 offered for the identity of Baba Jukwa, a masked whistle-blower using 
Facebook to expose inside information on State and ruling party issues 
July 2013 - The Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (IDAZIM) launches a 
website, www.myzimvote.com to help people check if they are registered on the voters’ roll. Govt 
criticises the website but voters have access to register, which was only issued to candidates on the 
eve of elections. 
July 2013 – A website, zimvoices.co.zw which allows visitors to select their constituency, district 
and ward to get a listing of polling stations nearest to them goes live.  
July 2013 - A new website, electiOnride.com, designed to make results of Zimbabwe’s national 
elections available online in real time, goes live. 
July 2013- ERC, ZESN, MISA, a few other NGOs and Daily News use Ushahidi platform to crowd 
source election information from citizens and election observers using SMS and WhatsApp. MISA 
also uses Citizenbuzz for the same purpose using community media activists. 
Aug. 2013 – Econet Wireless launches 4G/LTE and Facebook bundles, offering unlimited 
Facebook access for $3 a month.  
Jan. 2014 – Zimbabwe records 5.2 million internet subscribers, marking a 40% internet penetration 
which is driven almost entirely by mobile broadband connections 
Feb. 2014 –Econet offers WhatsApp bundles for $3 per month. The promotion offers one of the 
cheapest ways for HRDs to communicate both in towns and rural areas. 
Jan. 2015 - 6.1 million internet subscriptions with 99% of them being mobile- device-based. The 
country also has 11.4 million active SIM cards (11,9m Dec 2015) and 6,900 km of backbone fibre.  
May 2015 - The Centre for Applied Legal Research (CALR) a local legal research institution 
(NGO) launches a mobile-based Human Rights App. Refer to Chapter on Findings. 
Jan. 2016 – WhatsApp becomes completely free as the service drops its annual $1 subscription. 
The development further increases use of the application by HRDs/activists. 
Mar. 2016 –WhatsApp accounts for 34% of all broadband traffic in Zimbabwe 
Mar. 2016 - Zimbabwe’s mobile penetration increases to 95.4% while active internet subscriptions 
increased to 6,575,591 and the national internet penetration rises to 48.1%  
Mar. 2016 – 84% of rural households in Zimbabwe have at least one mobile device. 
Apr. 2016 – Govt. denies that it is planning to ban social media, but warns against its abuse. 
May 2016 – A number of activists that include a pastor called Evan Mawarire (with a growing 
campaign called #ThisFlag) and a group known as Tajamuka adopt social media as a tool for 
spreading messages that encourage citizen protest over corruption and economic hardships. 
July 6th, 2016 – Zimbabwe experiences a 4 hour WhatsApp blackout and loss of internet service 
from providers. The day has been earmarked for a nationwide stay away by protest groups. Citizens 
believe the blackouts have been instigated by the State.  
July 2016 –POTRAZ warns citizens against abuse of social media. 
Aug. 2016 – With applications like WhatsApp becoming more popular voice traffic continues to 
decline. 
 
#The establishment in 2013 of websites with voter-related information was one indicator of the failure 
by the election supervisory body, ZEC, to manage a transparent electoral process. 
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Appendix 6 Select activist arrests/detentions and laws breached (2007-2013) 
No Date NGO CASE Act Quoted 
1 12/03/07 CSO & MDC 
activists 
Police detain 30 members of the opposition and CSOs in 10 
police stations all over Harare and deny ZLHR access to them for 
a day. The activists are released after a day 
POSA 
2 06/06/08 WOZA Seven members are arrested in Bulawayo after participating in a 
peaceful protest. Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu turn 
themselves in in solidarity with their members. They are charged 






























December 3, 2008, Jestina Mukoko, is abducted from her Norton 
home by six plainclothes men and women – some carrying 
handguns – from the Law and Order section of the ZRP. Police 
deny knowledge of her whereabouts but eventually produce her 
on 23 Dec 2008 for a court appearance, charged, under CODE, 
with recruiting youths for military training in Botswana. Case is 
eventually dismissed in 2009.Amnesty International describes 
Jestina  as a Prisoner of Conscience.  
Two ZPP staff are abducted from the ZPP offices in Harare. Also 
surface in police custody on 23 Dec 2008 charged together with 
Jestina under CODE. Case also eventually dismissed.  
Zacharia Nkomo, the brother to Harrison Nkomo – ZLHR lawyer 
handling Mukoko’s abduction investigation- is also abducted by 
four plainclothes from his home in Rujeko, Masvingo. He also 
surfaces in police custody on 23 December, charged under POSA. 













4 06/05/09 ZLHR ZLHR lawyer, Alec Muchadehama, is charged with contempt of 
court for securing unlawful release of journalist Andrison 
Manyere and two MDC activists. Acquitted on Feb 15, 2012 after 
3 years of judicial harrassment 
CODE 
5 25/10/09 NANGO NANGO CEO, Cephas Zinhumwe and staffer, Dadirai 
Chikwengo are arrested at Vic Falls airport after attending an 
NGO Directors annual Summer school. Accused of holding 
meeting without police clearance. Acquitted later. 
POSA 
6 13/09/10 Art Activist Gukurahundi visual artist Owen Maseko wins case against 
charges of showing Gukurahundi massacre pictures. Charged with 
publishing or communicating falsehoods prejudicial to the State, 
alternatively, violating Section 33 of the same Act and 
undermining the authority of, or insulting the President. 
CODE 
7 30/03/11 NGO 
Forum 
Abel Chikomo (Nat Dir) charged with running an illegal PVO. 
Acquitted on 22/11/13 after two years of judicial harassment. 
PVOA  
8 07/02/12 WOZA 10 WOZA members and 4 bystanders arrested for participating in 
an illegal demo in Byo. Bystanders released soon after; the rest 
after some hours. 
CODE 
9 29/06/12 WOZA 101 WOZA members detained for 5 hrs in Central Bulawayo 
during peaceful protests. Released. 
POSA 
10 13/12/12 Zim Rights Leo Chandahwinya & Dorcas Sharara arrested and charged with 
forgery of voting documents & conspiracy to commit fraud & 
publishing falsehoods. Acquitted. 
CODE 
11 17/12/12 ZimRights Bulawayo Reg. Co-ordinator detained briefly as police search for 
material prejudicial to the state. Material is found to be non-
existent. Charges withdrawn 
CODE  
12 26/06/12 ZimRights Byo members of Zimrights arrested on way back from workshop 
to commemorate the 2012 UN Victims of Torture day. Charges of 
illegal assembly dropped. 
POSA.  
13 26/06/12 Zimrights Another 4 members of Zimrights briefly detained in Karoi POSA  
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(200km from Harare) for illegal assembly. Charges dropped 
14 04/01/13 ZimRights  Okay Machisa (Nat. Dir) & Faith Mamutse arrested on charges of 
contravening sections of CODE. Forging & Manufacturing of 
counterfeit voter education documents thereby defrauding the 
AG’s office. Acquitted 
CODE 
15 17/03/13 ZLHR Beatrice Mtetwa arrested for obstructing justice while intervening 
in the case in which Police are searching Thabani Mpofu (MDC-
T) house for illegal documents. Held under CODE but after 
judicial harassment for 9 months eventually acquitted.  
CODE 
16 22/09/13 WOZA WOZA Pres. Jenni Williams arrested and detained at Harare 
Rotten row when she arrives to inquire about her detained 




17 22/09/13 WOZA   83 WOZA members who have spent two nights in police cells at 
Harare Central Police Station are released. Initially held under 
POSA but after 48 hours released without charge. The WOZA 
members were arrested after marching to Parliament to 
highlight concerns around community safety and unprofessional 
police conduct 
POSA 
18 07/09/13 WOZA Magodonga Mahlangu, WOZA Secretary, is arrested for making 
threatening and offensive phone call to an MDC-T female 
member. Charged under the Postal and Telecommunications 
Act.(PTC Act) 
PTC Act 






























Appendix 7  Community journalists charged by the state and assisted by MISA lawyers. 
Medium & Date Case 
MMPZ personnel 
Dec. 26, 2011 
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) personnel Molly Chimhanda, Fadzai 
December and Gilbert Mabusa arrested for holding a public civic education meeting in 
Gwanda. Charged under  
Section 25 of POSA – for organising a gathering without notifying the police;  
Section 33 of CODE- for undermining the authority of or insulting the president; 
Section 37 of CODE- for distributing materials likely to provoke a breach of the peace 
Ntepe Community 
Radio Feb.10, 2012 
Ntepe Rural community radio station report police visiting the Community Radio and 
questioning the station’s aims and alleging that the station was linked to the Movement for 
Democratic Change and spreading negative information about President Mugabe. (Source 
Studio 7 of 10/02/12) 
Kariba News,  
Newsletter 
December 13, 2012. 
 Kariba News journalist Kudakwashe Matura acquitted on charges of criminal defamation, 
Section 96 of CODE. Charged with defaming Sam Mawuwa, a Councillor in Kariba, in a 
story published in the newsletter. MISA lawyer Tapiwa Muchineripi defends Matura, 
arguing that the state had failed to prove its case because there was no evidence to prove 
that Matura had published the article in question.  
Radio Dialogue 
(Community Radio), 
March 7th, 2013. 
Radio Dialogue production manager Zenzele Ndebele is arrested for contravening Section 
182 of the Customs & Excise Act and Section 38 Importation and Broadcasting Acts 
for allegedly smuggling 180 shortwave radio sets and owning a SW radio receiver without a 
licence. MMPZ argues that Section 38B of the BSA did not make it illegal to possess 
shortwave radio receivers. The police ban therefore appeared aimed at unjustifiably 
curtailing citizens’ rights to access alternative information.                                                                                  
Southern Mirror, an 
un-regisred paper 
July 2, 2015 
Chiredzi- based freelance journalist Patrick Chitongo is sentenced to 8 months’ 
imprisonment in 2015 for contravening Section 72 (1) of Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, for publishing three issues of an unregistered newspaper the 
Southern Mirror.  





























Institution Subject Type of Interview 
1 Moses & Sanyamahwe 1/14 Airtime vendors WhatsApp use  P2P 




Civil society, ICT 
activism 
Email & P2 P 
3 Tania K Gwangwadza 6/3/14 Internet Cafe User ICTs P2P 
4 Raymond Billiart 6/3/14 Internet Cafe User ICTs P2P 
5 Vance Guwa 6/3/14 Internet Cafe User ICTs P2P 
6 Martin Matamba 6/3/14 Internet Cafe User ICTs  P2P 
7 Lucky Magorimbo 6/3/14 Internet Cafe User ICTs P2P 
8 Clifford Makasi 6/3/14 Internet Cafe User ICTs P2P 
9 Dep Min of ICT (Dr Win  
Mlambo)  
1/14 Min of ICT State investment in 
ICTs 
Written Answers 
10 Hilda Mutseyekwa 25/1/14 POTRAZ POTRAZ role  P2P 
11 Mrs Chirume 6/3/14 Min of ICT ICTs in govt P2P 
12 Mr Dhobha 6/3/14 Min Higher Educ. ICTs for rural schools P2P 
13 Bulk SMS company 
Owner 
11/7/14 Bulk SMS 
company 
NGOs, bulk SMS & 
politics  
Skype 
14 Nigel Mugamu 4/9/14 #263 Chat Creator  Social media uses P2P 
15 Pearson Pfuvayi 27/2/14 Web designer NGOs & ICT 
competencies 
P2P 
16 Ranga Mberi 24/1/14 Econet Comms Mobile growth  P2P 
17 Farai Chiweshe 23/1/14 Lawyer- NGOs and 
Human Rights Law 
ZIM laws & NGOs P2P 
18 Wilson Mtetwa 27/1/14 Technomag- ICT 
magazine 
ICTs & phone use  P2P 
19 Limbikani Kabeza 3/2/14 Techzim-ICT 
magazine 
ICTs & phone use  P2P 
20 Eddie Mhonda  Former ZBC 
Producer 
NGO-media relations Telephone 
21 Desmond Kumbuka 7/3/14 Journalist Media laws  P2P 
22 John Masuku 17/2/14 Radio VOP  Media-NGO relations P2P 
23 Buhle Moyo 24/2/14 ZWRCN  NGOs, ICTs P2P 
24-25 Sindiso Moyo & Robert 
Ndlovu 
28/1/14 NANGO NGOs & legal 
environment,  
P2P 
26 Lawrence Gudza 28/2/14 People Action C4D-  P2P 
27 Sharleen Mabisa 26/2/14 UNICEF Mobile phones & U-
report 
P2P 
28 OK Machisa  26/9/14 ZimRights ICT, phones & hrts Email(Email –
nmasaire@zimrights) 
29 McDonald Lewanika 7/1/15 .CiZC NGOs & human rights P2P 
289 
 
30-31 Vimbayi & Memo Kadau 19/8/14 
 
CiZC NGOs & human rights. P2P 
 Memo  29/4/15 CiZC NGOs & human rights Skype 
32 Dixon 21/1/16 Magamba Network Phones & citizen 
journalism 
P2P 
33 Privilege Musvanhiri 21/1/16 Mobile Community 
Zim/Her Zimbabwe 
Mobile Phone security P2P 
34 Precious Shumba 18/1/16 Harare Residents 
Trust (HRT) 
Phones and residents’ 
rights 
P2P 
35 Edknowledge Mandikwaza 20/1/16 Heal Zimbabwe 
Trust 
Phone use by rural 
HRDs 
P2P 
36 Kevin Maenzanise   21/2/14 
 
ZESN Info Officer Phones and election 
monitoring 
P2P 
37 Tawanda Chimhini 26/8/14 & 
27/2/15 
ERC (Director) Phones & voter 
education 
P2P &  
Skype 
38 Ignatius Mafura 11/9/14 ERC Officer Bulk SMS & voter 
education  
P2P 
39 Kumbirai Mafunda  21/1/14 
19/1/15 
ZLHR Hotlines & media P2P & Tel. 
40 HRD 1 20/1/16 OAUS ZLHR hotline P2P 
41 HRD 2 26/1/16 OAUS ZLHR hotline WhatsApp Call 
42 HRD 3 24/6/16 OAUS ZLHR hotline WhatsApp Text 
45 Koliwe Nyoni 3/3/14 MISA Community 
Media 
Phones and community 
media 
P2P 
46 Nhlanhla Ngwenya 18/2/14 MISA Director Media laws P2P 
47-49 Mlondolozi,,Khumalo 
&,Mabhurukwa 
24/2/14 MISA Media 
interns-  
Phones & community 
media 
P2P 
50 Nyasha Nyakunu 19/2/14 MISA Info Officer ICTs & community 
media  
P2P 





Phones & community 
media 
Email; P2P &  
Whatsapp Text 
52 Annie Musemburi 8/8/14 MISA Admin. MISA history  P2P 
53 Journalist 1 18/1/15 Chitungwiza News Production & 
distribution challenges 
P2P 
54 Journalist 2 19/1/15 Mhondoro Pachena 
News 
 
 Production & 
distribution challenges 
Telephone 




WhatsApp Calling & 
Text 







57 Journalist 5 17/1/15 Kariba News Political challenges. Whatsapp Text & 
Calling 
58 Journalist 6 20/1/16 Bubi News Production & 
distribution challenges 
Whatsapp Text 
59 Journalist 7 20/1/16 Hurungwe Star Production & 
distribution challenges 
Whatsapp Text 
60 Journalist 8 20/1/16 Kwekwe Spy Glass Production & 
distribution challenges 
Whatsapp Text 
61 Journalist 9 20/1/16 Wedza News Production & 
distribution challenges 
Whatsapp Text 
62 Journalist 10 20/1/16 Lalapansi Yotaura Production & 
distribution challenges 
Whatsapp Text 
63 Journalist 11 20/1/16 Gweru Eye Production & 
distribution challenges 
Whatsapp Text 
64 Journalist 12 20/1/16 Chinhoyi Focus Production & 
distribution challenges 
Whatsapp Text 
65 Data Officer 14/1/15 ZPP Web-based reporting  P2P  




ZPP Violations monitoring P2P 
67 Valentine Maponga 
Communications Officer 
9/9/14 ZPP Networks & media 
analysis 
P2P 
68 Monitor 1 (Female) (60) 14/1/15 ZPP-Mhondoro Violations monitoring P2P 
69 Monitor 2 (Male) (60) 14/1/15 ZPP-Marondera Violations monitoring P2P 
70 Monitor 3 (Female) (42) 14/1/15 ZPP-Bindura Violations monitoring P2P 
71 Monitor 4 (Male, Rev) (40) 14/1/15 ZPP- Harare Violations monitoring P2P 
72 Goodhope Ruswa 5/15 ZPP Violations monitoring Whatsapp Call 
73 Thelma Chikwanha 24/4/15 Daily News CSO & phone use for 
human.rights 
Skype 
74 Ropafadzo Mapimhidze 27/4/15 Newsday CSOs & phone use for 
human rights 
Email 
75 Tonderai Rutsito 3/3/14 Technomag ICT adoption P2P 
76-77 Stewart Musiwa &  
Givemore Chipere 
20/1/15 CORAH 4ne use in content 
production 
P2P 
78-81 Carol, Vivian, Kudzi 3/9/14 ZACRAS Media laws 
Community radios  
P2P 
82 Patience Zirima 24/2/14 MAZ Media laws & 
standards 
P2P 
83 Takura Zhangazha 3/3/14 Former VMCZ & 
MISA Chair 
Media laws, CSOs, 





Appendix 9   List of Community Radio Stations as at end of 2016 (Sources: ZACRAS & MISA) 
 Name of Community 
Radio 
Location Government or Government- 
Affiliated Radio Stations 
1 **Community Radio 




ZBC Power FM;  
ZBC Radio Zimbabwe 
ZBC Radio SFM  




Private but govt-affiliated 
 
#Zimpapers Star FM  
#ZiFM 
#Zimpapers’ Diamond FM 
#Ya FM in Zvishavane 
2 Nkabazwe  Gweru, Midlands 
3 *Radio Kwelaz  Kwekwe, Midlands 
4 *Kumakomo   Mutare, Manicaland 
5 Wezhira  Masvingo, Masvingo 
6 Berina  Kadoma, Mashonaland West 
7 Hwange,  Hwange, Matebeleland North 
8 *Ntepe,  Gwanda, Matebeland North 
9 Nkayi,  Nkayi Matebeleand North 
10 Vemuganga  Chipinge, Manicaland 
11 Mzinyathi,  Esigodhini Matebeleland. South 
12 Chikombedzi  Chiredzi, Midlands 
13 Getjenge,  Plumtree Matebeleland. South   
14 Hwange  Hwange Matebeleland North 
15 Zhowane,  Tsholotsho, Matebeleland. South 
16 Patsaka  Kariba, Mashonaland Central 
17 Mabhikwa,  Lupane, Matebeleland. North 
18 Wasuwasu  Nyanga, Manicaland 
19 Buja,  Mutoko, Mashonaland East 
20 *Bulawayo Youth 
Broadcaster 
Bulawayo 
21 **Radio Dialogue Bulawayo 
22 Twasumpuka  Binga, Matebeleland North 
23 # **Radio Chiedza Harare Catholic Radio Station 
**Active Stations broadcasting daily.  * Active stations, but only prepare content for broadcast 







Appendix 10  Sample interview questions for different groups of participants 
For Media practitioners:  
• What do you see as some of the problems with, and for our human rights NGOs?  
For Community Newsletter journalists 
• What is the role of the phone in the production and distribution of the newsletter? 
• What are some of the challenges in using the phone in your work? 
• What risks and challenges do you face in producing the newsletter? 
• How important is the Newsletter to your communities? 
For Bulk SMS company 
• You expressed concerns with managing SMS for human rights NGOs in this 
environment. What are they?  
• Can you confirm if you filter NGO SMS texts? 
For NGOs, including the Case Studies. 
• What are some of the challenges you face in using mobile phones? 
• How effectively do you feel human rights organisations and human rights defenders are 
using the mobile phone to protect human rights in Zimbabwe? 
• To what extent would you say your reports have helped international opinion put pressure 
on the Zimbabwean government to change? (To ZPP) 
For human rights lawyer. 
• Which would you say have been the most difficult laws in the country for NGOs? 
• What have been the main points of contention or conflict between NGOs and the State? 
For OAUS activists 
• How useful has the mobile phone become in your activities as HRDs? (HRD2) 
• I understand you may have used the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights hotline 
before. Can you describe one or two incidences when you did. Under what 
circumstances? (HRD1) 
• What would you say are some of the risks you believe Zimbabwean HRDs face? 












Appendix 11  Select WhatsApp and Facebook Arrests (2012-2016) 
Examples of individuals who fell victim to interception of Whatsapp, Facebook by police (*Records drawn from Freedom-on-the-net 
2013, 2014 reports; ZLHR and other media sources) 
Date Activist or 
victim 






Edna Garwe & 
Lenman 
Pwanyiwa  
Arrested on 9/2/16 for photo-shopping President’s pictures into degrading and 
insulting formats and then sharing on FB and on  mobile on Whatsapp application 
with each other. One of the pictures compares number of Zambian Presidents since 






An opposition MDC-T councillor was arrested and brought to court for erroneously 
sending a slur about Mugabe to a Whatsapp group of rural councillors. The message 
was an adulteration of the Lord’s prayer and directed at the President. The sender 
was reported by the administrator of the councillor’s group. He was suspended from 
Council and as at end of Nov 2015 was awaiting trial. 
CODE* 
 
19/7/15 Maposa Arrested and then brought to court on Oct 23,2015 charged with forwarding a text to 
friends claiming that President Mugabe had acknowledged receiving a donation of 
$1500 for ZANU PF, something police charged Maposa knew was patently false. 









Arrested and charged with attempts to subvert and overthrow the govt. Suspected of 
being ‘Baba Jukwa’, Face Book character with 500 000 followers. Character 
divulged ZANU PF secrets in 2013. Police claim to have traced Baba Jukwa posts 
originating from a phone number owned by Kudzayi and his brother, also arrested. 
Offence is one of the most serious in Zim’s law books. Case was eventually 






Arrested for posting on his Facebook page message that the President was dead and 
was being preserved in a freezer in the Far East. Charged with insulting the 
President and passing falsehoods. Case dismissed. Defended by ZLHR. Call 
advising of his arrest made on the Mutare ZLHR hotline. Mutare then advised 








31-year old. Arrested for posting, on his Facebook page, a photo of a marked ballot 
displaying a vote for MDC leader. Given 10-months sentence but served only one 
month after winning his appeal. 
Contravening 
Electoral Act 
7/ 2013 Josaya 
Mahovoya 
(activist) 
Arrested for insulting the Police Commissioner and ZANU PF member through 
SMS. Had retrieved their phone numbers from FB character Baba Jukwa. Police 





Zimbabwe’s first Face Book activist. Posted Egyptian Uprising on PM’s Face Book 
page through SMS. .Police claimed to have traced source of Msge  to his phone and 
retrieved the folder. However, Mavhudzi had a friend delete the FB post. Police 





20- year- old Bulawayo shop assistant arrested for sending a ‘nude’ image of the 
President through her mobile phone’s Whatsapp to a friend. Picture intercepted by 
police after a leak. Charged with “causing hatred, contempt or ridicule of the 
President.” Case eventually dismissed in 2014 
CODE, 
Section (33) 
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